臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

受到民營化潮流的影響，政府也逐漸開放公營事業轉由民間來經營，不外乎是為了提昇效率以達更高的績效，促進市場自由運作。在本文當中，我們採用Hotelling spatial model且假定本國只有兩家廠商，且生產成本相同的混合寡占模型，其中一家以福利為目標的公營廠商，而另一家則以傳統利潤極大的私營廠商，且在無外來廠商進入的情況下，利用逆解法(backward induction)的方式，依序將三階段賽局求出均衡所在。發現在沒有外來廠商干預的情況之下，兩廠商對於各自訂價方面將趨近一致，而後兩廠商的位置卻不同於Hotelling結論，意謂兩廠商將不會同時位在中點，唯獨私營廠商將位在中點，而公營廠商為了避免競爭過於激烈，因此與私營廠商將產生距離，如此產品之間亦可區別出差異性來，最後私營廠商的總利潤受持股與持股策略之雙重效果的影響，將會傾向完全持股，透露出當無外來廠商進入市場取得股權，加上公營釋股後將不影響福利之狀態，若能完全民營化，將有利於福利與私營總利潤極大的雙重目標。

頁次
第一章 緒論.................................................................1
1.1 研究動機與目的................................................ 1
1.2 文獻回顧...................................................... 7
第二章 最適釋股比率分析....................................................13
2.1 理論模型...................................................... 13
2.2 基本分析...................................................... 15
2.3 兩家廠商之價格競爭............................................ 17
2.4 兩家廠商之位置選擇............................................ 21
2.5 公營廠商釋股比率選擇.......................................... 28
第三章 福利分析............................................................32
3.1 價格、位置與持股對生產者剩餘之影響............................ 32
3.2 價格、位置與持股對消費者剩餘之影響............................ 33
3.3 公營廠商釋股對社會福利之影響.................................. 35
3.4 利潤與福利整合比較............................................ 37
第四章 結論................................................................39
附錄.........................................................................41
參考文獻.....................................................................49

中文部分
立法院圖書資料室，(1996)，《公營事業民營化(上、下輯)》，立法院圖書資料室。
余世芳等人，(2005)，《邁向財團化之路－臺灣公營事業民營化12年全紀錄》，高雄市基督教社會互談會。
佛里曼(Thomas L. Friedman)著/楊振富、潘勛譯，(2004)，《世界是平的》，雅言文化，第二章。
周添城，(1999)，《台灣民營化經驗》，中華徵信所。
邱俊榮、黃鴻，(2006)，公營廠商民營化的最釋股比例分析，《經濟論文叢刊》，34:2, 245-259。
翁永和、羅鈺珊、劉碧珍，(2003)，市場結構與最適民營化政策，《經濟論文》，31:2, 149-169。
詹中原、謝麗秋，(2006)，《台灣民營化政策之再檢討》，國政研究報告，憲政(研) 095-031 號。











英文部分
Anderson, S.P., and D.J. Neven, (1991), “Cournot competition yields spatial agglomeration,” International Economic Review 32, 793–808.
Anderson, S.P., A. de Palma and J.-F. Thisse, (1997), “Privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry,” European Economic Review 41, 1635-1654.
Bester, H., A. De Palama,W. Leininger, J. Thomas and E.-L.Von Tadden, (1996), “A noncooperative analysis of Hotelling’s location game,” Games and Economics Behavior 12,165-186.
Cremer, H., M. Marchand and J-F. Thisse, (1989), “The public firm as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market,” Oxford Economic Papers 41, 283-301.
Cremer, H., M. Marchand and J-F. Thisse, (1991), “Mixed oligopoly with differentiated products,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 9, 43-53.
Dasgupta, W. S.,and E. Maskin., (1986), ”The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games,II:Application.” Review of Economic Studies, 53, 27-41.
d’Aspremont, C., J.J. Gabszewicz and J.-F. Thisse, (1979), “On Hotelling’s ‘satibility in competition,” Econometrica 47, 1045-1050.
De Fraja, G. and F. Delbono, (1989), “Alternative strategies of a public enterprise in oligopoly,” Oxford Economic Papers 41, 302-311.
De Fraja, G. and F. Delbono, (1990), “Game theoretic models of mixed oligopoly,” Journal of Economic Surveys 4, 1-17.
Economides, N., (1984),“The principle of minimum differentiation revisited,” European Economic Review 24,345-368.
Economides, N., (1986),“Minimal and maximal product differentiation in Hotelling’s duopoly,” Economics Letters 21,67-71.
Economides, N., (1998), “The max-min-min principle of product differentiation,” Journal of Regional Science 38,207-230.
Fershtman, C., (1990), “The interdependence between ownership status and market structure:The case of Privatization,” Economica 57, 319–328.
Fjell, K. and D. Pal, (1996), “A mixed oligopoly in the presence of foreign private firms,” Canadian Journal of Economics 29, 737–743.
George, K. and M. La Manna, (1996), “Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership,” Review of Industrial Organization 11, 853–860.
Hamilton, J.H., J.F. Thisse and A. Weskamp, (1989), “Spatial discrimination: Bertrand versus Cournot in a model of location choice,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 19, 87–102.
Hotelling, H., (1929), “Stability in competition,” Economic Journal 39, 41-57.
Lambertini, L., (1997), “Optimal fiscal regime in a spatial doupoly,” Journal of Urban Economics 41, 407-420.
Lu, Y., (2006), “Hotelling’s location model in mixed duopoly,” Economics Bulletin 8(1), 1-10.
Matsumura, T., (1998), “Partial privatization in mixed duopoly,” Journal of Public Economics 70, 473–483.
Matsumura, T. and N. Matsushima, (2003), “Mixed duopoly with product differentiation: sequential choice of location,” Australian Economic Papers 42(1), 18-34.
Matsushima, N. and T. Matsumura, (2003), “Mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration,” Canadian Journal of Economics 36, 62-87.
Merril, W. and N. Schneider, (1966), “Government firms in oligopoly industries: a shortrun analysis,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 80, 400-412.
Mujumdar, S. and D. Pal, (1998), “Effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly,” Economics Letters 58, 199–204.
Neven, D. J., (1987), ” Endogenous Sequential Entry in a Spatial Model,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 5, 419-434.
Pal, D. and M. D. White, (1998), “Mixed oligopoly, privatization, and strategic trade policy,” Southern Economic Journal 65, 264–281.
Pal, D. and J. Sarkar, (2002), “Spatial competition among multi-store firms,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 20, 163–190.
Salop, S.C., (1979), ”Monopolistic competition with outside goods,” Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141–156.