臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本篇是有關母公司轉投資新事業失敗原因之探討的個案研究。個案公司是一間通路代理商，為避免原產品供應商跳過代理自行販售，因而進行非本業的策略佈局，轉型投資新事業製造自有產品。新事業在一段時間運作下來並無法達到損益平衡，在持續虧損之下，衍生出原董事長與新事業部負責人的信任問題，以及後續委派資深經理人進入救援的變革議題。進入求援階段，個案公司仍然未見起色，最後放棄新產品事業。本研究歸納上述失敗原因，透過「核心能力」、「跨越鴻溝」、「破壞式創新」、「代理理論」及「變革理論」進行分析後發現：
1.核心能力並不如想像中容易轉移，重新建立往往需要長時間投入
2.新產品若不能鎖住某一特定客戶群，產生一定的量，將掉入鴻溝；具低階市場破壞式創新的技術，主事者的承諾及組織能持續的能耐是突破原技術並取代其市場的關鍵因素。
3.專業經理人股權比例不大及營運績效不佳，將使得兩造之間的代理問題更加嚴重。
4.委託資深經理進行變革，雖然解決代理問題，但一開始的策略投資錯誤，將使得原組織持續虧損，要止血，只能逐步退出事業範疇，最後缺乏自行創造收益的能力之下，將無法生存。

This is a case study of failure analyses about a manufacturing company diversified from a successful trading service company. The company X is a commerce agent. For avoiding the threat from suppliers’ going direct the company X decided to diversify itself into a new business to manufacture its own products. The trust issues between the board and the division general managers emerge as the new business cannot make a break-even and keep losing money after operating for a period of time. Under such a critical situation, the new change agent was assigned by the board to make a turn-around. Nevertheless the operation of the new business was not improved and the board finally abandoned the whole new business. The case was analyzed from various theoretical perspectives with the following findings:
1.It is difficult of core competence transfer as it takes a long time to acquire.
2.If a new product fails to win the specific buyers over it is very likely to fall into the chasm; the penetration of a low-end disruptive innovation technology demands the high commitment of owners and sustained capability of the organization.
3.The agency problem would become worse if business continued losing money and general managers of the new business own only minor equities.
4.The room of making change is quite limited if the initial strategy is wrong. The only way to stop loss is to withdraw gradually or completely if the new business unit cannot generate income by current products.

摘要 i
Abstract ii
致謝辭 iii
目錄 iv
圖目錄 v
表目錄 vi
一、緒論 1
1.1. 研究動機與背景 1
1.2. 研究目的 3
二、文獻探討 4
2.1. 核心競爭力 4
2.2. 跨越鴻溝 7
2.3. 代理問題 13
2.4. 變革理論 16
2.5. 破壞性創新 20
三、研究方法 28
3.1. 研究架構 28
3.2. 個案研究 29
四、個案分析 31
4.1. 產業概況簡介 31
4.2. 個案公司簡介及問題描述 47
4.3. 企業危機之挽救過程 48
4.4. 失敗原因之分析及理論歸納 54
五、結論及管理意涵 65
5.1. 結論 65
5.2. 管理意涵 66
參考文獻 67
中文文獻 67
英文文獻 69

參考文獻
中文文獻
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英文文獻
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