臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

公司治理向來為學術研究之重點，先前之研究大多著重在於董事會單一特徵與公司經營績效關連性的研究，本論文欲探討董事會執行效果和獨立性與公司績效的關係，藉由透過財星雜誌挑選美國和歐洲前20大企業來探究，共計四十家樣本，在界定董事會執行效果和獨立性則用ISS所發佈的最低公司治理指標，在董事會指標下，我們選取四個關於董事會執行效果的指標以及六個關於董事會獨立性的指標，在公司年報與網站搜尋其董事會是否有達到最低公司治理指標，每個指標皆為虛擬變數，最後加總其兩項得分所得到董事會的執行效率和獨立性分數，而在公司經營績效面則選取股東權益報酬率、資產報酬率以及銷貨成長率。
經由bootstrap實證結果發現董事會的執行效果與公司經營績效有顯著正相關，此結果和假說相符，而董事會的獨立性僅與銷貨成長率有顯著正相關，此原因探究可能為獨立性六指標內有一指標為董事長不可兼任總經理，但一些文獻有提出當董事長兼任總經理時，公司績效是較佳的，另外，有些文獻也提出當董事會外部獨立董事比率較高時，公司經營績效是比較好的，但是我們的獨立性指標為當董事會外部獨立董事超過百分之五十，其公司經營績效會比較好，這兩個原因有可能將實證結果的顯著性降低。

Board of directors has always been the issue when talking about corporate governance. Previous literature emphasized on the relationship between single characteristic of the board and corporate performance. Our research focuses on the board effectiveness and independence. Whether board performs more effectively and directors are more independent have the association with the corporate performance.
The samples are the big 20 corporations in the U.S. and Europe from the Fortune magazine totaling 40 observations. In distinguishing the board effectiveness and independence, we use the minimum corporate governance standards released by ISS. In the category of the board effectiveness, we get four factors while six factors in the category of the board independence. We search the proxy statement and corporation website to see whether the firm satisfies our chosen corporate standards and summarized the factors into two characteristics we would like to analyze.
Our empirical result shows that the board effectiveness is significantly related to the corporate performance in terms of return on equity, return on assets, and sales growth. However, in the perspective of independence, only sales growth is significantly associated with the board independence. Two of the independent factors are “no duality of CEO and chairman”, and “more than 50% of the directors that are outside independent directors”. Some prior research points out that when the firm has the duality of CEO and chairman and more outside and independent directors, the corporation will perform better. That may be the reason that our result does not reach our expectation, which the board independence is significantly related to the corporate performance.

I. Introduction 1
i. Research Motivation 1
ii. Research Structure 4
II. Literature Review 6
III. Research Design and Methodology 13
i. Sample Selection and data resources 13
ii. Corporate Governance Variables 15
iii. Corporate Performance Variables 17
iv. Control Variables 18
v. Research Hypotheses 19
vi. Empirical Model 21
vii. Analyzing Method 22
IV. Empirical Result 23
i. Description Statistics 23
1. Industries of each sample 23
2. Statistical Analysis of Each Variable 24
3. Comparison of minimum corporate governance standards 28
ii. Analysis of Multicollinearity 30
iii. Multiple Regression Analysis 31
1. The bootstrap result of return on equity and the board’ s effectiveness and independence. 31
2. The bootstrap result of return on assets and the board’s effectiveness and independence. 33
3. The bootstrap result of sales growth and the board’ s effectiveness and independence. 35
iv. Summary of Factors Associated with Corporate Performance 37
V. Conclusion and Comments 38
i. Research Conclusion 38
ii. Research limitations 39
Reference: 41

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葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩，2002年11月1日，公司治理與評等系統，第一版，商智文化事業股份有限公司。