臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本論文除第一章緒論外，包含三章相關議題的研究，主要目的在於重新探討所得稅損失扣除政策的福利效果。
第二章從保險市場存在逆選擇的問題探討是否實施所得稅損失扣除政策，文中應用 Rothschild 與 Stiglitz (1976) 的保險模型建構一個兩階段賽局，分析所得稅損失扣除政策的福利效果。文中有兩點重要發現：首先，所得稅損失扣除政策會改變 Rothschild與 Stiglitz (1976) 一文分離均衡的特質：所得稅率高到超過高風險者的最大忍受程度時，私人的保險市場將不復存在;其次，該項政策具有三種福利效果，分別為所得重分配效果，高風險者之風險承擔效果，以及低風險者之風險承擔效果。當上述三項的總效果為正，則引進所得稅損失扣除政策將使得社會福利水準獲得改善。另外，數值分析的結果顯示：惟有當所得稅率高時，引進損失扣除政策才具有福利增進的效果，不過此時私人的保險市場並不存在;當所得稅率較低，使得私人保險市場得以存在時，引進損失扣除政策的福利效果幾乎都為負，僅有少數近乎於零。
第三章放寬 Kaplow（1992）一文中關於保險公司風險態度的假設，重新探討所得稅損失扣除政策的福利效果。研究顯示：(1) 無論保險公司的風險類型為何，若引進損失扣除政策得以降低社會的總合風險成本，則實施該政策可以增進社會的福祉；反之，則會降低社會的福祉。(2)當保險公司為風險中立者時，引進損失扣除政策必然會降低社會的福祉;當保險公司為風險趨避者時，只要所得稅率夠低，引進損失扣除政策則可增進社會的福祉。因而 Kaplow (1992)所獲致的結果可視為本文的一個特例。(3) 引進損失扣除政策後，當保險公司為風險中立者時，保險公司的風險成本沒有改變，投保人的風險成本則會增加；當保險公司為風險趨避者時，保險公司的風險成本會降低，至於投保人的風險成本則未定。另外，數值分析的結果顯示：引進損失扣除政策會降低社會的總合風險成本，因而社會的福祉得以上升。
第四章主要乃是仿照Kaplow （1991）的模型，並延續第三章放寬保險公司風險態度的假設，將所得稅損失扣除政策內生化並將道德危機導入保險市場，此一課題可以更一般化的驗證第三章所獲致的結果，我們的研究顯示，即使在所得稅損失扣除政策為內生化以及保險市場包含道德危機的情況下，若保險公司為風險趨避者，則引進損失扣除政策可以增進社會的福祉。

謝辭 i
摘要 ii
目錄 iv
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 逆選擇問題與所得稅損失扣除政策的福利效果 4
2.1 前言 4
2.2 Kaplow 的問題 8
2.3 基本模型 10
2.3.1 求解次賽局均衡 11
2.3.2 保險公司的策略 12
2.3.3 福利之比較 18
2.3.4 數值分析 22
2.4 擴充與討論 24
2.5 結論 24
數學附錄 26
附圖、表 27
第三章 保險公司風險態度與所得稅損失扣除政策的福利效果 31
3.1 前言 31
3.2 基本模型 34
3.2.1 求解次賽局均衡 35
3.2.2 保險公司的策略 36
3.3 福利之比較 38
3.3.1 解析保險公司與投保人個別的風險成本的變化 41
3.4 數值分析 44
3.5 結論 45
數學附錄 47
附表 48
第四章 道德危機問題與所得稅損失扣除政策的福利效果 50
4.1 前言 50
4.2 基本模型 51
4.2.1 求解次賽局均衡 53
4.2.2 保險公司的策略 54
4.2.3 政府的決策 57
4.3 結論 61
數學附錄 62
第五章 結論 63
參考文獻 64

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