臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本篇論文的目的是，「把生命形式為使用語言的基礎」的觀點之下理解《哲學探究》，尤其是對私用語言論證的理解。
為了討論私用語言論證，先要理解整個《哲學探究》的思想，所以筆者在序章中介紹筆者對《哲學探究》的理解。其內容包括語言遊戲、實指定義、家族類似性和哲學。
第一章討論遵守規則。維根斯坦說：「人們不可能『私人地』遵守規則」，所以遵守規則是公共的。但是關於這個公共性有「實際上的分享」與「分享的可能性」的爭論。筆者從支持「分享的可能性」的立場，並且指出生命形式是遵守規則以及使用語言的基礎。第一章的討論間接地支持第三章的討論。
第二章討論私用語言論證。筆者先確認「我覺得痛」或「他覺得痛」是在我們的實踐中有意義的表述。接著討論私用語詞「S」的不可能，並且指出「對記憶的懷疑論」的解釋是錯誤的。再來確認「我痛」和「他痛」的不對稱。語言的看起來的相似性蠱惑我們，但是對所有東西的懷疑是不可能的。
第三章討論庫律基（S. A. Kripke）的社群觀。庫律基認為《哲學探究》的主題是休謨式懷疑論的問題和它的解決。但是這個《哲學探究》的解釋不僅與維根斯坦的文本衝突，也與我們的實踐衝突。筆者指出庫律基的誤解和他的主張引起的困難。

The purpose of this thesis is to understand Philosophical Investigations (especially, its “private language argument”). I will understand it under the view point where form of life is the basis of language usage.
In order to discuss about “private language argument”, one has to understand the whole thought of Philosophical Investigations, therefore, I will introduce my understanding about Philosophical Investigations in the preliminary. It contains language-game, ostensive definition, family-resemblance and philosophy.
In the first chapter, I will discuss rule-following. Wittgenstein said, “it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’”. Therefore rule-following is public. However, there are arguments about this public character, i.e. whether the practice must be actually shared or sharable. I will endorse the view of sharable practice and point out that the basis of rule-following and language usage is form of life. The discussion of the first chapter supports the third chapter indirectly.
In the second chapter, I will discuss private language argument. The first thing I will confirm is “I feel pain” and “he feels pain” these two expressions have sense in our practices. Next will I discuss impossibility of a private word “S” and point out a kind of interpretation which insists skepticism about memory is wrong. Thereafter I will make the asymmetry between “I’m in pain” and “he is in pain” clear.
Apparent similarities in language make us bewitched, but we don’t doubt everything.
In the third chapter, I will discuss S. A. Kripke’s community view. Kripke thinks that the main theme of Philosophical Investigations is Humean skeptical problem and it’s solution, but this interpretation of Philosophical Investigations is not only incompatible with Wittgenstein’s texts but also with our practices. I will point out Kripke’s misunderstanding and problems which his interpretation entails.

口試委員審定書……………………………………………………………..……i
謝辭……………………………………………………………………………..….iii
中文摘要………………………………………………………………………..….v
英文摘要……………………………………………………………………….....vii
緒言………………………………………………………………………………...ix
前言………………………………………………………………………………....1
序章 《哲學探究》的思想
第一節 《哲學探究》………………………………………………………...5
第二節 語言遊戲（language-game）………………………………………….6
第三節 實指定義（ostensive definition）…………………………………….8
第四節 家族類似性（family resemblance）…………………………………10
第五節 哲學……………………………………………………………..…..12
第一章 遵守規則（rule-following）
第一節 遵守規則的基礎……………………………………………………17
第二節 公共性………………………………………………………………18
第三節 分享的可能性………………………………………………………22
第四節 生命形式……………………………………………………………26
第五節 第243節…………………………………………………………….32
第二章 私用語言論證
第一節 私用語言論證的含意………………………………………………35
第二節 痛……………………………………………………………………35
第三節 S…………………………………………………………………….45
第四節 「我痛」與「他痛」的不對稱性…………………………………….53
第五節 懷疑…………………………………………………………………58
第三章 社群觀
第一節 「真正私用語言論證」………………………………………………63
第二節 懷疑論的問題和它的解決…………………………………………63
第三節 意義與理解…………………………………………………………66
第四節 一個維根斯坦還是二個維根斯坦…………………………………69
第五節 懷疑論的解決………………………………………………………71
結論………………………………………………………………………………..75
參考書目………………………………………………………………………….79

