臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

摘要
本文主要是以加入代理變數的投資模型辨認台灣上市公司投資與現金流量敏感度之影響因素；過去研究投資與現金流量敏感度主要是站在內部資金與外部資金成本上有差異，Jensen（1986）提出當公司擁有過多的自由現金流量時，管理者為了自己的私利，會傾向投資在負淨現值的投資方案上，因此產生代理問題使得公司因過度投資導致高投資與現金流量敏感度；Myers and Majluf（1984）提出資訊不對稱會導致投資者會要求較高的風險溢酬，導致公司優先採用公司內部現金流量作為投資資金，因此資訊不對稱導致高投資與現金流量敏感度；後續學者亦有以公司成長機會及融資限制觀察公司投資與現金流量敏感度；因此本文透過加入變數的投資模型欲了解台灣上市公司投資與現金流量敏感度主要是受到代理問題或是資訊不對稱所影響，並且以公司成長性及融資限制作為樣本分類依據，檢驗其結果。實證結果發現台灣上市公司投資與現金流量敏感度主要是受到資訊不對稱的因素影響，以公司成長性分類樣本結果亦同，唯有以融資限制分類樣本發現到代理問題的現象較為明顯，此結果隱含高融資限制公司有發生過度投資的現象。

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is mainly to identify the factors of the investment-cash flow sensitivity in Taiwan listed companies by the investment model with proxy variables. A key assumption is the cost of internal free cash flow and external funds is different. Jensen(1986) proposed when the company has the excessive free cash flow, the manager will tend to pursue negative investment plans for his self-interest. For this reason, the agency problem causes high investment-cash flow sensitivity due to excessive investment. Myers and Majluf(1984) proposed that the company will first take internal cash flow to be the funds of investment plans when asymmetric information leads the investor to request overly high risk premium. Accordingly, asymmetric information leads to high investment-cash flow sensitivity. The following paper also observe the investment-cash flow sensitivity by growth opportunities and financial constraints Therefore, this article examined investment-cash flow sensitivity caused by the agency costs or asymmetric information in Taiwan listed companies by the investment model with proxy variables. We also reexamine the results by classifying the samples according to growth opportunities and financial constraints. The empirical results reveal that the factor influencing the investment-cash flow sensitivity in Taiwan listed companies is mainly asymmetric information. Reexamining the result by classifying the samples according to growth opportunities is same. In the high financial constraints group, the result shows agency problem is more obvious. This result showed the high financial constraints group itself had already occurred excessive investment.

目錄
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 5
第三節 研究架構 7
第貳章 文獻探討 9
第一節 代理問題與公司投資 10
第二節 資訊不對稱與公司投資 12
第三節 公司成長性與與公司投資 14
第四節 融資限制與公司投資 15
第參章 研究方法 17
第一節 研究期間、對象與資料來源 17
第二節 投資與現金流量敏感度研究假說 18
第三節 研究模型 25
第四節 代理問題及成長機會之代理變數 28
第肆章 研究結果與分析 30
第一節 敘述性統計分析 30
第二節 公司投資與現金流敏感度之理論驗證 35
第伍章 結論與建議 51
第一節 結論 51
第二節 研究建議 52
附錄 54
參考文獻 64

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