臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

因應專業化分工的需求及產業競爭日益激烈，現代化企業的所有權與經營權漸趨分離。企業因所有權與經營權分離，將導致權益代理問題，進而降低公司經營績效。基於此一權益代理問題，我國立法強制規定所有權與經營權作某一程度的結合。然而，強制所有權與經營權結合有違世界立法潮流，並不符合股份有限公司資本大眾化的理念。因此，本研究欲探討內部人持股比例與公司經營績效間是否存在系統性及非單調線性的關係，以供未來修法的參考依據。
本研究以董監事及經理人之持股作為內部人持股的定義。傳統理論認為，內部人持股比例會影響公司績效，以普通最小平方法迴歸模型進行實證分析。公司經營績效可能透過內部訊息或以績效為基礎之薪酬制度等因素，影響內部人持有公司股份的意願。因此，內部人持股與公司經營績效間存在內生問題，針對此一內生問題，本研究建立聯立方程式模型，以兩階段最小平方法進行估計。本研究之實證模型包含了普通最小平方法迴歸模型、分段式迴歸模型，及聯立方程式模型。另一方面，由於電子業在台灣資本市場中受到相當多的矚目，因此本研究檢視電子業與非電子業間是否存在顯著差異。
就全部樣本之各模型實證結果來看，內部人持股比例對公司經營績效之影響並非單調的線性關係，呈現遞增但趨緩的關係。另一方面，當內部人持股比例介於5％～25％的區間時，內部人持股比例對公司經營績效呈現顯著的正向影響，符合利益收斂假說的論點。至於公司經營績效對內部人持股比例則沒有顯著的影響力。
分別就電子業與非電子業樣本之各模型實證結果來看，內部人持股比例與公司經營績效間之關聯性大致上與全部樣本之實證結果相符。值得一提的是，電子業樣本的實證結果顯示，當內部人持股比例超過25％時，內部人持股比例對公司經營績效呈現不顯著的負向影響力。然而，非電子業樣本卻無此負向影響力的實證結果出現。
本研究實證結果大致上是支持我國相關法規的立法旨意，亦即將經營權與所有權作一定程度的結合，以降低代理成本，進而促進公司經營績效，保障股東權益。

This study intends to examine the relationship between insider’s ownership and corporate performance, observes whether the relationship between insider’s ownership and corporate performance in the electronics industry are significantly different from that in the non-electronics industry, and further examines whether the legislation for the combination of ownership and control to a certain extent is appropriate.
Traditional studies state that insider’s ownership can affect corporate performance. However, recent studies indicate that firm performance can reversely affect insider’s ownership through insider information or performance-based compensation. This implies that the endogenous relationship between insider’s ownership and corporate performance should be taken into account during examining their relationship.
This study not only uses the ordinary least square regression and piecewise regression, but also uses simultaneous equations model which takes into account the endogenous relationship between insider’s ownership and corporate performance. The empirical results of the whole sample indicate that the relationship between insider’s ownership and corporate performance is non-monotonic. When the percentage of insider’s shareholding is around the range of 5% to 25%, insider’s ownership positively affects corporate performance, which is consistent with the convergence of the research hypothesis. When the percentage of insider’s shareholding is beyond 25%, insider’s ownership negatively affects corporate performance, but not significantly.
Like the empirical results of the whole sample, the empirical results of the sample of electronics industry show that insider’s ownership negatively affects corporate performance when the percentage of insider’s shareholding is beyond 25%. However, the research result is not found in the empirical results of the sample of non-electronics industry. Except that, the respective empirical results of the samples of electronics industry and non-electronics industry are similar to the whole sample. At the end, the overall empirical results of this study show that the legislation for the combination of ownership and control to a certain extent is appropriate.