英文部分
A. J. Ayer, ‘Can There Be a Private Language?’, in Wittgenstein, ed. by G. Pitcher, Notre dame, University of Notre dame Press, 1968.
G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker, ‘Malcolm on language and rules’, Philosophy, 65, pp.167-79, 1990.
——, Scepticism, Rules & Language, Oxford, Blackwell, 1984.
——, Wittgenstein Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Oxford, Blackwell, 1985.
——, Wittgenstein Understanding and Meaning, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980.
S. Candlish, ‘The Real Private Language Argument’, Philosohy 55, p. 85-94, 1980.
J. V. Canfield, ‘Private language: the diary case’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, pp. 377-94, 2001.
——, ‘The community view’, The Philosophical Review, 105, pp. 469-88, 1996.
J. W. Cook, ‘Human beings’ in Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, ed. by P. Winch, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.
——, ‘Wittgenstein on Privacy’, in Wittgenstein, ed. by G. Pitcher, Notre dame, University of Notre dame Press, 1968.
R. Descartes, The philosophical writings of Descartes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.
R. J. Fogelin, Wittgenstein, 2nd ed., London, Routledge, 1976.
H. J. Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Oxford, Blackwell, 1996.
P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein, London, Phoenix, 1997.
——, Wittgenstein Meaning and Mind, Oxford, Blackwell, 1990.
D. Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 3rd ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, text revised and notes by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975.
A. Kenny, ‘Cartesian Privacy’, in Wittgenstein, ed. by G. Pitcher, Notre dame, University of Notre dame Press, 1968.
——, Wittgenstein, revised ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 2006.
S. A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1982.
J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975.
N. Malcolm, ‘Knowledge of Other Minds’, in Wittgenstein, ed. by G. Pitcher, Notre dame, University of Notre dame Press, 1968.
——, ‘Wittgenstein on language and rules’, Philosophy, 64, pp. 5-28, 1989.
——, ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’, in Wittgenstein, ed. by G. Pitcher, Notre dame, University of Notre dame Press, 1968.
D. Pears, The False Prison (Volume Two), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988.
R. Rhees, ‘Can There Be a Private Language?’, in Wittgenstein, ed. by G. Pitcher, Notre dame, University of Notre dame Press, 1968.
L. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, revised ed. by G. H. von Wright, Oxford, Blackwell, 1994.
——, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. by Cyril Barrett, Oxford, Blackwell, 1966.
——, Notebooks 1914-1916, 2nd ed. by G. H. von Wright & G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford, Blackwell, 1979.
——, On Certainty, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Oxford, Blackwell, 1969.
——, Philosophical Grammar, ed. by R. Rhees, Oxford, Blackwell, 1974.
——, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 1958.
——, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, revised ed. by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees & G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford, Blackwell, 1978.
——, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (Volume One), ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980.
——, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (Volume Two), ed. by G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980.
——, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London, Routledge, 1922.
——, The Blue and Brown Books, 2nd ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 1969.
——, Zettel, ed. by G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Oxford, Blackwell, 1967.

中文部分
劉福增著：《維根斯坦哲學》，三民書局代銷，1987。
趙敦華著：《維特根斯坦》，遠流出版公司，1988。

翻譯書
中文部分
福吉林著，劉福增譯：《維根斯坦》，台北，國立編譯館，1994。
維根斯坦著，范光棣•湯潮合譯：《哲學探討》，台北，水牛出版社，1990。
維根斯坦著，李步樓譯：《哲學研究》，北京，商務印書館，1996。

日文部分
維根斯坦著，大森荘藏、杖下隆英譯：《ウィトゲンシュタイン全集６『青色本・茶色本』、『「個人的経験」および「感覚与件」について』、『フレーザー『金枝篇』について』》，東京，大修館書店，1975。
維根斯坦著，藤本隆志譯：《ウィトゲンシュタイン全集８『哲学探究』》，東京，大修館書店，1976。
維根斯坦著，坂井秀寿譯：《論理哲学論考》，東京，法政大學出版局，1968。