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研究生:蔡佩雯
論文名稱:多角化、董事會結構與公司價值關聯性之研究
論文名稱(外文):A Study of Relation between Diversification, Board Structure, and Firm Value
指導教授:林淑惠林淑惠引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立彰化師範大學
系所名稱:商業教育學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
語文別:中文
論文頁數:58
中文關鍵詞:多角化董事會結構公司價值
外文關鍵詞:DiversificationBoard StructureFirm Value
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本研究以多角化為研究主軸,探討多角化與董事會結構的關係,進而探討多角化、董事會結構與公司價值之間的關係。本論文透過複迴歸模型檢驗是否多角化會影響董事會結構,並檢驗是否多角化公司的董事會結構會影響公司價值。本研究的實證結果為:(1)僅從事地理多角化的公司,有較小的董事會規模;(2)同時從事產業多角化與地理多角化的公司,有較高的內部董事比例;(3)董事會規模與Tobin’s Q值之間沒有顯著的關係;(4)僅從事地理多角化的公司有較小的董事會規模,可以增進公司價值;(5)內部董事比例與Tobin’s Q值之間呈現顯著的負向關係;(6)對於同時從事地理多角化與產業多角化的公司、僅從事地理多角化的公司而言,有較高的內部董事比例,可以增進公司價值。
This study investigates the relationship between diversification and board structure and it impacts on the firm value. The empirical results indicate that: (1)Firms that are only geography diversified have the smaller board size. (2)Firms that are both industry diversified and geography diversified have higher fraction of inside directors on the board. (3)The relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q is not significant. (4)For firms that are only diversified across geography areas, the firm value decreases with the board size. (5)The relationship between the fraction of inside directors and Tobin’s Q is negative. (6)For firms that are both industry diversified and geography diversified and firms that are only diversified across geography areas, the firm value increases with the fraction of inside directors.
第一章 序論 …………………………………………….……1
第一節 研究背景與動機 …………………………….....1
第二節 研究目的 …………………………………......…3
第三節 論文架構 …………………………………………4
第二章 文獻探討 …………………………………………..6
第一節 多角化 ……………………………………………6
第二節 董事會結構 …………………………………….11
第三章 研究設計 ………………………………………….15
第一節 研究假說 ……………………………………….16
第二節 研究模型與變數定義 ………………………..21
第三節 樣本選取與資料來源 ………………………..28
第四章 實證結果與分析 ………………………………..32
第一節 敘述性統計分析 ………………………………32
第二節 複迴歸模型實證結果分析 …………………..38
第五章 結論與建議 ………………………………………47
第一節 研究結論 ……………………………………….47
第二節 研究建議…………………………………………50
參考文獻…………………………………………………….…51
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