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研究生:許逸驥
研究生(外文):Hsu I-Chi
論文名稱:公司治理與股利政策-長期驗證
論文名稱(外文):Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy -Long Term Evidence from Taiwan
指導教授:葉銀華葉銀華引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yeh Yin-Hua
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:輔仁大學
系所名稱:金融研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
語文別:中文
論文頁數:75
中文關鍵詞:公司治理股利政策
外文關鍵詞:Corporate GovernanceDividend Policy
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:4
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  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:258
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
基於台灣上市(櫃)集團公司,公司治理架構具有獨特性,其股權結構相對集中且董事會組成趨於家族化,因此「控制股東」與「少數股東」之代理問題嚴重。本研究利用台灣上市(櫃)集團公司2005年及上市年長期資料,驗證公司治理與股利政策之長期關係。研究結果顯示公司治理越好,代理問題越低,股利發放越少;而公司治理越差,代理問題越高,股利發放越多。
該研究結果表示股利可以作為降低控制股東與少數股東代理問題之工具,即Jensen and Meckling (1976)、Grossman and Hart (1980)、Easterbrook (1984)及Crutchley and Hansen (1989)提出之公司發放股利,管理者被迫必須尋求外部融資,將使公司內部經營受到外部市場監督,而且可以減少公司的自由現金流量,解決代理問題;該研究結果亦符合La Porta等人 (2000)提出股利政策的替代模型,公司治理不佳,公司為籌集外部資金,必須透過股利發放,建立公司聲譽,來消除少數股東對控制股東剝奪公司資源之疑慮。
另外,當控制股東現金流量權增加幅度高於一般公司水準時,代表公司治理相對較一般公司變好,則公司較不需要透過股利發放,建立公司聲譽,來消除少數股東對控制股東剝奪公司資源的疑慮。
因此,若公司能有效運用現金股利政策,將有助於建立公司聲譽,消除少數股東對控制股東剝奪公司資源之疑慮,讓公司致力於公司價值之創造,極大化股東財富。
There is an agency problem between control shareholders and minority shareholders because the ownership structure is concentrated and the board of director is control by family in the Taiwan Listed business group. The essay took advantage of the Taiwan Listed business group’s data to prove the long term relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy. The result shows that those companies with bad corporate governance and high agency problem will pay more dividends compared to those with good governance and low agency problem.
The result indicates that dividends as a vehicle to reduce agency problem between control shareholders and minority shareholders. That is the payment of dividends exposes companies to capital markets in the future when they have to raise external funds and hence give external market an opportunity to monitor the inside operating and reduce company free cash flow. The result also indicates that in order to get external funds, company should build up a reputation for not expropriation from minority shareholders by paying dividends.
Specially, when control shareholders’ cash flow rights are increasing above average, that is corporate governance better than others, the companies with high control shareholders’ cash flow rights didn’t build up a reputation for not expropriation from minority shareholders by paying dividends.
Therefore, if company could operate dividend policy effectively, it could build up a reputation for not expropriation from minority shareholders. And then company could strive to create firm’s value and maximize shareholders’ wealth.
目錄
壹、緒論 1
一、研究動機 1
二、研究問題與目的 4
三、論文架構及研究流程 5
貳、文獻探討 7
一、公司治理 7
二、股利政策 9
三、公司治理與股利政策 11
參、研究方法 13
一、研究架構 13
二、研究假說 14
三、樣本與資料 16
(一)、研究樣本與期間 16
(二)、資料來源 16
四、實證模型 21
(一)、股利變數(因變數) 22
(二)、公司治理變數 23
(三)、控制變數 26
肆、實證結果 30
一、敘述統計量 30
二、相關性檢定 36
三、多元迴歸結果 40
(一)、上市年多元迴歸結果 40
(二)、2005年多元迴歸結果 48
(三)、2005年-上市年(變動)多元迴歸結果 55
(四)、多元迴歸結果分析 68
伍、結論、研究限制與建議 70
一、結論 70
二、研究限制與建議 71
陸、參考文獻 72
一、中文部分 72
二、英文部分 73

表目錄
表3- 1 研究樣本-集團市值 17
表4- 1 上市年敘述統計量 33
表4- 2 2005年敘述統計量 34
表4- 3 2005年-上市年(變動)敘述統計量 35
表4- 4 上市年股利變數與公司治理變數、控制變數相關係數矩陣 37
表4- 5 2005年股利變數與公司治理變數、控制變數相關係數矩陣 38
表4- 6 2005年-上市年(變動)股利變數與公司治理變數、控制變數相關係數矩陣 39
表4- 7 上市年現金股利支付率迴歸結果 43
表4- 8 上市年現金股利/銷貨率迴歸結果 44
表4- 9 上市年現金股利率迴歸結果 45
表4- 10 上市年現金股利/現金流量率迴歸結果 46
表4- 11 上市年每股現金股利多元迴歸結果 47
表4- 12 2005年現金股利支付率迴歸結果 50
表4- 13 2005年現金股利/銷貨率迴歸結果 51
表4- 14 2005年現金股利率迴歸結果 52
表4- 15 2005年現金股利/現金流量率迴歸結果 53
表4- 16 2005年每股現金股利迴歸結果 54
表4- 17 2005年-上市年(變動)現金股利支付率迴歸結果 58
表4- 18 2005年-上市年(變動)現金股利/銷貨率迴歸結果 60
表4- 19 2005年-上市年(變動)現金股利率迴歸結果 62
表4- 20 2005年-上市年(變動)現金股利/現金流量率迴歸結果 64
表4- 21 2005年-上市年(變動)每股現金股利迴歸結果 66

