臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

　　欲對「或有事項」之揭露得以有效從事，必待會計師與律師協力不為功。然而，此二專業陣營向來各有其角色扮演，會計師旨在揭其所見；至於律師之使命則在保護客戶資訊之秘密性。本論文擬自比較的視角－美國經驗－加以探討，有關「或有事項」之揭露議題，應如何在確保(1)審計品質以及(2)律師的保密義務及律師業務文書保護原則二個公共利益上，尋求其平衡點及其交互之作用。本論文欲透過介紹美國的實務，提供予台灣實務一個鳥瞰的理解。
　　雖然會計師從事審計業務多被認為係具備合理之確信，可認其取自客戶的財務報告均無重大性之錯誤，然而，歷經美國2001－2002年間的若干舞弊醜閒，美國的「證管會」(SEC)以及「公開公司會計監督委員會」(PCAOB)業已開始致力於強化會計師之職能。無可避免的，一旦會計師對於客戶的各種情境及議題要求取得更進一步的資訊，公司則難以期待其公司資訊之秘密性。具體而言，在(美國)財務會計準則第五號公報的規定下，會計師為瞭解客戶的或有事項之目的，得以向被審計對象公司的律師要求揭露及表態其對於特定「或有事項」之判斷，以及攸關於的判決可能性結果，可能性損失以及相關於訴訟主張等評價資訊。然而，就制度分析之層面而言，一個法律規範體系，如未能確保公開公司在尋求律師協助時得受資訊秘密以及律師業務文書保護原則的社會承諾，則此建制無異於否認其得受律師有效協助之機會。為求得利害之平，1975年伊始，在美國的會計和法律兩專業陣營達成了一個所謂的“協議”(Treaty)，藉以規範及界定律師回覆會計師詢證函時，可能因其揭露相關訴訟或主張資訊以致發生“放棄”資訊秘密特權之疑慮。此所謂“協議”，透過限制律師應揭露事項之程度以及限制會計師得以詢問或有事項之範圍，藉以平衡會計師之揭露義務以及律師保密義務此兩層面之利害。
　　美國會計師及法律兩專業陣營為「或有事項」之揭露所獲致之“協議”，在實踐上並非毫無問題，而且距離完美尚遠。然而，為使「或有事項」之揭露得以有適當之業務運作，兩個專業陣營的對話絕對有其正面意義。在台灣，迄今兩個專業陣營尚未有類似美國實務的“協議”存在，從而，有關「或有事項」之揭露－即詢證函答復實務－在我國的實務上仍然莫衷一適。本論文希冀透過對美國過往及目前實務及法律的介紹，得以對我國會計及法律實務對於「或有事項」之揭露實務帶來更多的關注，並得以促成兩大專業陣營可能的對話，為其所盼。

Effective reporting of contingencies takes two professions—auditors and lawyers-- to dance. However, traditionally, play role of auditors and lawyers are different; auditors shall disclose contingencies as he performs audit work, while lawyers shall maintain confidentiality of his client’s information unless the laws provides otherwise. From US perspective, this thesis addresses two vital public interests – the public company audit function and protection of the attorney work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege – as well as their intersection, in connection with the contingencies reporting. By way of introducing the “Treaty” between auditors and lawyers (details see below) in US and indicating its development and issues in application, this thesis tends to give a general survey on the matter for the reference of Taiwan practice.

While auditors have historically planned and performed their audits in such a manner that they can obtain reasonable assurance that a company’s financial statements are not materially misstated, sparked by the corporate scandals of 2001-2002 in US, however, the Securities & Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) have focused attention on strengthening the auditors’ vigilance. Once auditors perform their audit work and seek and then obtain access to the company’s privileged information regarding a variety of circumstances and issues, companies are increasingly losing expectation that their information will remain confidential. Specifically, pursuant to FAS 5, auditors may require public company clients to disclose loss contingencies by asking a corporation’s legal counsel disclose their judgments and supporting information regarding potential outcome, range of loss and other issues resulting from litigation, claims and assessments against the company; as a matter of policy, however, a legal system that fails to assure public companies the protection of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection denies those companies the effective assistance of counsel when potentially illegal corporate behavior is discovered. In 1975, the audit and legal professions in US reached an accord – or “Treaty,” regarding the waiver problem arising when auditors ask their clients for privileged information related to the judgments of company counsel regarding loss contingencies for litigation, claims and assessments. This “Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers’ Responses to Auditors’ Requests for Information,” as adopted by the ABA and consented to by the AICPA, struck a balance between two very important public interests, by limiting the range of acceptable disclosures that lawyers may make to auditors with the client’s informed consent, and thus defined the scope of what the auditors may request from lawyers regarding confidential attorney information.

The Treaty in US is not without problem and is in no way perfect; communication between two professions would definitely bring benefit, however, for the purpose of contingencies reporting. In Taiwan, no similar Treaty between two professions is found for the contingencies reporting purpose and therefore practice in this connection varies. By way of introducing US practice --the Treaty and relevant development of laws and relevant regulations-- from past to current, this thesis tends to bring our attention to this subject matter and expect to entail dialogue between two professions in this connection in Taiwan.

目 錄
謝　辭 iv
摘　要 v
ABSTRACT vii
目 錄 ix
表目錄 x
I.Preface－Relevance of contingencies reporting for lawyers and auditors 1

II.The growing tension between lawyers and auditors —US perspective 4
A.Different roles between auditors and lawyers 4
B.Peace through negotiated mechanism between two professions 5
C.Shifted rules of confidentiality for lawyers 6

III. Contingency reporting and the way auditors audit contingency 9
A.Professional standards affecting the report and audit of contingency under US GAAP & GAAS since 1975. 9
B.Significant developments after the 1975 Accord 41

IV.Regulating lawyers 49
A.Client’s fraud situation: Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 49
B.Section 303 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and SEC Rule 13b2-2 50
C.The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 52

V.Issues that remain 53
A.Theoretical problems in evaluation of contingencies 53
B.Some practical issues in application of ABA Statement 57

VI.Conclusion—Way down the road 62

參考文獻 64

Appendix 65

1.GEORGE MUNDSTOCK, A FINANCE APPROACH TO ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 149 n.6 (1999).
2.CLYDE P. STICKNEY & ROMAN L. WEIL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USES.
3.JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 976 (2d ed. 1997)
4.A.B.A., Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers’ Responses to Auditors’ Requests for Information, 31 BUS. LAW.
5.Note, Attorney Responses To Audit Letters: The Problem of Disclosing Loss Contingencies Arising From Litigation and Unasserted Claims, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 838, 877 (1976).
6.Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2000)
7.Kenneth C. Fang & Brad Jacobs, Clarifying and Protecting Materiality Standards in Financial Statements: A Review of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, 55 BUS. LAW. 1039 (2000)
8.Byron F. Egan, “Communicating with Auditors After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,” Tex. J. Bus. L. 131 (Fall 2005).
9.Latham and Watkins LLP, “The Auditor’s Need for Its Client’s Detailed Information vs The Client’s Need to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection: The Debate, The Problems, and Proposed Solutions.”
10.Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984)
11.ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932)
12.Russell Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000)
13.Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1556-57 (1998)
14.Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 377 (1997)