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研究生:鄭文宜
研究生(外文):Wen- Yi Cheng
論文名稱:旋轉門關係對會計師獨立性影響之實證探討
論文名稱(外文):Revolving Door and Auditor Independence
指導教授:林嬋娟林嬋娟引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2006
畢業學年度:94
語文別:中文
論文頁數:71
中文關鍵詞:旋轉門關係獨立性裁決性應計數查核品質
外文關鍵詞:revolving doorauditor independencediscretionary accruaaudit quality
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實務上,企業經常雇用前任審計人員擔任高級主管或董監事,形成審計人員和客戶之間的「旋轉門關係」,這種關係是否影響現任審計人員之獨立性,進而損及審計品質,隨著安隆案(Enron)及其他弊案相繼爆發後,受到特別注意。2002年美國國會通過沙氏法案,針對公司雇用前任審計人員做了若干限制。國內企業亦不乏聘用前任審計人員擔任要職,惟目前尚乏完整的規範。
本研究主要目的在探究審計人員於離職後擔任查核客戶之高階主管或董監事,是否會損及審計人員的獨立性及審計品質。假說一預期客戶雇用前任審計人員擔任高級主管或董監事,則現任審計人員之獨立性可能折損。而假說二則預期客戶雇用前任審計人員擔任財務長或會計長,則現任審計人員之獨立性可能折損。本研究採用裁決性應計數的程度衡量審計品質,裁決性應計數之估計使用Modified Jones Model。本研究以我國上市上櫃資訊電子業公司為研究樣本,在民國89年至93年內,共有2296筆觀察值,樣本分為測試組和控制組,本研究的測試樣本不侷限於合夥人和經理階級的轉任,只要樣本公司的董監事或經理人曾在會計師事務所擔任審計人員即歸為測試樣本。
實證結果顯示,相對於其他公司,雇用前任審計人員擔任要職的公司並沒有較大的裁決性應計數,且也不因前任審計人員擔任財務或會計主管,而損及審計人員之獨立性。
論文摘要…………………………………………………………… I
章節目錄…………………………………………………………… III
表目錄……………………………………………………………… V
圖目錄……………………………………………………………… V
第一章 緒論…………………………………..…………................ 1
第一節 研究背景…………………………………................ 1
第二節 研究動機與目的……………………………….….…..... 4
第三節 研究架構與流程…………….………….………….. 6
第二章 文獻探討…………………………………..…………........ 9
第一節 審計人員的獨立性………………………………….... 9
第二節 旋轉門條款…………………………………….….…..... 12
第三節 訴訟成本與名譽成本…………….………….………. 17
第四節 小結………………………………………………… 18
第三章  研究方法…………………………….………….. ………. 19
第一節  研究假說之建立…………………………………… 19
第二節  變數衡量…………….………………………………….. 22
第三節  實證模型…………………………………………... 31
第四節  研究期間與樣本選取條件………………………... 34
第四節 實證結果與分析……….…………………. ……….……. 39
第一節 樣本特質……………………….…………...……... 39
第二節 敍述性統計分析…………………………………... 41
第三節 單變量分析………………………………………... 44
第四節 多元迴歸分析結果………………………………... 46
第五節  敏感性測試………………………………………... 52
第五章 研究結論、限制與建議…………………………………. 55
第一節 研究結論……….…………...……........................... 55
第二節 研究限制…………………………………………... 58
第三節 研究建議…………………………………………... 59
參考文獻……………………………………………………………. 61
附錄一 測試組樣本範例…………………………………………. 68
附錄二 控制組樣本範例一………………………………………. 69
附錄三 控制組樣本範例二………………………………………. 70
附錄四 控制組樣本範例三………………………………………. 71
中文文獻
何思湘,2002,美國安隆公司倒閉事件對我國相關立法之啟示(二),會計研究月刊,第200期,105-116頁。
李建然、許書偉與陳正芳,2003,非審計服務與異常應計數之關聯性研究,會計評論,第37期 (7月),1-30頁。
李建然與陳政芳,2004,審計客戶重要性與盈餘管理:以五大事務所組別為觀察標的,會計評論,第38期 (1月),59-80頁。
李建然與林秀鳯,2005,會計師任期與異常應計數之關聯性研究,管理評論,第二十四卷,第四期(10月),103-126頁。
施妙樺,2003,審計公費、非審計公費與財務報表裁量性應計數之關聯,國立政治大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
洪正吉、彭禎伶與周慧如,2004,會計師助理將訂旋轉門條款,工商時報,12月31日,第10版
洪偉倫,2004,非審計服務、會計師營運風險、公司治理與會計師獨立性之關聯性研究,國立臺灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
胡靜妮,2002,非審計服務與會計師獨立性關係之實證研究,國立臺北大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
張光佑,2003,訴訟風險與審計品質之關聯性-從海外集資的角度探討,國立臺北大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
許淑琇,2003,非審計公費及審計公費與財務報表品質之關聯性研究,國立政治大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
陳依蘋、鍾惠珍與李香瑩,2003,從查核報告了解會計師,第46屆會計師節特刊,52-63頁。
陳依蘋、鍾惠珍與李香瑩,2003,會計師的發展與挑戰,第46屆會計師節特刊,20-29頁。
傅鍾仁、張福星與陳慶隆,2005,審計失敗對會計師保守主義的影響:ENRON案是否存在產業蔓延效果?會計評論,第40期,31-67頁。
鍾惠珍,2002,「從安隆(Enron)案談會計專業相關議題」座談會報導,會計研究月刊,第198期,91-104頁。
英文文獻
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Chang, C., and N.R. Hwang. 2003. The impact of retention incentives and client business risks on auditors’ decisions involving aggressive reporting practices. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 22: 207-218.
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DeAngelo, L. 1981(a). Auditor independence, ''Low Balling'', and disclosure regulation. Journal of Accounting & Economics 3:113-127.
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DeAngelo, L. 1986. Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of management buyouts of public stockholders. The Accounting Review 61: 400 -420.
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Fan, Joseph P. H., and T. J. Wong, 2004. Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from east Asia. Journal of Accounting research 43: 35-72.
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