本文以Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007)所使用的模型為基礎，研究公司治理對公司價值、現金持有價值以及股利的影響。以市值對淨資產比、資產報酬率(以同產業的平均ROA調整後)為衡量公司價值的變數。而以內部人的行為和公司監督機制2項指標來衡量公司治理。其中，公司內部人行為指標包括：董監質押比、盈餘股份比、關係人融資比。公司監督治理機制指標包括：法人持股比、大股東持股比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比、外部持股比。
以民國85-95年上市櫃公司為研究對象，以panel data之fix effect方式進行分析，實證結果顯示(一)對公司價值影響方面：盈餘股份比和法人持股比與公司價值呈現顯著正向關係；而董監質押比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比與公司價值呈負向關係。(二)在現金持有價值影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對現金持有價值影響為顯著負向，並無發現監督機制對現金持有價值有正向影響。(三)在股利影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對股利的影響為顯著正向，並無發現監督機制對股利有負向影響。整體來看，公司治理對公司價值確有影響，但對現金持有價值和股利的影響方面，並沒有發現如Pinkowitz et al. (2006)之實證結果。

Based on Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007) valuation models, I investigate how the corporate governance affects the contribution of cash holdings and dividends to firm value. Firm value was measured by market value to book value ratio and the adjusted return on assets. We use two major categories of corporate governance measures including the degree of insider acting and the presence of shareholder monitoring. The degree of insider acting includes the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged (dsip) , the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp). The shareholder monitoring includes institutional holding(ihp), large shareholder holding(mhp), the ratio of independent directors and supervisors(idsp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors(ocp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors holding(ohp).
Firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC during 1995-2006 are selected as the sample. The empirical results indicate that the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and institutional holding(ihp) are significantly and positively related to market value and return on assets. Second, the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly and negatively related to the value of cash holding. We didn’t find the shareholder monitoring significantly increase the cash holding value. Finally, only the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip) and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly related to dividends value. The conclusion is that although corporate government affects firm value, corporate government doesn’t significantly determines the value of cash holding and dividends. That empirical result is not consistent with the one of Pinkowitz et al. (2006).

第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機……………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的……………………………………………………………2
第三節 研究架構……………………………………………………………2

第二章 文獻探討……………………………………………………………4
第一節 公司治理變數與公司價值之間的關係……………………………4
第二節 公司治理與現金持有價值及股利之關係…………………………9
第三節 研究假設 …………………………………………………………12

第三章 研究設計……………………………………………………………16
第一節 資料來源……………………………………………………………16
第二節 研究方法……………………………………………………………16
第三節 變數定義……………………………………………………………20

第四章 實證結果分析………………………………………………………25
第一節 敘述統計分析………………………………………………………25
第二節 迴歸分析……………………………………………………………30

第五章 研究結論與建議……………………………………………………37
第一節 研究結論……………………………………………………………37
第二節 研究建議……………………………………………………………40
參考文獻 ……………………………………………………………………41
附錄 迴歸結果 ………………………………………………………………44

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