臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文利用數量競爭的空間模型探討廠商在受限制空間下的區位決策，並進一步探討分區使用管制政策(zoning regulation)的可行性。
傳統文獻指出數量競爭廠商會集中在一線型市場的中點。 本文則利用對稱的分區使用管制政策當作空間上的限制來干預數量競爭廠商之區位決策。結果發現在雙佔的市場結構下，廠商在區位決策上是分散在管制區的兩個端點上。另外，當市場上有三家廠商競爭時，其中兩家廠商會聚集在管制區的某一端點上，剩下的一家廠商則獨自座落於管制區的另一端點上。
關於分區使用管制政策之效力可分成兩方面討論。首先，在不考慮任何外部性時(即不考慮舒適效果)，分區使用管制政策仍然可以提高整體的社會福利。在此，該政策之效力取決於保留價格與運輸成本之相對水準，及市場上競爭廠商之家數。當產品之保留價格低於某一程度時，分區使用管制政策可以避免雙佔廠商過度集中，進而提高整體社會福利。至於在三家廠商時，此政策之效力則不顯著。其次，當考慮舒適效果時，無論是在兩家或是三家廠商的市場結構下，分區使用管制政策可以透過降低因廠商集中所產生的負外部性，進而可以提高社會福利。

This research introduces a symmetric zoning regulation ﹣that prohibits firms from locating to the middle interval in a linear city ﹣into a location model with Cournot competition to investigate the behavior of firms' location choice. It is shown that Cournot duopoly firms will not agglomerate at the same location, but choose to disperse and then locate separately at the endpoints of the zoning area. Furthermore, without considering any externality, when the reservation price is sufficiently low, governments still can employ a zoning regulation to prevent duopoly firms from locating too close so that improving the social welfare. The efficacy of a zoning regulation, however, is insignificant in the case of three firms. Finally, if an amenity effect is involved in the model, then the zoning regulation is clearly helpful to enhance social welfare regardless of whether the market structure is a duopoly or a triopoly.

1 Introduction 1
2 Literature Review 4
2.1 The Location Models with Bertrand Competition 4
2.2 The Location Models with Cournot Competition 6
2.3 Welfare and Policy Regulation in the Location Models 8
3 Duopolistic Location under Spatial Cournot Competition 11
3.1 Location Choice without Zoning Regulation 13
3.2 Location Choice with Zoning Regulation 16
4 Welfare Analysis and Optimal Zoning 26
4.1 Optimal Zoning Regulation From an Industrial Aspect 26
4.2 Optimal Zoning Regulation with an Amenity Effect 32
5 Extensions 35
5.1 Location Choice with Three Firms 35
5.2 Zoning Regulation in the Case of a Triopoly 42
6 Conclusions 45
Appendix 48
References 49

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