臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

公司重整宣告不外乎總體環境改變對企業營運的影響、內部經營環境的影響，以及盈餘管理等構面。也因此市場對於不同的重整型態，反應可能有所不同；並且好壞消息公司資訊型態的不同，可能伴隨的反應可能也會有所不同。因此擬研究當重整資訊傳遞至市場上時，可能會改變投資人對標的資產的價值信念，從而改投資人持有的意願，進而影響市場的價格，本研究以事件研究法及多元迴歸分析來評估重整宣告對資本市場的影響。

　　研究結果發現在事件研究法之下，就全體樣本公司而言，當公司宣告重整時，顯示投資人普遍對於重整感到悲觀。壞消息公司呈現顯著負的累積平均異常報酬；並且隨著重整宣告幅度的增加而使得負的累積平均異常報酬增加，但壞消息公司不因重整動因之不同而有不同的市場反應。然而好消息公司在事件研究法之下，皆無顯著的累積異常報酬產生，顯示重整宣告對好消息公司而言，沒有攸關資訊內涵。

　　季報酬之多元迴歸分析方面發現好壞消息公司之非常項目前淨利與季報酬呈現顯著相關。並且仍然只在壞消息公司呈現重整會影響公司的價值。

　　另多元迴歸分析下，本研究控制風險、盈餘持續性、成長機會、公司規模後，卻顯示好壞消息公司宣告重整與三天窗期之累積平均異常報酬皆呈現顯著相關，因此重整費用傳遞特定公司的資訊。

Factors that lead to restructuring by firms include changes in economic conditions in which the firms operate changes in business models, and earnings management. Thus, capital markets may respond differently to different types of restructurings. In addition, direction of contemporaneous earnings surprises may convey different information about firms’ restructurings. This study, using event study methodology based on a sample of restructuring firms whose restructuring amounts exceed or equal to three percent of total assets during the period from 1993 to 2000, investigates the value impacts of restructuring types and amounts on restructuring firms’ equity securities.
The results indicate that, overall, capital markets respond negatively to the announcements of restructuring. However, markets do not react to the restructurings made by firms with positive earnings surprises. For firms with contemporaneous negative surprises, the larger the restructuring charges, the more negative capital markets react to the restructuring announcements. Such negative reactions are consistent regardless the type of restructurings.
Evidence from examining the relationship between the quarterly buy-and-hold returns and earnings before restructuring charges indicates that quarterly buy-and-hold returns are positively associated with earnings surprises. However, quarterly buy-and-hold returns are positively associated with restructuring charges only when earnings surprises are negative. Therefore, restructuring accompanying positive earnings surprises do not have information content.
Further study using multiple regression that controls risk, growth potential and capitalization size indicates that the three-day CARs (-1, +1) are positively associated with the amount of restructuring charges, regardless of the direction of earnings surprises. Therefore, restructuring charges convey firm-specific information in a complicated manner.

誌謝……………………....................................I
摘要……………………………………………………………………II
英文摘要………………………………………………………………III
目錄……………………………………………………………………IV
表目錄…………………………………………………………………V
第一章 緒 論……………………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機…………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………3
第三節 論文架構…………………………………………………4
第二章 文獻探討…………………………………………………5
第一節 特殊項目資訊內涵………………………………………5
第二節 盈餘資訊內涵……………………………………………9
第三章 研究方法…………………………………………………13
第一節 研究假說…………………………………………………13
第二節 變數定義與衡量…………………………………………16
第三節 實證設計與模型設立……………………………………21
第四節 研究期間、資料來源與選取標準………………………24
第四章 實證結果及分析…………………………………………30
第一節 樣本及相關變數之基本分析……………………………30
第二節 自發性重整公司資訊內涵之實證研究…………………34
第五章 結論與限制………………………………………………50
第一節 研究結論…………………………………………………50
第二節 研究限制…………………………………………………52
參考文獻……………………………………………………………53

表3-4-1樣本選取…………………………………………………27
表3-4-2季報酬多元迴歸分析之樣本選取………………………28
表3-4-3 累積平均異常報酬多元迴歸分析之樣本選取………29
表4-1-1各奱數敍述性統計---事件研究法……………………39
表4-1-2各奱數敍述性統計---季報酬之多元迴歸分析………40
表4-1-3各奱數敍述性統計---累積平均異常報酬多元迴歸分析…41
表4-1-4各奱數之相關係數矩陣---季報酬之多元迴歸分析………42
表4-1-5各奱數之相關係數矩陣---累積平均異常報酬多元迴歸分析…43
表4-2-1全體樣本及好壞消息公司樣本三天期(-1,1)之累積平均異常報酬……44
表4-2-2將特殊項目百分比幅度分類以進行分組比較……………45
表4-2-3依重整動因分類之(-1,1)累積平均異常報酬率表………46
表4-2-4季報酬之多元迴歸結果分析………………………………47
表4-2-5累積平均異常報酬之多元迴歸結果分析…………………48
Panel：A壞消息公司樣本…………………………………………48
Panel：B好消息公司樣本…………………………………………49

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