臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

過去認為賣家評價對於價格是正、統計上顯著地影響價格，但是這影響卻不大，我們建立一個模型去解釋是兩種正負關係互相抵消，造成觀察到的結果是很小的情況。具體的說，賣家需要高評價分數去銷售高單價商品，而累積評價分數快速又低成本的方法就是利用低單價商品，利用降低低單價商品價格，讓銷售量增加的更快，銷售量增加快，評價就會增加快速。所以評價對於低價商品是一種負的關係，對於高單價商品才是正的關係。

It has been recognized empirically that in internet auctions, seller's reputation has a positive, statistically significant, but small impact on the price. We construct a model on internet auctions and delineate this small impact with two opposite forces. To be specific, it needs higher reputation for sellers to sell high-price goods and a cheap way to achieve this objective is to lower the price of low-price goods. By this way one can raise the sale volume of low-price commodities to increase reputation score quickly, which benefits the sale of high-price goods. Therefore, reputation imposes positive impact on prices of "expensive" goods and negative impact on prices of "cheap" ones.

1.INTRODUCTION.........................................3

2. LITERATURE DISCUSSION SURVEY........................9

3. BASIC MODEL.........................................11

3.1 Traders' Behavior...........................11

3.2 Commodities and Reputation .................14

3.2.1 Low Price Commodity....................14

3.2.2 High Price Commodity...................15

3.2.3 Reputation and Sales Volume............15

4. MAIN RESULTS........................................16

5. FURTHER EXTENSION AND DISCUSSION....................24

5.1 The Extensive Form of High Price Sale Volume...24

5.2 When Sellers Have Sufficiently High Reputation.24

6. CONCLUSION...........................................28

REFERENCES...............................................29

[1]Anderson, S., Friedman, D., Milam, G., and Singh, N. (2004), "Seller Strategies on eBay" UCSC Working paper.

[2]Budish, E.B. and Takeyama L.N. (2001), "Buy Price in Online Auctions: Irrationality on the Internet?" Economics Letters, 72, 325-33.

[3]Houser, D and Wooders, J.(2005), "Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay" University of Arizona Working paper.

[4]Kirkegaard, R. and Overgaard, P.B.(2007), "Buy-Out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demand," Brock University, Canada Working paper.

[5]Livingson, J.A. (2005), "How Valuable is a Good Reputation? A Simple Selection Model of Internet Auctions," Review of Economics and Statistics, 87, 453-65.

[6]Mathews, T. (2004), "The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Buy-out Option: a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay's But-It-Now Feature," Journal of Economics, 81, 25-52.

[7]Mathews, T. and B. Katzman (2006), "The Role of Varying Risk Attitudes in an Auction with a Buyout Option," Economic Theory, 27, 597-613.

[8]Melnik, M. and Alm, J. (2002), "Does A Seller's Ecommerce Reputation Matter? Evidence from eBay Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, 50, 337-349.

[9]Shapiro, C. (1983), "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputation," Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 659-680.