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研究生:游士儀
研究生(外文):YOU, SHIH-YI
論文名稱:廠商逃稅與利潤分紅─效率工資理論的分析
論文名稱(外文):Firm's Tax Evasion and Profit Sharing- An Analysis of Efficiency Wage Theory.
指導教授:賴景昌賴景昌引用關係
指導教授(外文):LAI, CHING-CHONG
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:輔仁大學
系所名稱:經濟學研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:經濟學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
語文別:中文
論文頁數:44
中文關鍵詞:廠商逃稅利潤分紅效率工資
外文關鍵詞:Firm''s Tax EvasionProfit SharingEfficiency Wage
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本文依據Lin et al.(2002)的架構結合Wang and Conant(1988)的廠商逃稅模型,藉此分析分紅制廠商的逃稅行為如何影響受雇員工的工作決策。我們發現若政府的稅負政策對廠商逃稅的期望利潤造成不利的影響,在分紅的管道下,會直接影響受雇員工的行為,進而對於勞動市場的就業情況有負面的衝擊。此外,若政府降低對廠商的利潤稅,有可能達到增加稅收的效果。最後,政策當局可以將提高稽查逃稅的比例與罰鍰視為減少廠商逃稅的替代性工具,這與Allingham and Sandmo(1972)的結果一致,然而該政策卻不一定可以使得政府的總稅收增加。
This thesis sets up an efficiency wage model with the role of tax-evading firms, and uses it to analyze the ambiguous linkage between government’s tax policies and tax revenues. We show that the tax on the profit-sharing firms crucially governs the employee’s effort decision, and further leads to a negative impact on the level of employment. In addition, a higher profit tax is not necessarily associated with a higher level of tax revenues. Finally, although a rise of both sanction and fine rates can discourage firm’s tax evading-activities, these policies not certainly have positive effect on tax revenues.
目 錄.............................................................. 1
第一章 緒論...........................................................2
第一節 研究動機與目的..................................................2
第二節 文獻顧........................................................ 4
第二章 理論模型.......................................................8
第一節 廠商的逃稅決策.................................................10
第二章 勞動者的行為...................................................15
第三節 廠商的工資及勞動雇用量決策.......................................22
第三章 勞動市場均衡與政府稅收..........................................26
第一節 勞動市場均衡.................................................. 26
第二節 政府稅收.................................................. 29
第四章 結論..........................................................34
附 錄 .............................................................36
參考文獻............................................................38
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