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研究生:林筱婷
研究生(外文):Siao-Ting Lin
論文名稱:銀行在企業董監事會對企業資本結構之影響
論文名稱(外文):The impact of banker in board on debt ratio of firm
指導教授:郭憲章郭憲章引用關係賴怡洵賴怡洵引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsien-Chang KuoYi-Hsun Lai
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立暨南國際大學
系所名稱:財務金融學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
語文別:中文
論文頁數:52
中文關鍵詞:資本結構銀行融資公司治理董監事會
外文關鍵詞:Capital structureBanks financingCorporate governanceBoards of directors
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:2
  • 點閱點閱:306
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  • 下載下載:84
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
本研究是在探討銀行進入企業董監事會對企業資本結構的影響,進而討論銀行在企業董監事會提供的服務與主要扮演的角色為何。我們的研究利用二階段程序法聯立迴歸模型。主要的實證結果發現:(1)臺灣上市公司有銀行進入企業董監事會將有顯著的長期負債比率上升,代表銀行進入企業董監事會具有提供專業負債認證的服務;(2)在整體及大企業樣本下,放款銀行進入企業董監事會會增加企業長期負債比率,而放款銀行在企業董監事會的存續期間愈長並不會減緩長期負債比率對可供擔保資產比率的敏感度,故放款銀行進入企業董監事會有不盡力的監督行為,且此不盡力的監督行為係來自於先借款再進入企業董監事會的放款銀行所產生;(3)在小企業樣本下,放款銀行進入企業董監事會會促使企業長期負債比率下降,且當放款銀行在企業董監事會的存續期間愈長時,會減緩企業長期負債比率對可供擔保資產比率的敏感度,故放款銀行為小企業會提供了監督功能,且此一監督功能係來自先借款再進入企業董監事會的放款銀行。
The primary purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact that bankers on the board are a firm’s debt ratio. Then discussing bankers service that offer on the board and analyze what it will be role that act mainly. Our research is utilized method of two-stage simultaneous estimation procedure. The empirical results show that 1 .bankers on a firm’s board positively and significantly affects the long debt ratio. The results suggest that bankers provide expertise and certification; 2.in total sample and large firm sample, lending bankers also positively and significantly affects the long debt ratio. the longer lending bankers, the more sensitive is its debt ratio to the collateral, raising debt ratio implies that lending bankers are the “disabled monitors” roles. Disabled monitors exist in the sample that enters the firm’s board after financing activity.; 3.in contrast, in small firm sample, lending bankers on a firm’s board negatively affects the debt ratio. the longer lending bankers, the less sensitive is its debt ratio to the collateral. The results suggest that lending bankers exercise a monitoring role for small firm. monitors exist in the sample that enters the firm’s board before financing activity.
第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機……………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的……………………………………………………………………3
第三節 研究架構與流程……………………………………………………………3
第二章 文獻探討……………………………………………………………………5
第一節 銀行與企業往來關係………………………………………………………5
第二節 銀行持股、進入企業董監事會的利益與成本……………………………6
第三節 銀行進入董監事會的企業特性與自身利益衝突問題……………………7
第四節 銀行進入企業董監事會的放款條件………………………………………8
第五節 銀行進入企業董監事會的角色……………………………………………8
第三章 研究方法……………………………………………………………………11
第一節 資料與樣本…………………………………………………………………11
第二節 模型建立與研究假說………………………………………………………11
第四章 實證結果與分析……………………………………………………………22
第一節 敘述性統計分析……………………………………………………………22
第二節 銀行進入企業董監事會與企業資本結構之關係…………………………27
第三節 銀行在企業董監事會對可供擔保資產比率與企業長期負債比率之關係36
第四節 外生控制變數對企業長期負債比率之影響………………………………38
第五節 研究討論……………………………………………………………………44
第五章 結論與建議…………………………………………………………………47
第一節 結論…………………………………………………………………………47
第二節 建議…………………………………………………………………………48
參考文獻 ……………………………………………………………………………49
莊永津(民91)「銀行有無進入董監事會與公司特性及放款條件之關係」,中興大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
賴怡洵、陳家彬、何加政(民96)「台灣地區銀行進入企業董監事會之決定因素:代理成本與放款者利益衝突假說」財務金融學術研討會,台灣財務金融學會。
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