一、中文部份
方智強與吳安妮，1997，台灣經理人員主動揭露盈餘預測之實證研究，會計評論，
第三十期：253 - 269。
李建然，2000，影響上市公司自願性盈餘預測頻率之研究，會計評論，第三十二期：49 - 79。
宋義德，1995，管理當局自願性財務預測準確性與資訊內涵，國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
金志遠，1999，董事會特性與年報自願性揭露關係之研究，國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
林淑莉，2004，管理當局盈餘預測態度與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵的關係，當代
會計，第五卷第二期：175- 206。
林穎芬，1989，民營企業最高主管報酬與公司績效之研究，國立中山大學企業管理研究所，碩士論文。
林紓瑋，2001，公司監理、產品市場競爭程度與公司績效之關連性研究，國立中
正大學會計學研究所，碩士論文。
沈中華與李建然，2000，事件研究法，華泰文化事業公司出版。
吳安妮，1991，經理人員自願揭露盈餘預測資訊給外界之決定因素－實證研究，
會計評論，第二十五期：1-24。
莊尚志，2003，資訊揭露程度與資金成本關聯之實證研究，私立東吳大學會計研究所碩士論文。
邱碧珠，2000，資訊揭露程度與權益資金成本之關係：我國資訊電子業之研究，
國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
張窈菱，2005，我國企業年報揭露程度與分析師盈餘預測關聯之研究，會計理論
與實務研討會。台灣大學。
陳美蒨，1993，自願性盈餘預測時點特徵與資訊內涵關聯之研究，國立台北大學會計研究所碩士論文。
陳美娟，1997，年報自願性揭露水準與公司特徵之關聯性研究，國立政治大學會
計研究所碩士論文。
陳建樺，2002，自願性盈餘預測揭露之資訊內涵，科技與管理學術研討會論文集：
507- 518。 義守大學。
黃瓊慧、許周全，2001，機構投資人對自願性盈餘預測之影響，會計理論與實務
研討會。東吳大學。
黃志強，2000，管理當局自願性財務預測揭露對股價變動影響之研究，私立中原
大學會計研究所碩士論文。
蔡彥卿，1990，中美財務揭露系統管制之比較—財務資訊揭露之背景與相關理論
(上)，會計研究月刊，民國79年12月：23- 25。
蔡彥卿，1991，中美財務揭露系統管制之比較—財務資訊揭露之背景與相關理論
(下)，會計研究月刊，民國80年1月：52- 55。
蔡柳卿與楊朝旭，2004，會計盈餘之監督與評價角色關聯性之研究：台灣實證結
果，風險管理學報第六卷第一期：119-154。
楊朝旭與吳幸蓁，2003，總經理薪酬績效敏感性、績效門檻與盈餘管理關聯之研
究，會計評論，第三十六期：56 - 87。
二、英文部分
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Cooke, T. E. 1989. Voluntary disclosure by Swedish companies. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 1: 1-25.
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Grossman, S., and J. Stiglitz. 1980. On the impossibility of informational efficient markets. American Economic Review 70: 393-405.
Holmstorm, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91.
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