本研究主要分析對管理當局-董事長及總經理以員工股票選擇權和薪資作為其激勵措施對公司經營績效影響之研究，研究樣本取自2001年1月1日至2006年12月31日、發行員工股票選擇權計劃之上市、櫃公司331家企業為樣本。實證結果顯示公司以發放員工股票選擇權對管理當局-董事長及總經理進行酬償，導致公司經營績效較佳。當公司以薪資當作管理當局-董事長及總經理的激勵，當董事長及總經理薪資愈多則其所帶來公司經營績效愈差。
但將研究樣本分為，企業規模大小、高科技產業和傳統產業、創立在15年以上企業和15年以下企業。各別進行回歸分析，發現企業規模較大、高科技產業、創立15年以上企業，以發放員工股票選擇權對管理當局-董事長及總經理進行酬償，導致公司經營績效較佳。而發現企業規模較小、傳統產業、創立15年以下企業，以發放員工股票選擇權對管理當局-董事長及總經理進行酬償，對於公司經營績效較無提升效果。

This study investigates the impact of executives compensation plans on firm performance during the period 2001-2006. Our study executive compensation plans separately for the president and CEO. We find that president and CEO grant more option incentives exhibit significantly higher levels of firm performance. Otherwise, CEO grant more salary incentives exhibit significantly lower levels of firm performance.
It also find that most of the president and CEO serviced at company belongs to more size, history and electronics industries offering option for motivating them and exhibiting positive effect on management business performance.

中文摘要 ........................................................... i
英文摘要 ........................................................... ii
誌謝 ........................................................... iii
目錄 ........................................................... v
表目錄 ........................................................... vii
符號說明 ........................................................... viii
第壹章 緒論....................................................... 1
1.1 研究動機................................................... 1
1.2 研究目的................................................... 3
1.3 預期研究結果............................................... 4
1.4 研究架構................................................... 4
第貳章 文獻探討................................................... 6
2.1 激勵契約的必要性........................................... 7
2.1.1 高階管理當局酬償計劃....................................... 10
2.2 員工股票選擇權............................................. 13
2.2.1 何謂股票選擇權............................................. 14
2.2.2 股票選擇權之特性........................................... 16
2.3 公司經營績效............................................... 16
2.4 會計績效指標............................................... 18
2.5 市場績效指標............................................... 20
2.5.1 公司多角化的程度........................................... 21
2.5.2 產品差異性................................................. 21
2.5.3 公司風險................................................... 21
2.5.4 公司成長率................................................. 22
2.5.5 與管理者有關的因素......................................... 23
2.5.6 產業別與公司經營績效....................................... 23
2.5.7 資本結構與公司經營績效..................................... 23
2.6 企業規模................................................... 24
2.7 企業創立歷史............................................... 25
2.8 Tobin’s Q理論架構........................................... 26
2.8.1 Tobin’s Q值計算............................................. 27
第參章 研究方法................................................... 31
3.1 樣本選取與資料來源......................................... 31
3.2 變數定義與衡量............................................. 33
3.2.1 依變數-公司帳面價值(Tobin’s Q).............................. 33
3.2.2 自變數..................................................... 34
3.2.3 控制變數................................................... 34
3.3 迴歸檢定-複迴歸............................................ 35
3.4 變數的操作性定義........................................... 36
3.5 研究假設................................................... 36
第肆章 實證結果................................................... 38
4.1 管理當局－董事長薪資激勵對經營績效關係分析產業分析......... 38
4.1.1 高科技產業及傳統產業經營績效關係分析....................... 38
4.1.2 年輕企業和老企業經營績效關係分係........................... 41
4.1.3 規模大小經營績效關係分析................................... 43
4.2 管理當局-高階主管董事長持有員工股票選擇權對經營績效關係分析 45
4.2.1 高科技產業及傳統產業經營績效關係分析....................... 45
4.2.2 年輕企業和老企業經營績效關係分係........................... 47
4.2.3 規模大小經營績效關係分析................................... 49
4.3. 管理當局－總經理薪資激勵對經營績效關係分析產業分析......... 51
4.3.1 高科技產業及傳統產業經營績效關係分析....................... 51
4.3.2 年輕企業和老企業經營績效關係分係........................... 53
4.3.2 規模大小經營績效關係分析................................... 55
4.4 管理當局－總經理持有員工股票選擇權對公司經營績效關係分析... 57
4.4.1 高科技產業及傳統產業經營績效關係分析....................... 57
4.4.2 年輕企業和老企業經營績效關係分係........................... 59
4.4.3 規模大小經營績效關係分析................................... 61
第伍章 結論與建議 ................................................ 63
5.1 研究結論 .................................................. 63
5.2 研究建議................................................... 64
參考文獻 ................................................................ 66
簡歷 ................................................................ 75
表目錄
表3.1 實際實施員工股票選擇權計畫上市、櫃公司產業分佈表........... 32
表4.1.1 高階主管董事長-薪資激勵對經營績效回歸分析表................ 40
表4.1.2 高階主管董事長-薪資激勵對經營績效回歸分析表................ 42
表4.1.3 高階主管董事長-薪資激勵對經營績效回歸分析表................ 44
表4.2.1 高階主管董事長-ESOP激勵對經營績效回歸分析表............... 46
表4.2.2 高階主管董事長-ESOP激勵對經營績效回歸分析表............... 48
表4.2.3 高階主管董事長-ESOP激勵對經營績效回歸分析表............... 50
表4.3.1 高階主管總經理-薪資激勵對經營績效回歸分析表................ 52
表4.3.2 高階主管總經理-薪資激勵對經營績效回歸分析表................ 54
表4.3.3 高階主管總經理-薪資激勵對經營績效回歸分析表................ 56
表4.4.1 高階主管總經理-ESOP激勵對經營績效回歸分析表............... 58
表4.4.2 高階主管總經理-ESOP激勵對經營績效回歸分析表............... 60
表4.4.3 高階主管總經理-ESOP激勵對經營績效回歸分析表............... 62

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