臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討公司治理之內部控制機制－「董事會特性」及「股權結構」，是否能發揮監督效果，提供投資大眾作為判斷公司宣告買回庫藏股決策之參考依據，並反應在其投資決策及公司股價上。本研究以2000年8月7日至2006年12月31日間國內上市公司為研究對象，有效樣本共1197筆。本研究設計以累計異常報酬(cumulative abnormal returns, CAR)作為庫藏股宣告買回之市場反應的衡量指標，並以多元迴歸模式檢驗本研究之各項假說。此外，更進一步以產業別及買回目的區分樣本，探討在不同產業別及不同買回目的下，公司治理變數對於庫藏股宣告買回市場反應的影響。
本研究結果主要發現為：
1.「外部董事席次」對於庫藏股宣告買回之市場反應具有正面影響，顯示董事會若由外部人士參與，則其憑藉者本身專業知識與經驗，及關注自身聲譽的動機下，更能客觀且公正的擔任公司決策角色，發揮監督效果，且此正面效益多發生在非電子業。
2.「經理人持股」對於庫藏股宣告買回之市場反應具有正面影響，證實經理人持股能有效降低代理成本。
3.「機構投資人持股」對於庫藏股宣告買回之市場反應具有正面影響，顯示機構投資人擁有專業人才與知識，更能有效地監督公司之決策，抑制傷害公司之非法行為產生。
4.「控制權與所有權偏離」對於庫藏股宣告買回之市場反應具有負面影響，顯示控制股東會透過金字塔結構與交叉持股，提升自身對公司的控制力並主導公司決策，誘使控制股東濫用公司資源，傷害外部股東之利益，且此負面效益對於電子業及以「轉讓員工及股權轉換」為買回目的之公司更為顯著。

The purpose of this research is to examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, board characteristics and ownership structure, influence investors’ perceptions on the credibility of firms’stock repurchase announcements.

The research target of this study is all the public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation, starting from August 7, 2000 to December 31, 2006. The number of effective sample is 1197. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is adopted as a measurement of the market reaction of stock repurchase. The results of multiple regressions on our data are used to validate the hypotheses of this research. Moreover, the sampling companies are further classified into different classes according to their industry classification and the purpose of stock repurchase. The classified data are used to analyze the effects of corporate governance variables on the market reaction of stock purchase.

Four major findings are derived from our analysis, listed as follows:

(1) Outside directors have positive influence on market reaction of stock repurchase. With the consideration of their reputation and their domain specialized knowledge and experiences, outside directors play a non-judgmental and fair role on decision making of companies and offer positive surveillance effect. Our results indicate that this positive benefit usually occurs in the non-electronic industry.

(2) CEO ownership has positive influence to the market reaction of stock repurchase. It confirms that the ownership of CEO can reduce costs of agency effectively.

(3) Institutional ownership has positive influence to the market reaction of stock repurchase. It demonstrates that if institutional investors have domain-specified knowledge and are professionals in the domain of companies, they can effectively supervise decision-making of the company and suppress illegal behaviors that may injuries the company.

(4) Separation of ownership and control has negative influence to the market reaction of stock repurchase. It demonstrates that, if controlling shareholders promote their force on controlling company and dominate company decision-making through the use of pyramids and cross-holding, it will lure controlling shareholders to abuse company resources, and further injure benefits of outside stockholders. The analysis of this research indicates that this phenomenon usually occurs in the companies of electronic industry and the companies which aim their repurchase purpose on transferring shares to employees and the uses for convertible bonds.

摘要.......................................................I
Abstract..................................................II
目錄.....................................................III
表目錄....................................................IV
圖目錄.....................................................V
第一章 緒論................................................1
第一節 研究背景........................................1
第二節 研究動機與目的..................................2
第三節 研究流程........................................5
第四節 論文架構........................................6
第二章 文獻探討............................................7
第一節 公司治理........................................7
第二節 公司治理之內部機制.............................10
第三節 庫藏股買回之文獻探討...........................23
第三章 研究方法...........................................29
第一節 研究架構.......................................29
第二節 研究假說.......................................30
第三節 實證模型與變數定義.............................35
第四節 研究期間、資料來源與樣本選取標準...............41
第五節 研究方法.......................................43
第六節 敏感性分析.....................................48
第四章 實證結果分析.......................................51
第一節 敘述性統計分析.................................51
第二節 相關分析.......................................57
第三節 迴歸結果分析...................................60
第四節 敏感性分析.....................................70
第五章 結論與建議.........................................82
第一節 研究結論.......................................82
第二節 研究限制.......................................84
第三節 研究建議.......................................85
參考文獻..................................................87

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