臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究蒐集三年高階經理人的薪資資料，進行經理人薪資如何影響廠商研發投資的研究，包含二階段的研究設計，第一階段為經理人薪資決定與調整迴歸式之設定，與現有研究經理人薪資之相關文獻不同的是，本研究的重點在於強調外部勞動市場的運作對經理人薪資決定與調整的影響；第二階段為設定廠商研發投資迴歸式，主要是透過第一階段的迴歸模型與其估計結果，建立不同複雜程度之代表薪資誘因的變數，做為研發投資迴歸式的主要解釋變數。
實證結果顯示，外部經理人勞動市場在經理人薪資的決定與調整過程中確實扮演著重要的角色。我們發現，經理人薪資水準的決定與變化，主要是來自於與外部經理人勞動市場所決定的酬勞行情做比較之後所做出的調整，而且薪資的增加與減少有不對稱的調整。例如，若公司經理人上一年度的薪資較市場決定的一般行情為低，今年的薪資將有大幅度且顯著的增加，以趨近於外部勞動市場水準；相反地，若公司經理人上一年度的薪資較市場決定的一般行情為高，由於勞動市場工資向下調整的僵固性，今年的薪資不太可能有大幅度且明顯的調降。事實上，若高階經理人對於公司的決策具有較高的決定權與控制權，因此即使前期薪資高於市場所決定的酬勞行情，經理人仍有可能使其當期的薪資水準維持上升的趨勢。除此之外，在經理人預期薪資調降，但實際薪資卻調升的情況下，薪資調升的幅度愈大，或是觀察外部勞動市場行情之後，預期的薪資調升幅度與實際薪資調升幅度的差異愈大時，當能提供經理人進行研發投資的最大誘因。

This study collects three-year compensation data of top executives, and uses two-stage model to analyse the impact of top executive compensation on the R&D investment decisions. The first stage is the determination (and adjustment) of market compensation level .Different from the method of prior studies, we bring in the influence of the external managerial labor market on the adjustment of top executive compensation. The second stage specifies the R&D investment equation, which is set up by the first stage estimated compensation level.
We find that the external managerial labor market does play an important role in shaping the executive compensation, the companies will take account the market level when they adjust their executive compensation and attempt to move the pay towards the level. And the adjustment process towards market compensation level is asymmetric for overpaid and underpaid executives. That is, for those executives that have been paid below the market level at year t-1, their pay tends to be increased at year t; on the contrary, for those that have been paid above the market level, their pay is unlikely to suffer a significant reduction in the subsequent period’s pay, and in fact overpaid executives may have their pay increase if they are in a position to maintain their relative pay advantage in the subsequent period. Besides, it could make an incentive for managers to be engaged into R&D investments under the condition that the managers'' expected wages increase but the real wages decrease.

目 錄
第壹章 緒論..............................- 1 -
第一節 研究動機與目的....................- 1 -
第二節 論文架構..........................- 5 -
第貳章 實證模型與研究假說................- 6 -
第參章 變數設定、樣本選取與資料來源......- 15 -
第一節 變數設定..........................- 15 -
第二節 樣本選取與資料來源................- 26 -
第肆章 實證結果..........................- 28 -
第一節 敘述統計分析......................- 28 -
第二節 實證結果分析......................- 32 -
第伍章 結論..............................- 52 -
第一節 研究結論..........................- 52 -
第二節 研究限制..........................- 52 -
參考文獻..................................- 54 -

表目錄
表3-1-1 變數定義-經理人薪資決定與調整迴歸式.........- 24 -
表3-1-2 變數定義-研發投資迴歸式.....................- 25 -
表4-1-1 經理人薪資決定與調整迴歸式各變數之基本統計量- 30 -
表4-1-2 研發投資迴歸式各變數之基本統計量............- 31 -
表4-2-1 經理人薪資決定迴歸式之實證結果..............- 37 -
表4-2-2 經理人薪資調整迴歸式之實證結果..............- 40 -
表4-2-3 經理人薪資調整迴歸式之實證結果-考量薪資向下調降的僵固性..........................................- 43 -
表4-2-4 研發投資迴歸式之實證結果....................- 46 -
表4-2-5 研發投資迴歸式之實證結果....................- 47 -
表4-2-6 研發投資迴歸式之實證結果....................- 49 -
表4-2-7 研發投資迴歸式之實證結果....................- 51 -

參考文獻
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