圖目錄
圖1- 1 研究流程圖 6
圖3- 1 研究架構圖 13
圖3- 2 台塑集團股權結構圖 25
中文部分:
王麗亭,2005, 公司治理、股利政策及應計品質與公司價值之關係, 輔仁大學會計學系碩士論文

甘世芬, 2004, 公司治理與投資支出之關聯性研究, 淡江大學會計系碩士論文

俞海琴和鄭明祺, 1995, 我國上市公司股權結構與投資、融資、股利決策關係之實證研究, Proceedings of the National Science Council (Part C),第5卷第1期:16-28

洪翔詩, 2004, 公司治理與股利政策, 台灣大學財務金融學研究所碩士論文

盧育仕, 1999, 兩稅合一對我國上市公司股利政策影響之實證研究, 逢甲大學會計與財稅研究所碩士論文

謝奐儀, 2002, 公司治理與融資決策, 台灣大學商學研究所碩士論文

英文部分:
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and H.P., Lang, 2000, “The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asia Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81-112.

Claessens, S., S., Djankov, J., Fan, H.P., Lang, 2002, “Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings”, Journal of Finance 57, 2741-2742.

Crutchely, C.E. and R.S., Hansen, 1989, “A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends”, Financial Management 18, 36-46.

DeAngelo, H. and L. DeAngelo, 1990, “Dividend Policy and Financial Distress: An Empirical Investigation of Troubled NYSE Firms”, Journal of Finance 45, 1415-1431.

DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. Skinner, 1992, “Dividends and Losses”, Journal of Finance 47, 1837-1864.

Dempsey, Stephen J., and Gene Laber, 1992, “Effects of Agency and Transaction Costs on Dividend Payout Ratio: Further Evidence of the agency-Transaction Cost Hypothesis”, The Journal of Financial Research 15, 317-321.

Easterbrook, F.H., 1984, “Two Agency Costs Explanations of Dividends”, American Economic Review 74, 650-659.

Eugene F. Fama, R. French Kenneth, 2001, “Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay?”, Journal of Financial Economics 60, 3-43.

Faccio, M, L. Lang, L. Young, 2001, “Dividends and Expropriation”, American Economic Review 91, 54-78.

Faccio, M., Lang, L.H.P., 2002. “The Ultimate Ownership in Western European Corporations”, Journal of Financial Economics 65, 365-395.
11、Gordon, M.J., 1963, “Optimal Investment and Financing Policy”, Journal of Finance 18, 264-272.

Grossman, S. J., and O. D. Hart, 1980, “Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation”, Bell Journal of Economics 11, 42-64.

Grullon, G. and R. Michaely, 2002, “Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis”, Working paper.

Holder, Mark E., Frederick W. Langrehr and J. Lawrence Hexter, 1998, “Dividend Policy Determinants: An Investigation of Influences of Stakeholder Theory”, Financial Management 27, 73-82.

Jensen, Gerald R., Solberg, Donald P., and Zorn, Thomas S., 1992, “Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt, and Dividend Policies”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 27, 247-263.

Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.

Jensen, M. C., 1986, “Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers”, American Economic Review 76, 323-329.
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La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 2000, “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance”, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 3-27.

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999, “Corporate Ownership around the World”, Journal of Finance 54, 471-517.

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000, “Agency problems and dividend policies around the world”, Journal of Finance 55, 1-33.

Lang, L. H. P, R. M. Stulz, and R.A. Walking, 1991, “A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, the Case of Bidder Returns”, Journal of FinancialEconomics 29, 315-335.

Lee, Y. T., Y. J. Liu, R. Roll and A. Subrahmanyam, 2006, “Taxes and Dividend Clientele: Evidence from Trading and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Banking & Finance 30, 229-246.

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Litzenberger, R. H. and K. Ramaswamy, 1979, “The Effect of Personal Taxes and Dividends on Capital Assets Prices: Theory and Empirical Evidence”, Journal of Financial Economics 7, 163-195.

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Schooley, K. Diane, and L.Dwayne Barney Jr., 1994, “Using Dividend Policy and Managerial Ownership to Reduce Agency Costs”, Journal of Financial Research, 363-373.

Smith C., and R. Watts, 1992, “The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing Dividend and Compensation Policies”, Jorunal of Financial Economics 32, 263-292.

Yeh, Y.H., T.S., Lee, T., Woidtke, 2001, “Family Control and Corporate Governance: Evidence for Taiwan”, International Review of Finance 2, 21-48.

Yeh, Y.H., and T. Woidtke, 2005, “Commitment or Entrenchment?: Controlling Shareholders and Board Composition”, Journal of Banking & Finance 29, 1857-1885.
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