臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近十年來，國內外陸續爆發企業醜聞，投資大眾逐漸的對資本市場失去原有的信心，因此如何強化資訊揭露程度，降低經營者與所有者的資訊不對稱，讓投資者能獲得正確且及時的資訊，已成為投資者所關注的焦點。此外，一家公司經營的成敗，其最主要的因素在於高階經理人。高階經理人不僅僅影響了公司的經營績效，更決定公司未來的經營方向。
本研究目的即在探討資訊揭露程度和繼任高階經理人型態與經營績效的影響，本研究以2002年和2003年有發生更換高階經理人公司為研究對象。實證研究結果如下：
一、資訊揭露程度與經營績效呈顯著正相關。
二、繼任高階經理人為內部繼任者與經營績效呈顯著正相關。
三、不同繼任高階經理人型態其經營績效有顯著差異。
四、不同繼任高階經理人型態其資訊揭露程度有顯著差異。

During the recent ten years, the corporate fraud and scandal have been happening both at domestic and abroad. The investors are losing their confidence in capital market. The major concerns for investors are how to improve the information disclosure, reduce the imbalance of information between business operators and owners and help investors acquiring the accurate and timely information. In addition, the high-ranking managers are very crucial to decide a company’s success or failure. The high-ranking managers not only influence the corporate performance but also decide the future direction of op-eration.
The purposes of this research are exploring the associations among the degree of information disclosure, the type of successive high-ranking managers and the corporate performance. This research focuses on companies which have changed the high-ranking managers from 2002 to 2003. The research results are as following:
1. There are correlative between the degree of information disclosure and the corporate performance.
2. There are correlative between the internal high-ranking successors and the cor-porate performance.
3. It shows significant difference in corporate performance of companies among different type of high-ranking successors.
4. It also shows significant difference in degree of information disclosure of com-panies among different type of high-ranking successors

中文摘要　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．iii
英文摘要　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．iv
內容目錄　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．v
表目錄　　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．vii
圖目錄　　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．ix
第一章　　緒論．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．1
　　第一節　　研究背景與動機．．．．．．．．．．．．．1
　　第二節　　研究目的．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．4
　　第三節　　論文架構．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．5
第二章　　文獻探討．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．7
　　第一節　　代理理論．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．7
　　第二節　　訊號理論．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．12
　　第三節　　資訊揭露．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．14
　　第四節　　繼任高階經理人型態．．．．．．．．．．27
第三章　　研究方法．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．31
　　第一節　　研究架構．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．31
　　第二節　　研究假說．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．33
　　第三節　　變數定義．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．36
　　第四節　　研究範圍與資料來源．．．．．．．．．．41
　　第五節　　統計分析方法．．．．．．．．．．．．．44
　　第六節　　模型建立．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．45
第四章　　實證結果分析．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．48
　　第一節　　敘述性統計．．．．．．．．．．．．．．48
　　第二節　　相關性分析．．．．．．．．．．．．．．51
　　第三節　　迴歸分析．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．53
　　第四節　　獨立樣本t檢定．．．．．．．．．．．．61
　　第五節　　敏感性分析．．．．．．．．．．．．．．63
第五章　　結論與建議．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．72
　　第一節　　結究結論．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．72
　　第二節　　結究建議．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．75
　　第三節　　結究限制．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．76
參考文獻　．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．78
附錄A-1　2002年標準普爾公司(S & P)資訊透明度衡量．．90
附錄A-2　2002年更換高階經理人樣本公司．．．．．．．98
附錄A-3　2003年更換高階經理人樣本公司．．．．．．．100

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