本研究測試各項公司治理指標（盈餘分配權、席次盈餘偏離差、經理人持股比例、機構法人投資者持股比例、董監質押比率與董事長兼任總經理）對於盈餘保守性之影響。筆者延用Basu (1997) 與Wu (2006)對於及時性與保守性之定義：及時性係指會計盈餘認列消息之速度，由盈餘對於未預期股票報酬率之敏感性衡量；保守性係指壞消息較好消息及時反映於會計盈餘，由盈餘對於正報酬率及負報酬率其敏感性上之不對稱衡量。為探討國內公司治理較佳之公司，其經理人與控制股東是否因為存在自利之動機而使會計盈餘之報導較不具保守性，本研究以1996年至2006年國內上市上櫃公司計7,503筆已刪除極端值之觀察值為樣本，參考Wu (2006)之研究並援用Basu (1997)之模型衡量盈餘保守性，發現盈餘分配權愈大、席次盈餘偏離差愈小、經理人持股比例愈高或董監質押比率愈低之公司，抑或董事長未兼任總經理之公司，所報導之年度盈餘較不具保守性。此結果在本研究所進行之三項敏感性測試中仍得到支持：不同公司治理指標之測試、產業別之測試、未刪除極端值樣本之測試。

The study investigates how various corporate governance indices (cash flow rights, the deviation between the control rights and cash flow rights, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, pledged share ratio of directors and supervisors, and CEO duality) affects earnings conservatism. I define earnings timeliness and conservatism following Basu (1997) and Wu (2006): Timeliness is defined as the speed at which accounting earnings incorporate news, and is empirically measured by the sensitivity of earnings to unexpected stock returns; conservatism is defined as when bad news is reflected in accounting earnings more quickly than good news, and is empirically measured by the asymmetry in earnings’ sensitivity to positive returns and negative returns. To examine the earnings reported by the firms with better corporate governance mechanism will be not more conservative because of self-interested motivations of managers and ultimate controlling shareholders, this study refers the research of Wu (2006) and measures earnings conservatism in the models of Basu (1997). Using a sample of 7,503 firm-year observations after taking out extreme data from 1996 to 2006 in Taiwan, I find that firms with a higher percentage of cash flow rights, a lower deviation between the control rights and cash flow rights, a higher percentage of managerial ownership, or a lower pledged share ratio of directors and supervisors, or without CEO duality exhibit more conservative patterns in their annual earnings. The empirical result is robust to the three sensitivity tests in the study: the test of the different corporate governance index, the test of industrial effect, and the test of the sample without taking out extreme data.

摘要 I
Abstract II
謝辭 IV
目錄 V
圖表目錄 VI
第壹章　緒論 1
第一節　研究背景與動機 1
第二節　研究目的 5
第三節　研究架構 6
第貳章　文獻探討 8
第一節　代理理論 8
第二節　股權結構與控制股東 10
第三節　盈餘保守性 14
第參章　研究方法 19
第一節　研究假說 19
第二節　實證模型 24
第三節　變數之衡量與影響方向之預期 27
第四節　研究範圍與資料來源 30
第肆章　實證結果 33
第一節　敘述統計及相關性分析 33
第二節　實證結果分析 37
第三節　敏感性測試 40
第伍章　結論與建議 49
第一節　研究結論 49
第二節　研究限制 50
第三節　研究建議 51
參考文獻 52
中文部分： 52
英文部分： 55

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