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研究生:劉顯仲
研究生(外文):John S. Liu
論文名稱:成群結隊的董事們:董事多重連結研究
論文名稱(外文):Multiple Interlocks of Corporate directors
指導教授:楊千楊千引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chyan Yang
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立交通大學
系所名稱:經營管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
語文別:英文
論文頁數:54
中文關鍵詞:公司治理董事會連結董事會多重連結關聯網路
外文關鍵詞:Corporate governanceInterlocking directoratesMultiple interlocksAffiliation networks
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  • 被引用被引用:1
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董事會與董事行為是公司治理研究的重要議題,本研究探討董事行為的一個普遍但是未曾被仔細探討的現象–董事成群結隊。董事成群結隊是指兩位董事同時擔任相同兩家或更多公司的董事或者是多位董事同時擔任相同兩家或更多公司的董事。傳統的董事會連結文獻稱此種現象稱為多重連結。多重連結普遍存在,例如在國內 (2004年12月資料),徐旭東與席家宜兩位先生同時擔任亞泥、遠紡、宏遠、東聯、遠東商銀等五家公司董事,是雙重連結到五家公司。許勝雄、柯長崎與郭賢明三位先生同時擔任金寶、統寶、建榮等三家公司董事,是三重連結到三家公司。嚴凱泰、陳莉蓮、蘇慶陽、吳舜文、徐善可、戚維功、陳國榮、黃日燦、黃文成等九位先生女士同時擔任裕隆與中華兩家公司董事,是九重連結到兩家公司。
本研究嘗試解答三個問題。第ㄧ個問題,董事多重連結是巧合抑或是有意識的行為?第二,多重連結如果是策略性的行為,參與如此行為的董事以及董事會有何特徵?又為了什麼原因?第三,董事成群結隊對公司績效的影響是正面或者是負面的?
本研究提出一個成群結隊的社會網路模型以探討第ㄧ個問題,經由電腦模擬比較隨機網路與成群結隊模型產生的網路,發現成群結隊模型產生的網路遠比隨機網路更近似真實世界的董事會網路。因此推斷董事多重連結並不是隨機行為。第二以及第三個問題則經由統計分析台灣2005年董事會資料來解答。迴歸分析結果顯示,控制大量國內公司資產的董事、擁有ㄧ家公司多數股份的董事以及內部董事比較會參與多重連結。最後,董事會中有成群結隊董事的公司,績效較差。
摘 要 i
ABSTRACT ii
誌 謝 iv
LIST OF TABLES vii
LIST OF FIGURES viii
LIST OF SYMBOLS ix
1. Introduction 1
1.1 The importance of corporate governance 1
1.2 Multiple interlocks and interlocking directorates 1
1.3 The network view on multiple interlocks 3
1.4 Research objectives 5
1.5 Research flow 6
1.6 Position of this research in the literature 7
1.7 Organization of the document 7
2. Literature Review 8
2.1 General corporate governance 8
2.2 Interlocking directorates and multiple interlocks 9
2.3 Affiliation network models 11
3. Herding Measures 14
3.1 Bipartite clustering coefficient 14
3.2 Social inertia 16
3.3 Redundancy 16
3.4 Herding balance 16
4. Board of directors network in Taiwan 18
4.1 Sample 18
4.2 Constructing the networks 18
4.3 General statistics of the affiliation network 20
4.4 Statistics regarding multiple interlocks 20
5. Simulating the herding phenomenon 25
5.1 Simulation procedure 25
5.2 Simulation results 26
5.3 Summaries 30
5.4 Discussions 31
6. Statistical analysis 32
6.1 Hypotheses 32
6.2 Data and regression method 36
6.3 Empirical results 42
6.4 Summaries 43
6.5 Discussions 44
7. Conclusions 47
7.1 Conclusions 47
7.2 Suggestions future research 48
REFERENCES 49
APPENDIX 53
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