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研究生:周于籌
研究生(外文):Chou, Yu Chou
論文名稱:研發策略行為分析研究
論文名稱(外文):A Research of Game-Theory Strategy in R&D Behavior
指導教授:林啟智林啟智引用關係
指導教授(外文):Cady Lin
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:佛光大學
系所名稱:經濟學系
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
語文別:中文
論文頁數:30
中文關鍵詞:研發合作共同研發研發外溢兩階段賽局生產者剩餘消費者剩餘社會福利強迫性消費者壓制性多項式對稱性
外文關鍵詞:R&D SpilloverCooperationNoncooperationTwo-Stage GameProducer SurplusConsumer SurplusSocial welfarepolynomial
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本篇文章的主題研討乃在於研發策略行為於研發合作行為層面的分析,針對廠商間的研發合作行為對廠商、消費者、社會福利三個層面所產生的的影響進行分析觀察。本研究以 D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) 的研發生產兩階段賽局模型為基礎,將模型架構作延伸,並參考Poyago-Theotoky (1995)的模型擴充方式與分析手法,將市場競爭廠商數由 2 家的合作競爭模式擴充為 n 家,並將外溢效果( Spillover Effect )的變化納入模型計算當中,且維持其對稱性。於此設定的模型中,市場共有 n 家廠商,其中的 k 家廠商可選擇於研發階段進行合作,共同分攤一份研發成本,此舉將造成研發階段市場所有競爭廠商數量的減少,因此市場所有廠商得面對研發外溢家數減少的影響,此模型於最後達成均衡。本文探討在研發階段的競爭與合作之限制條件與變動,且於最後求出之均衡解中模擬市場規模數量而給與不同外生變數實際之數值,嘗試分析對廠商之成本與利潤、消費者剩餘、社會福利三個層面的正反影響,進而解釋經濟行為的因由與尋找更好的經濟發展方向。
本文最後得出各項結論重點如下:
1. 合作廠商的研發成本(固定成本)總是大於不合作廠商的研發成本(固定成本)。
2. 研發合作行為對合作廠商的均衡邊際成本產生下降的影響,對不合作廠商則為提高,使得加入合作的廠商具有較低邊際成本的優勢。
3. 研發合作的行為能提升廠商自身利潤,還會對不合作廠商產生利潤的壓低,迫使不合作廠商加入合作,因此有「利潤壓制性」或「合作強迫性」的效果存在。
4. 市場廠商家數越多時,合作空間能存在的 β 範圍越大,換言之,當市場有足夠多的廠商數量競爭時,則幾乎所有不同研發外溢的產品題材都能有合作的空間。
5. 當市場有足夠多的廠商數量競爭時,則合作廠商追求最大利潤之最佳合作家數 kf 趨近於 n/3。
6. 研發合作行為有對廠商、消費者、社會福利皆為正面影響之區域存在於β小於近似多項式 βw(n,k) 的近似區域內,其近似多項式如下:βw(n,k)=0.2177e^-2+0.9678k/n-1.4946k^2/n^2+0.8573k^3/n^3-0.1288k^4/n^4-0.2038k^5/n^5 ,該區域內,市場最適合作家數 大於廠商最佳獲利合作家數 ,故建議政府應鼓勵推動研發合作行為之進行,藉此可增進社會福利。
This paper studied the strategy behavior in cooperative R&D and tried to analyze the degree of effects to Producer Surplus, Consumer Surplus and Social welfare. The model of this study was base on the model structure of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) in Two-Stage Game(R&D and Production stage) and referred the way of extending style and analysis skill of Poyago-Theotoky (1995) to extend the market scale from 2 firms to n firms, and designed the spillover effect in the model symmetrically. There were n firms in the model and it designed allowing k of n firms could choose to make cooperation to be one firm in R&D stage to share the cost, and then all of n firms kept noncooperation in production stage. It caused the result that reduced the amount of firms to bring spillover effect to each other in R&D stage. The purposes of this study were focused on equilibriums calculating and analyzing in the limitations and boundary conditions between cooperation and noncooperation that firms chose in R&D stage, and tried to explain the strategy behavior and find the better way in economic.

The conclusions of this study are shown as below:
1. The investment of R&D(fixed cost) in cooperation is always greater than in noncooperation.
2. The R&D cooperation behavior reduces the firm’s marginal cost in choosing cooperation but raises in noncooperation. It's advantage in cost issue.
3. The R&D cooperation behavior always raises the firm’s profit in choosing cooperation but reduces in noncooperation. It forces the firms have to choose cooperation by profit issue in R&D stage.
4. More firms in the market makes bigger range of β value for R&D cooperation exist. In other words, firms can choose R&D cooperation in any kind of products with different β value when there are more enough amount of firms in the market.
5. When there are more enough amount of firms in the market, in the final state of equilibrium, the optimum amount of firms in R&D cooperation that makes maximum profit for themselves.
6. The region is exist in β value less than approximate polynomial βw(n,k) that R&D cooperation behavior makes positive effect in Producer Surplus, Consumer Surplus and Social welfare at the same time. The approximate polynomial βw(n,k) is shown as below: βw(n,k)=0.2177e^-2+0.9678k/n-1.4946k^2/n^2+0.8573k^3/n^3-0.1288k^4/n^4-0.2038k^5/n^5
In the final state of equilibrium and in this region described above, the optimum amount of firms in R&D cooperation that makes maximum Social welfare and the is greater than , therefore it suggests government should encourage the R&D cooperation to raise Social welfare.
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究方法與架構 1
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第一節 合作研發之定義 3
第二節 研發外溢效果之定義 3
第三節 外溢與研發之相關影響 5
第四節 相關研究之文獻 6
第三章 模型與均衡 8
第一節 賽局說明 8
第二節 基本模型與變數邊界條件規範 9
第三節 賽局流程與均衡 9
第四章 數值分析 18
第一節 研發合作與不合作之均衡研發投入量的比較 21
第二節 研發合作行為對廠商均衡邊際成本之影響 21
第三節 研發合作行為對廠商均衡產量之影響 22
第四節 研發合作行為對廠商均衡利潤之影響與「利潤壓制性」效果的存在 22
第五節 判讀合作存在之β限制點與n數量變動對β限制點範圍的影響? 23
第六節 k群廠商最大利潤之最佳合作家數 24
第七節 研發合作行為對消費者之影響 24
第八節 研發合作行為對社會福利之影響 25
第五章 結論與建議 27
參考文獻 28
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