臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

共同研發一直是企業所樂於採用的一種策略合作模式。企業以組成共同研發聯盟，來分攤研發風險及確保自身的市場競爭力，甚至政府亦大力推動企業成立共同研發聯盟，強化本國企業在國際市場的的科技領先性及競爭力。共同研發有其特定的策略含意。但是，共同研發的組成員為原本在市場上相互競爭之企業，則另牽涉競爭法上的嚴肅法律議題。在我國公平交易法的規範範疇內，把水平競爭關係企業間的共同研發行為，歸類聯合行為的型態之一，賦予高度的管制色彩，唯有獲得公平交易委員會許可後方得實施。
我國公平交易法所規範的聯合行為，主要是避免企業藉由組成卡特爾組織，來濫用其市場地位。但是，在以研發為目的所組成的組織，是否即具有與卡特爾相同的市場力，而必須繩之以聯合行為的管制規範，則不無疑問。尤其，現有的公平交易法執法成果，與現行實務界推動共同研發的熱度相互比較，可以發現法律規範與實務運作出現了重大落差，許多共同研發聯盟均暴露於高度的違法風險，而不自知。
本文即是針對我國公平交易法對於共同研發規範的妥適性，以經濟模型分析方法，作一仔細的檢視並提出建議。文中發現，現行公平交易法將共同研發，以聯合行為的方式加以規範，首先，在適用的行為主體上，就出現經濟理論與法律規範的落差。其次，最重要地，現行的規範模式，不是造成公平交易委員會龐大的的執法成本負擔，就是讓參與共同研發成員面臨高度的違法風險。

本文建議，若將現行共同研發管制的態度，由「原則禁止，例外許可」，開放為「原則許可，例外禁止」，並佐以「負面表列」、「主動申報」以及「善用許可處分附款」等的配套措施，即足以發揮維護市場競爭，以及促進企業組成共同研發聯盟的風氣，同時衡平促進經濟發展以及維護市場競爭的難題。

In order to consolidate market competitiveness, enterprises have to engage in research and development activity continuously. For most of enterprises, this kind of activity is too highly risky and costly to finish independently. Joining in a joint research and development venture is a good strategy for them to leverage the high risk and expensive cost problem. Of course, the participants may be or may not be competitors. However, if the partners are competitors or potential competitors, this venture will be scrutinized more closely for anticompetitive impact.

Competitors or potential competitors organize a joint research and development venture is a serious anticompetitive issue in many countries’ competition law. In Taiwan, this kind of venture is classified into one type of concerted actions and intensively regulated by Fair Trade Law Article 7 and Article 14. The Article 14 allows no joint research and development venture unless it meets specific requirements on Article 14 and Article 14(2). In real circumstances, those regulations don’t show perfect function in keeping market competition. In fact there are so many ventures promoted by government or organized by enterprise spontaneously are born without approved by authority. The gap between legal regulations and industrial facts reflect the Fair Trade law does not function the main purpose must be reached.

In this study, we tried to prove the requirements of concerted action in Fair trade Law for regulating Cartel is not proper being used to joint research and development concerted action. Then we get some conclusions. First, this kind of regulations will drive authority to expend extra enforcement cost or the joint research and development participants face high legal risk in violating Fair Trade Law. Second, Article 7 restricts partners are competitors or potential competitors is also not proper for joint research and development concerted action.

Finally this study submits suggestions for solving those problems mentioned above. It concludes that Fair Trade Law must release the prohibition intensity in joint research and development from “generally prohibited” to “generally permitted”. This target could be achieved by enacting “black clauses” for saving authority’s censorship cost and by setting supplementary duties on participants in authority’s joint research and development approval for decreasing authority’s monitoring cost.

目 錄
中文摘要..............................................i
英文摘要............................................iii
目錄..................................................v
表目錄...............................................vi
圖目錄...............................................vi
一、緒論..............................................1
1.1、研究動機.........................................1
1.2、研究方法.........................................5
1.3、研究章節架構.....................................7
1.4、預期研究成果.....................................7
二、共同研發之經濟分析................................9
2.1、前言 .............................................9
2.2、共同研發經濟分析文獻回顧........................10
2.3、共同研發之一般化產業結構模型....................17
2.4、小結 ............................................25
三、共同研發之性質及公平法觀點.......................27
3.1、研發策略聯盟與共同研發之意涵....................27
3.2、共同研發及聯合行為..............................30
3.3、我國公平法對共同研發行為之管理..................32
3.4、小結 ............................................34
四、共同研發影響市場競爭之因素分析...................36
4.1、公平法聯合行為構成要件之經濟學觀點..............36
4.2、公平法對共同研發管理之經濟效果分析..............42
4.3、建立經濟學觀點之共同研發管理標準................52
4.4、小結 ............................................58
五、案例分析.........................................60
5.1、我國共同研發推動及申請許可概況..................60
5.2、公平會研發聯盟許可決定個案評析..................61
5.3、小結 ............................................81
六、結論與建議.......................................87
6.1、現行公平法對共同研發管制衍生問題................87
6.2、公平法對共同研發管制修法芻議....................92
6.3、建議未來研究方向................................95
參考文獻.............................................96

參考文獻

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