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研究生:陳榮恩
研究生(外文):Chen, Jung-en
論文名稱:消費者的委任護租分析
論文名稱(外文):Delegation for consumers' surplus defending activities
指導教授:翁仁甫翁仁甫引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ueng, Zen-fu
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺北大學
系所名稱:財政學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財政學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
語文別:中文
論文頁數:34
中文關鍵詞: 代表人 消費者 護租 競租
外文關鍵詞:rent-defendingconsumerfree-ridingdelegation
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當競爭市場中的廠商覬覦獨佔控制權而群起投入競租支出時,市場的現狀將質變為適合廠商逐利的獨占市場環境,在此同時,面對競爭市場現狀可能遭受改變的消費者們必定採取反制行動,此即護租活動的產生。傳統護租理論文獻對於消費者是否能組成群體進行護租活動多所質疑,並由理論模型推理得知由於搭便車(free riding)行為的存在將不可避免地使得消費者個別護租行為終止,這樣的闡述與實際世界大相逕庭,且無法解釋為何消費者護租行動依舊熱絡。

本文參酌現實世界消費者組成團體並委任代表人代行職權的合理情形,將代表人因素融入護租理論的分析架構裡,說明了為何消費者的委任護租活動必定形成,同時指出委任代表人存在的意義與功能,最後並討論委任護租活動對整體社會資源造成的影響。本文的觀點不僅解決護租理論發展上的障礙,且提供全新的思考視野,相當程度拓展了本領域的未來發展可能。
When policymakers regulate the market, either producers or consumers will seek for the rent from regulation, the action which consumers adopt is called rent-defending activity. Previous literatures present that the consumers’ rent-defending activities must be disappear because of the free-riding problem, and the rent of regulated market will just be competed by producers. In this work, we add a new agent in rent-defending activities. The delegate of consumers faces a contingent fee contract and does his effort to compete with the producers. Our major finding is that the free-riding problem will be solved by delegation. We also present: (1) the consumers’rent defending activities must be happened in form of delegation; (2) the delegated rent-defending activities will increase the social resource waste; (3) but the total social welfare raise up possibly.
第一章、緒論
第二章、文獻回顧
第一節、傳統競租理論的發展
第二節、護租理論的發展
第三節、委任代表競租理論的發展
第三章、模型與均衡解的推導
第一節、模型的基礎設定
第二節、透過委任代表投入護租活動之子賽局均衡解推求
第三節、消費者選擇自行投入護租活動之子賽局均衡解推求
第四章、均衡的委任決策分析
第五章、委任代表對整體資源浪費及社會福利的影響
第一節、委任護租活動對整體資源浪費水準的影響
第二節、委任護租活動對社會福利的影響
第六章、結論
一、中文部分
陳師孟(2006),「政治經濟-現代理論與台灣應用」,翰蘆圖書出版。
蕭全政(1988),「政治與經濟的整合-政治經濟學的基礎理論」,桂冠圖書出版。
二、英文部分
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Baik, K.H. (1999).”Rent-seeking Firms, Consumer Groups, and the Social Costs of Monopoly,” Economic Inquiry, 37(3), 54-553
Buchanan, J.M. (1975).The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: The University of Chicago.
Buchanan, J.M. (2003).”What is Public Choice Theory?” Economic Education Bulletin, 43(5), 1-4
Ellington, T. (1991).”Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly,” American Economic Review, 81(3), 648-57
Fabella, R. (1991).”The Bias in favor of Pro-tariff Lobbies,” Journal of Public Economics, 44, 87-93
Fabella, R. (1995).”The Social Cost of Rent Seeking under Countervailing Opposition to Distortionary Transfers,” Journal of Public Economics, 57, 235-247
Gordon, D.M. (1972).”Taxation of the poor and the normative theory of tax incidence,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 62, 319-328
Hillman, A.L. and Riley, J.G. (1989).”Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers,” Economics and Politics, 1, 17-39
Krueger, A.O. (1974).”The Political Economy of the Rent-seeking Society,” American Economic Review, 64, 291-303
Mueller, D.C. (2003).Public Choice III. Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press.
Nitzan, S. (1991a).”Rent-seeking with Non-identical Sharing Rule,” Public Choice,71, 43-50
Nitzan, S. (1991b).”Collective Rent Dissipation,” Economic Journal, 101, 1522-34
Nitzan, S. (1994).”Modelling Rent-seeking Contests,” European Journal of Political Economy, 10, 41-60
Peltzman, S. (1976).”Toward A More General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), 211-40
Polanyi, M. (1951).The Logic of Liberty. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Posner, R.A. (1975).”The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation,” Journal of Political Economy, 83,807-828
Schoonbeek, L. (2002).”A Delegated Agent in a Winner-take-all Contest,” Applied Economics Letters, p:21-23
Schoonbeek, L. (2004).”Delegation in a Group-contest,”European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 263-72
Stigler, G. J. (1971).”The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 5, 137-46
Tullock, G. (1967).”The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft,” Western Economic Journal, 5(3), 224-32
Tullock, G. (1980).”Efficient Rent Seeking,” in J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison, and G. Tullock, eds., Towards a theory of rent-seeking society. College Station Texas A&M University Press, Pp.97-112
Tullock, G. (2003).”The origin Rent-Seeking Concept,” International Journal of Business and Economics, 2(1), 1-8
Wärneryd, K. (2000).”In Defense of Lawyers: Moral Hazard as An Aid to Cooperation,” Game and Economic Behavior, 33, 145-58
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