臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

中文摘要
一個好的策略，必須要能夠執行，才能形成企業的競爭優勢。因此組織結構與功能政策這兩種類型的策略執行工具，普遍受到學者與實務界的經理人的重視，然而契約安排這第三種策略執行方案，較少被了解與研究，但本論文認為缺少對契約安排的了解，就無法真正了解組織結構與功能政策，因為這三項策略執行方案是要相輔相成的。
為了了解契約案排的選擇，本論文由組織經濟學中的產權理論以及資源基礎理論中，運用理論的構念來分析契約安排方案與企業策略執行的關係。本論文運用資源的特性與契約的正式化程度這兩個構面，將契約安排分為四個類型。
主要的命題是人力資本因為其產權特性，必須運用非正式契約來加以運用，而不能僅依靠正式契約進行，這個命題就帶出管理對策略執行的重要性。而企業運用非正式契約輔助正式契約的訂定，就成為其競爭優勢與模仿障礙的來源。這是因為契約安排的選擇有一個階段性，企業會經由正式契約到非正式契約等一連串的選擇，強化其經營模式的因果模糊性與模仿的不確定性，進而使得競爭者難以模仿，來維持企業的競爭優勢。

Strategies could create the competitive advantages only when they are executed. Scholars and practitioners have focused on two means of the strategic implementation, which are organizational structures and functional strategies. However, the thesis argues that contractual arrangements are other critical methods in the implementation of strategy and that they should be coordinated with organizational structures and functional policies. Secondly, organizational economics, especially the economics of property rights and the resource-based view of the firm, are introduced to present the fundamental concepts of contracts and the nature of team work. Thirdly, the issue of property rights of human resources is discussed in the viewpoint of implicit contracts. Fourthly, the thesis further maintains that firms could create core competences through their contracting abilities to form implicit contracts with their stakeholders. Finally, four types of contractual arrangements and their relationships with firm strategies are elaborated to support the arguments that contractual arrangements are one of the crucial strategic implementation instruments to gain sustainable competitive advantages.

Content
Chapter.1 Introduction 3
1.1 Research Objective and Motivation 3
1.2 Definition of Contracts 3
1.3 Strategic Implementation and Contractual Arrangements 4
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 8
Chapter.2 Literature Review 11
2.1 The Growth Motive of the Firm and the Resource-Based View 11
2.2 EPR and the Nexus of Contracts Theory 14
2.3 Cooperation Problem of Knowledge Transfer 17
2.4 Residual Rights and Attributes of Property Rights 22
2.5 Implicit Contracts and Evolutionary Theory 26
2.6 Boundaries Decisions and Residual Control Rights 29
Chapter3. Propositions of Contractual Arrangements 31
3.1 Four Types of Contractual Arrangements 32
3.2 Residual Rights and the Attributes of Property Rights 34
3.3 Contractual Arrangements as Imitation Barriers 36
3.4 Implicit Contracts and Human Resources 37
3.5 Process of an Evolution of Contractual Arrangements 42
Chapter4. Concluding Remarks 45
4.1 Contractual Arrangement as Strategic Implementation 45
4.2 Contractual Arrangement as Solution of Teamwork Coordination 46
4.3 Property Rights of Human Resources 47
4.4 Future Research and Empirical Method 49
References 52

Lists of Graphs
Graph 1 Contractual Arrangement as Means of Strategic Implementation
…………………………………………………………………………….…...7
Graph 2 Roadmap of the Thesis…………………………….………......... 9
Graph 3 Bundles of Rights and Productive Services……………………10
Graph 4 Four Types of Contractual Arrangements….............................36
Graph 5 Productive Services and Property Rights of the Services…....38
Graph 6 Contractual Arrangements and Imitation Barriers……………..39

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