臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

探討財政分權政策對於經濟成長影響的文獻中，並未有一致性的結論。已存在研究主要以政府支出性質以及稅制結構的不同等財政領域的觀點來解釋。本文納入貪污因素，建構一個結合貪污與財政分權的內生成長模型探討財政分權政策對於經濟成長的影響。研究發現財政分權政策會透過兩種管道影響經濟成長；第一種管道是財政分權對中央與地方資源配置的直接效果，存在一最適財政分權程度，過與不及都不利經濟成長；第二種管道是財政分權會提高貪污而間接影響經濟成長。藉此可以解釋為何在實證文獻中，開發中國家的財政分權與經濟成長關係多呈現為負相關或無顯著的關係，因為開發中國家的貪污情形或比已開發國家來得嚴重，且地方民主制度較不健全。因此開發中國家若要以已開發國家為標竿而實施財政分權政策，在未健全政治和法律等社會制度前，可能未蒙其利先受其害。

Existing literatures do not reach the consensus of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. Previous studies focused on characteristics of government expenditure and varieties of taxation. Incorporating corruption, we investigate the linkage between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in an endogenous growth model. We find fiscal decentralization affects economic growth through two ways. One way is through resource reallocation between different levels of government. The other way is through corruption on growth. Based on the findings, we can explain the existing empirical results that the correlation between fiscal decentralization and the economic growth is negative or not significant in the developing countries since these countries are usually plagued by corruption as well as defective political and legal systems comparing to those of developed countries. If the developing countries attempt to conduct fiscal decentralization without improving their political and legal system, they might suffer from such decentralization.

第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻回顧 6
第一節 財政分權與經濟成長之理論文獻回顧 6
第二節 財政分權與經濟成長之實證文獻回顧 9
第三節 貪污的相關文獻回顧 16
第三章 理論模型 21
第一節 基本模型建立 22
第二節 比較靜態分析 29
第三節 將貪污視為內生變數之延伸 34
第四節 各政策對經濟成長影響之分析 37
第四章 數値模擬分析 42
第一節 貪污為外生參數時之比較靜態模擬分析 44
第二節 貪污為內生變數時之政策效果模擬分析 49
第五章 結論與政策建議 53
參考文獻 55

一、中文部分
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2.陳明郎：《經濟成長》，（台北：華泰文化事業股份有限公司，初版，1999年5月）。
3.陳桂棣、吳春桃：《中國農民調查》，(台北：大地出版社，初版，2004年12月)。
4.賴景昌：《總體經濟學》，(台北市：雙葉書廊出版，一版，民國90年)。

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