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研究生:蘇志榮
研究生(外文):Chih-Jung Su
論文名稱:雙占競爭下管理授權與技術移轉之研究
論文名稱(外文):Studies on Managerial Delegation and Technology Transfer under Duopolistic Competition
指導教授:王鳳生王鳳生引用關係
指導教授(外文):Leonard Fong-Sheng Wang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄大學
系所名稱:經濟管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2006
畢業學年度:94
語文別:英文
論文頁數:57
中文關鍵詞:管理授權技術移轉固定費用授權權利金授權雙占競爭
外文關鍵詞:Managerial delegationTechnology transferFee licensingRoyalty licensingDuopolistic competition
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:263
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  • 下載下載:57
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本研究主要討論在雙占市場競爭模型下,廠商間技術移轉的發生可能性、技術授權費用的收取方式、以及最適授權費的決定等策略行為,在廠商考量進行管理者授權的誘因設計後會有何改變。
研究結果發現,在標準的Cournot、Stackelberg和Bertrand模型下,擁有技術的廠商,相對於採用固定授權費用(fixed fee)的方式,其會較傾向於採用權利金授權(royalty rate)的方式來向欲購買專利的廠商收取費用。當雙占市場上的廠商選擇將管理者授權放入廠商的策略考量後,我們發現此一結果仍然不變。
此外,在Cournot和Stackelberg模型中,當廠商皆採取管理者授權的誘因設計後,技術移轉發生的可能性會比標準模型、無管理者授權下來的小。但在Bertrand模型中此一結果會受產品差異程度的大小而有所改變。當產品差異程度小時,廠商若皆採取管理者授權,則技術移轉發生的可能性會比標準模型來的小;但當產品差異程度變大時,廠商採取管理者授權下之技術移轉發生的可能性,反而會比標準模型來的大。
In our studies, we studies and compared the different licensing fee policies of a cost-reducing innovation which a patent-holding firm could charge the paten-buyer, and find that: in the basic Cournot, Stackelberg and Bertrand model, if technology transfer occurs, then for the patent-holding firm, it would prefer royalty-fee licensing to fixed-fee licensing. And we also find that in the Cournot, Stackelberg and Bertrand model with delegation, patent-holder would still prefer royalty-fee licensing to fixed-fee licensing.
Besides, in the Cournot and Stackelberg model, patent-holder would license less likely than they do in the basic Stackelberg model without delegation. In the Bertrand model, if the product differentiated level is low, patent-holding firm would license less under strategic delegation than under standard price competition, but the product differentiated level is high, patent-holding firm would license more under strategic delegation than under standard price competition.
Chapter 1 Introduction……………………………………………………………… 2


1.1 Managerial Delegation ………………………………………………………… 3

1.2 Technology Transfer………………………………………………………………4



Chapter 2 Technology Licensing under Cournot Duopoly……………………… 8


2.1 Technology Licensing…………………………………………………………… 8

2.2 Technology Licensing with Delegation………………………………………13



Chapter 3 Technology Licensing in a Stackelberg Duopoly …………………18


3.1 Technology Licensing……………………………………………………………18

3.2 Technology Licensing with Delegation………………………………………25



Chapter 4 Technology Licensing under Bertrand Duopoly…………………… 37


4.1 Technology Licensing……………………………………………………………37

4.2 Technology Licensing with Delegation………………………………………41



Chapter 5 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………48

Reference……………………………………………………………………………… 50

Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………53
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