臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在寡占市場架構下，策略性決策之使用對於企業間的行為反應以及利潤因而產生的轉變，在文獻中已廣為討論。討論的重心則在策略之選擇與配對如何改變寡占市場結構中決策者的競爭關係與互動影響。企業常因不同的內部組織架構而採取不同的管理策略。有垂直部門化的廠商，將由企業決策核心利用轉撥價格作為一策略，來影響銷售部門的行為反應，以取得整個企業集團的最大利潤。而沒有垂直部門化的廠商，其產品的製造與銷售由單一經理人管理，組織可採取管理授權的方式，藉此透過邊際成本影響市場的決策，進而達成利潤移轉的目標。
研究結果發現，縱使不同策略會形成企業的目標函數有不同的線性組合，但本文証明轉撥訂價與管理授權是具有等同性的，也就是，企業不會因這兩個策略選擇的不同而有不同的市場均衡結果。本文亦建構策略領導者模型與數量領導者模型(或價格領導者模型)，並顯示分別將策略與數量(或價格)決策由同時決策(simultaneous move)改變成循序決策(sequential move)時，在策略領導者模型中，Cournot 競爭時，領導者具有市場份額及利潤移轉之優勢；相反的，在Bertrand 競爭，追隨者具有後動優勢。在數量領導者模型中，追隨者具有市場份額及利潤移轉之優勢，故有後動優勢。在價格領導者模型中，領導者具有市場份額及利潤移轉之優勢。本文亦證明寡佔市場中，一家垂直整合廠商與n家管理授授權廠商，當廠商數超過某一範圍時，管理授權廠商數的增加會致使管理授權廠商愈傾向利潤誘因及垂直整合廠商的轉撥價格趨近邊際成本。

Instruments may be applied to different organizations. Vertical-integrated firm’s headquarters may use transfer price as an instrument to influence marketing division manager’s behavior and maximize profit of the whole firm. Firms without adopting vertical integration may use managerial incentive to affect manager’s decision through a change in marginal cost in order to shift profit.
We base our models on asymmetric instrument scenario to discuss the equivalence of managerial delegation and transfer pricing in a two-stage differentiated-products model. It shows that the use of transfer pricing and managerial delegation has equivalence outcomes, but the increase in the number of managerial firms will make managerial firms’ managers tend to be profit incentive and vertically integrated firm’s headquarters may set transfer price closer to marginal cost. We not only discuss Stackelberg mode but also the instruments sequential move of oligopolistic firms. We find that leader’s output and revenue are larger than follower’s in the instrument-adopting Stackelberg with Cournot competition, the results are reversed with Bertrand competition. We find that leader’s output and revenue are lower than follower’s in the quantity-setting Stackelberg, the results are reversed in the price-setting Stackelberg.

CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION
1.1 Transfer Pricing....... 3
1.2 Managerial Delegation....... 4
CHAPTER TWO: EQUIVILENCE OF MANAGERIAL DELEGATION AND TRANSFER PRICING UNDER DUOPOLY
2.1 Cournot Competition Model....... 5
2.2 Bertrand Competition Model.......14
CHAPTER THREE: THE CHOICE OF MANAGERIAL DELEGATION AND TRANSFER PRICING UNDER COURNOT DUOPOLY: SEQUENTIAL MOVE
3.1 Instrument-adopting Stackelberg.......22
3.1.1 Vertical-integrated Firm is a Leader.......22
3.1.2 Managerial Firm is a Leader.......25
3.2 Quantity-setting Stackelberg.......29
3.2.1 Vertical-integrated Firm is a Leader.......29
3.2.2 Managerial Firm is a Leader.......32
CHAPTER FOUR: THE CHOICE OF MANAGERIAL DELEGATION AND TRANSFER PRICING UNDER BERTRAND DUOPOLY: SEQUENTIAL MOVE
4.1 Instrument-adopting Stackelberg.......37
4.1.1 Vertical-integrated Firm is a Leader.......37
4.1.2 Managerial Firm is a Leader.......40
4.2 Price-setting Stackelberg....... 44
4.2.1 Vertical-integrated Firm is a Leader.......44
4.2.2 Managerial Firm is a Leader.......47
CHAPTER FIVE：HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE UNDER OLIGOPOLISTIC UNDER OLISGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
5.1 The Basic Model.......53
5.2 The Choice of Managerial Delegation and Transfer Pricing.......56
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS.......59

REFERENCE .......64

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