目 錄
第壹章 緒論 ………………………………………………………………… 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 ……………………………………………… 1
第二節 研究目的 ……………………………………………………… 3
第三節 研究架構 ……………………………………………………… 3
第四節 研究限制 ……………………………………………………… 4
第貳章 文獻探討 …………………………………………………………… 5
第一節 代理理論 ……………………………………………………… 5
第二節 公司經營績效 …………………………………………………12
第三節 內部人持股與公司經營績效之關聯性 ………………………15
第參章 研究方法 ……………………………………………………………23
第一節 資料來源與選樣標準 …………………………………………23
第二節 研究假說 ………………………………………………………24
第三節 統計分析方法 …………………………………………………25
第四節 研究變數之定義及衡量方法 …………………………………31
第肆章 實證結果與分析 ……………………………………………………36
第一節 基本敘述統計分析 ……………………………………………36
第二節 相關分析 ………………………………………………………43
第三節 回歸分析 ………………………………………………………48
第四節 敏感性分析 ……………………………………………………60

第伍章 研究結論與建議 ……………………………………………………65
第一節 研究結論 …………..…………………………………………..65
第二節 研究建議 …………..…………………………………………..67
附錄一 我國強制所有權與經營權作某一程度結合之相關法規 …………68
附錄二 營業收入淨額統計表 ………………………………………………70
附錄三 本研究樣本公司明細表 ……………………………………………71
參考文獻 ………………………………………………………………………72

表 目 錄
表2.1 代理理論的整合歸納 ………………………………………………… 7
表2.2 財務比率 ………………………………………………………………13
表3.1 資料來源說明表 ………………………………………………………23
表3.2 變數定義整理表 ………………………………………………………35
表4.1 全部樣本之敘述統計表 ………………………………………………36
表4.2 內部人持股分配情形－全部樣本 ……………………………………37
表4.3 電子業與非電子業之敘述統計資料及差異檢定表 …………………40
表4.4 內部人持股分配情形－電子業 ………………………………………41
表4.5 內部人持股分配情形－非電子業 ……………………………………42
表4.6 Pearson相關係數矩陣表－全部樣本 ………………………………...45
表4.7 Pearson相關係數矩陣表－電子業 …………………………………...46
表4.8 Pearson相關係數矩陣表－非電子業 ………………………………...47
表4.9 最小平方法迴歸模型結果（ROA）
－未納入內部人持股比例平方項……………………………………..51
表4.10 最小平方法迴歸模型結果（ROA）
－納入內部人持股比例平方項………………………………………53
表4.11 分段式迴歸模型結果（ROA）……………………………………...56
表4.12 聯立方程式模型結果（ROA）……………………………………...60
表4.13 最小平方法迴歸模型結果（ROE）
－未納入內部人持股比例平方項 …………………………………..62
表4.14 最小平方法迴歸模型結果（ROE）
－納入內部人持股比例平方 ………………………………………..63
表4.15 分段式迴歸模型結果（ROE）……………………………………...64
表4.17 聯立方程式模型結果（ROE）……………………………………...65

圖 目 錄
圖1.1 權益代理問題與緩和機制架構圖 …………………………………….11

中文部分
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王惠昕，2001，代理問題對公司股權結構與財務決策之影響，國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
沈立平，2002，台灣上市公司股權結構、財務決策與公司價值之關聯性研究，國立中正大學企業管理學系研究所碩士論文
林燈煤，1999，股權結構、投資與公司價值之關係－以台灣上市公司為例，國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
張峻萍，1998，公司監理與經營績效之關係，國立台灣大學會計學系研究所碩士論文
張訓華，1991，股權結構、董事會組成與企業當年度財務績效－以77年度會計報酬率為準，私立東吳大學管理學研究所碩士論文。
周淑卿，2004，經理人持股的多元目的及股權變動分析，國立中山大學企業管理學系研究所博士論文
黃德舜，1998，企業財務分析－企業價值的創造及評估，台北，華泰文化事業公司。
陳宏姿，2000，董監事結構與企業財務績效關聯之研究，國立政治大學會計學系研究所碩士論文
陳迪，2002，董事會、監察人特性與公司績效關聯之再探討，國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文
葉銀華、邱顯比，1996，資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究：代理理論，台大管理論叢，第7卷第2期，pp.57～59。
詹家昌，2002，經理人固守職位、誘因與專屬投資決策，2002年財務金融學術研討會發表論文。


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