自亞洲金融風暴後，近年來國內外相繼爆發企業舞弊案件，公司治理(Corporate Governance)議題逐漸受到各界重視。長期以來從公司內部稽核、董事會到會計師等，這些原應層層把關並相互牽制的機制，卻無法有效發揮其效用，這象徵著公司治理機制出現了弊端。過去研究多探討董事會結構、股權結構及管理型態與公司經營績效的關係。但近年來董監事逐漸成為我國上市公司監理機制的主要核心下，本研究亦進一步探討董監事結構在公司監理機制上能否有效減緩公司代理問題。並以董事及監察人任期作為延伸探討，分析董事及監察人任期之長短對公司經營績效之影響。
本研究以敘述性統計分析、迴歸分析，選取2002年至2004年台灣證券交易所上市的1791家樣本公司，探討在我國公司治理機制下，董事及監察人任期與公司績效之關聯性，研究結果顯示如下：
（一）董事會結構中，董事會規模與公司績效無顯著關係，獨立董
事席次比例與公司績效達1%之顯著正相關。
（二）股權結構中，機構投資人持股比例、董監事持股比例與公司
經營績效皆達1%顯著之正相關；經理人持股比例與公司績效
分別達5％及1%之顯著正相關。大股東持股比例與公司績效達
10％之顯著負相關；董監事持股質押比例與公司績效達1%之
顯著負相關。
（三）管理型態中，董事長是否兼任總經理與公司績效ROE達10％之
顯著負相關。
（四）任期中，董事及監察人任期皆與公司績效呈1%之顯著負相
關。

Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, corporate governance has been the major issues concerning in the capital market in recent years. Academic literatures focus on the discussion of the association between board contexture, stock share contexture, administration style andcorporate performance.Furthermore, considering the quality of board oversight has received increasing attention in recent years. This paper investigates whether the board construction on corporate governance mechanism effectively discharge its monitoring function and mitigate central agency problem.This paper study of relationship between directors’ and supervisors’ tenures and corporate performance.
The 1791 samples are selected from the public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation from 2002 to 2004. This thesis tries to find the relationship between board contexture, stock share contexture, administration style, directors’ and supervisors’ tenures and corporate performance. The conclusions of our findings are as follows:
1. In the board contexture, the scale of the board has a
negative relation with the firm’s performance, but is
not significantly. The ratio of independent directors
has significantly positive relation with the firm’s
performance.
2. In the stock share contexture, the ratio of the stock
held by the institutions, directors and supervisors,
the managers, have significantly positive relationship
with the firm’s performance. The ratio of the stock
held by the big shareholders has a significantly
negative relation with the firm’s performance. The
Pledged Shares Ratio of Directors’ and Supervisors’
Shareholdings has a significantly negative relation
with the firm’s performance.
3. In the administration style, the board of director
concurrent general manager has a significantly negative
relation with the firm’s performance.
4. In the tenures, directors’ and supervisors’ tenures
have significantly negative relation with the firm’s
performance.

中文提要………………………………………………………………i
英文提要 ………………………………………………………….ii
誌謝 ………………………………………………………………..iii
目錄 …………………………………………………………………..iv
圖目錄 ………………………………………………………………..v
表目錄 ………………………………………………………………..v
第一章 緒論………………………………………………………….1
第一節 研究背景……………………………………………….1
第二節 研究動機與目的……………………………………….3
第三節 論文架構與研究流程………………………………….5
第二章 文獻探討…………………………………………………….7
第一節 代理理論……………………………………………….7
第二節 公司治理……………………………………………….15
第三節 公司治理與公司經營績效之相關文獻……………….18
第四節 任期與公司經營績效之相關文獻…………………….31
第三章 研究設計…………………………………………………….33
第一節 研究假設……………………………………………….33
第二節 變數定義……………………………………………….38
第三節 研究對象與研究期間………………………………….41
第四節 統計分析方法………………………………………….42
第四章 實證結果分析……………………………………………….45
第一節 敘述性統計分析……………………………………….45
第二節 多元迴歸分析………………………………………….51
第三節 敏感性分析…………………………………………….58
第五章 結論與建議………………………………………………….64
第一節 實證結果彙總與結論………………………………….64
第二節 研究限制與後續研究建議…………………………….65
參考文獻……………………………………………………………….66

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會計研究所，碩士論文。
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台北大學會計研究所，碩士論文。
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