臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近幾年來，國際間掀起了推廣公司治理機制的風潮，我國政府也積極推動公司治理機制。在亞洲金融風暴之後，外國投資機構已將企業推行公司治理列為選擇投資標的之重要評估指標，而善用獨立董事、監察人之專家知識，除了確保外部股東與債權人之利益之外，亦可增加公司競爭力與國際化的經營能力。
目前對國內食品業之公司治理評等系統並無太多之研究，所以探討台灣上市櫃食品業公司在公司治理機制的導入程度與經營績效良窳的關聯性，為本研究目的之一。再者，投資人期望公司有良好的營運成效，而財務分析數據則是客觀檢驗公司經營績效之指標，探討公司治理衡量變數對食品業經營績效之重要影響程度，為本研究目的之二。另外，針對食品業之公司特性，探討是否存在兩兩變數之交互作用，對公司績效有顯著影響之情形，為本研究目的之三。
本研究係以台灣上市、上櫃食品業公司為對象，研究期間為民國91年至93年，以單一年度財務資料完整的公司均予納入，所得之樣本公司為22家，其中上市公司為20家，上櫃公司2家。
本研究根據股權結構、董(監)事組成、管理型態、大股東介入股市等四個構面共九項變數，與公司之經營績效變數：ROA、ROE、EPS進行迴歸分析，探討公司治理衡量變數與經營績效變數間之關聯性。研究結果發現：
1. 董監事持股比率與經營績效呈正相關。
2. 最大股東成員擔任董事長/總經理與經營績效呈負相關。
3. 董監事股權質押比率與經營績效呈負相關。
4. 最大股東成員擔任董事席位比率與次大股東持股比率之交互作用，對經營績效有顯著的正相關。
5. 最大股東成員擔任董事席位比率與最大股東成員擔任監察人席位比率之交互作用，對經營績效有顯著的負相關。
6. 最大股東成員擔任監察人席位比率與監察人席位數目之交互作用，對經營績效有顯著的負相關。
公司治理已是國際重視的熱門課題與管理趨勢，推行公司治理，有展現國際視野之效果。塑造健全的公司治理文化，可強化經營體質，進而擁有因應全球競爭的實力。建議台灣企業之董監事應降低股票質押比率，並應避免過度介入股市，宜用心專注企業長遠發展之經營。建議企業宜延攬專業經理人，聘任學有專精之獨立董監事，制定良好的經營決策，提昇公司之經營績效。建議政府主管機關宜針對法制面全盤檢討，加速推行公司治理成效的評鑑制度，使公司治理的理念藉由主管機關的強制規定，深植於企業之運作機制之中。

In the recent years, it has become an international trend to advocate the enhancement of corporate governance. The government of Taiwan, as a result, has been actively engaged in strengthening corporate governance mechanisms. After the Asian financial crisis, foreign institutional investors have included corporate governance mechanisms as one of the major assessment indicators for their investment decisions. The proper utilization of the expertise of independent directors and supervisors will not only ensure full protection of the rights and benefits of external shareholders and creditors, but also enhance the company’s competitiveness and capabilities in international management.
In this research, targets on the listed and OTC food companies of Taiwan were focused. The research covered the period from year 2002 to 2004, and has included all the above companies with integrated financial information for each single year. In total, twenty-two (22) samples have been obtained, including twenty listed companies and two OTC companies.
To study the correlativity between variables in corporate governance, and the variables in operational performance, a regressive analysis has been conducted in this thesis, based on the nine variables in the four major phases of ownership structure, board composition of directors (supervisors), management styles and involvement of large shareholders in the stock market, against the operating performance variables including ROA, ROE and EPS. The major findings are:
1. The ratio of shareholding by directors and supervisors has a positive correlation with the operational performance.
2. The fact that the chairperson or general manager is acted by a member of the largest shareholder has a negative correlation with the operational performance.
3. The stock pledge ratio of directors or supervisors has a negative correlation with the operational performance.
4. A significant positive correlation with the operational performance was found when the ratio of board seats held by members of the largest shareholders was applied simultaneously with the ratio of shareholding by the second largest shareholders.
5. A significant negative correlation with the operational performance was found when the ratio of board seats held by the members of the largest shareholders was applied simultaneously with the ratio of supervisor seats held by the member of the largest shareholders.
6. A significant negative correlation with the operational performance was found when the ratio of supervisor seats held by the members of the largest shareholders was applied simultaneously with the number of supervisor seats.
Corporate governance has become an important trend in international management, as well as an issue of great concern. The promotion of corporate governance helps to demonstrate the international perspective of a country or an industry. While building up a business culture of sound corporate governance, a company is at the same time strengthening its operational efficiency, thereby raising its competitiveness in the global market. For the directors and supervisors of local companies, we recommend that efforts should be made to lower the stock pledge ratio of the company, and, rather than being excessively involved in the stock market, directors and supervisors should be more dedicated to the sustainable development of the company in the long term. Local industries should endeavor to recruit professional managers and independent directors and supervisors with professional expertise in the industry, so as to establish good management systems and strategies to improve the operational performance of the companies. For the competent authorities, we also recommend that an overall review of laws and regulations be carried out to expedite the implementation of a grading system on the efficiency of corporate governance. It is believed that a mandatory requirement by the competent authorities will facilitate the rooting of the concept of corporate governance into the operational systems of local companies.

目 錄
第一章 緒論……………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的………………………………………………………4
第三節 研究流程………………………………………………………6
第二章 文獻探討………………………………………………………7
第一節 公司治理的演進…….…………………………………………7
第二節 公司治理相關研究構面………………………………………12
第三節 公司治理評等系統……………………………………………19
第三章 研究方法………………………………………………………33
第一節 研究假設………………………………………………………33
第二節 資料來源與變數定義…………………………………………34
第三節 研究架構………………………………………………………38
第四節 統計方法………………………………………………………39
第四章 實證結果與分析………………………………………………40
第一節 基本統計量分析………………………………………………40
第二節 迴歸分析………………………………………………………43
第三節 逐步迴歸分析…………………………………………………50
第四節 交互作用迴歸分析……………………………………………56
第五章 結論與建議……………………………………………………59
第一節 研究結論………………………………………………………59
第二節 研究限制………………………………………………………65
第三節 建議……………………………………………………………66
參 考 文 獻……………………………………………………………….69
附 錄………………………………………………………………………77
附錄一：證券交易法部分條文修正條文對照表………………………77
附錄二：本研究樣本公司91年至93年之公司規模及董事席位數…93
附錄三：本研究樣本公司91年公司治理衡量構面資料……………..95
附錄四：本研究樣本公司92年公司治理衡量構面資料……………..96
附錄五：本研究樣本公司93年公司治理衡量構面資料……………..97
附錄六：本研究樣本公司91年經營績效指標………………………..98
附錄七：本研究樣本公司92年經營績效指標………………………..99
附錄八：本研究樣本公司93年經營績效指標………………………..100

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