本研究探討中國大陸上市公司之股權結構對資本結構之影響，除了靜態的考量之外，本文亦在動態調整的架構下進一步探討此一議題。
股權與資本結構之關係不論在先進國家或開發中國家文獻上都多有探討，但大陸上市公司和其股市環境與一般我們所熟知的西方國家有很大的不同：大陸證券市場是伴隨著國有企業改革而發展起來的，國有企業上市後，國家仍然保持對企業極大的控制力；此外中國大陸處於轉軌型經濟類型，其上市公司之股權結構有別於一般國家特別設置了具有中國特色的非流通股﹙國有股、境內法人股、外資法人股、募集法人股、內部職工股和轉配股﹚，因而使其流通在外股數偏低，按照流通性區分又可分為A股、B股和H股等，平均而言其流通在外的股權僅約總股權的三分之一。大陸上市公司的流通股過低及上市公司本身兼具國家企業的特性等特質，使其股權結構與其他國家具有相當程度的差異，相信此一特殊結構會影響代理成本進而使其股權結構與資本結構之間的關係有別於其他國家。
以往相關的研究主要在探討成長性、企業規模、盈利能力和內部人持股等變數對資本結構的影響，而沒有考慮到國家股和機構持股的影響。本研究採用橫斷面和時間序列混合分析(panel regression)就股權結構對資本結構的影響進行實證分析，本文特別區分股權為內部人持股比例、國家股比例與法人持股比例以深入探討中國大陸股權對資本結構的影響。
本文使用中國滬深300指數作為研究對象，研究結果發現，中國上市公司的股權結構是資本結構的重要決定因素，其中國家股持股、機構法人持股與資本結構均為顯著正相關，內部人持股比例與資本結構雖然是負相關，但關係不顯著。雖然這與代理理論所預期的結果有所差異，但在中國特有的特殊情況下是可以解釋的，結果也顯示公司的成長性、規模、資產擔保價值、盈利能力與非負債稅盾皆是影響其資本結構的重要決定因素。

This study discusses the influence of ownership structure on the capital structure of listed company in China. Besides the static models, this study also discusses this subject in the dynamic models.
The relationships between ownership structure and capital structure have been discussed in the developing countries and the developed countries, but the listed company and stock market of China are quite different because the stock market of China develops with the reform of state-owned enterprises. After the state-owned enterprise enters the market, the country still keeps the control over enterprise. In addition, China belongs to the Paradigm shift economic type. The listed companies specially issue the non-tradable stock having the characteristic of China. The tradable stocks are classified into the state-owned share, corporation share of state inside, corporation share of foreign capital, corporation share of collection, staff share and transferable share. The tradable stock is accounted for one-thirds of China‘s market capitalization. Those characteristics of China are different from other countries. And the particular structures will influence the agency cost, and then bring the relationships between ownership structure and the capital structure different from other countries.
Previous studies mainly discuses the influence of growth, firm size, profitability and the percentage of shares held by insiders on the capital structure of listed company in China, but have not considered the influence of state-owned share and corporation share. This study uses the panel regression to precede empirical study and specially classifies the percentage of shares held by insiders, percentage of the state-owned shares and percentage of the corporation share in order to explore the influence of ownership structure on the capital structure in China.
The results of this study find that ownership structure of China listed company is an important determinant in capital structure. There is a positive relationship among the shares held by state-owned, the shares owned by institutional investors, and capital structure. Although there is a negative relationship between the shares held by insiders and capital structure, it’s not significant. Differentiating from the results of expected agency theory, the negative relationship can be explained by specific situations in China. The results also show that the growth, firm size, collateral value of the firm's assets, profitability, and non-debt tax shields are the important determinants of influencing the capital structure of China listed company.

CONTENTS
ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH........i
ABSTRACT IN CHINESE........iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT........vi
LIST OF TABLE........viii
Chapter
I INTRODUCTION........1
Research Background, Motivation, and Objectives........1
II LITERATURE REVIEW........7
Agency Theory........7
The Determinant of Capital Structure........9
The Ownership Structure of China........12
III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY........25
Data Description........25
300 Indexes in Shanghai and Shenzhen........25
Variable Definition and Expected Result........28
Model Design........32
IV EMPIRICAL RESULT........37
V CONCLUSIONS........42
BIBLIOGRAPHY........44
VITA........49

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