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研究生:蔡其穎
研究生(外文):CHI-YING TSAI
論文名稱:CEO強迫性異動與相對市場績效之關連性研究
論文名稱(外文):CEO Forced Turnover and Relative Market Performance
指導教授:廖俊杰廖俊杰引用關係
指導教授(外文):CHUN-CHIEH LIAO
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:中國文化大學
系所名稱:國際貿易學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:貿易學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
語文別:中文
論文頁數:72
中文關鍵詞:同儕團體績效CEO強迫性異動相對績效評估二階迴歸
外文關鍵詞:peer group performanceforced CEO turnoverrelative performance evaluationtwo-stage regression approach
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
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  • 下載下載:28
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:3
公司績效一旦變差,CEO之留任或汰換便成為董事會重要決策。本研究利用二階迴歸的概念,來檢測CEO強迫性異動的可能因素。於第一階迴歸先將公司績效拆解成兩部份,包含產業所誘發的績效及公司特有績效,其中公司特有績效反映CEO的自身能力。利用第一階段所得到之兩變數,於第二階迴歸中作為自變數來預測CEO強迫性異動。本研究蒐集了2000年到2006年台灣上市公司CEO強迫性異動的樣本,發現CEO常因受到同儕績效之負面衝擊而被汰換。另外,實證結果也顯示,董事會在評估CEO能力時,僅能部份排除產業誘發因素,現存的過濾機制可能仍有許多不足,無法將同儕團體績效去除。

整體而言,董事會在制定CEO異動決策時,並無法完全過濾外在因素的衝擊。
The decision whether to retain or fire an incumbent CEO after bad accounting performance is one of the most important decisions made by corporate boards. Whether the reference group is booming or in a recession contains no information about CEO quality and has no predictive power for the likelihood of forced CEO turnovers?

This paper estimates the sensitivity of CEO turnover to common performance factors using a two-stage regression approach: The first stage regression decomposes firm performance into a systematic component caused by peer group performance and a firm-specific component that should, in part, reflect CEO ability. In the second stage, we predict the probability of a forced CEO turnover using the peer group component and the residual component of firm performance estimated in the first stage. Using a new hand-collected data set of CEO dismissals from 2000 to 2006, we find to the contrary that CEOs are significantly more likely to be fired after negative performance shocks to their peer group. There is some evidence that boards partially filter industry performance from their assessment of CEO quality, but the extent of this filtering is too limited to remove most of the peer performance effect.

We conclude that boards fail to fully filter exogenous shocks to firm performance from their CEO retention decisions. We discuss several extensions and modifications to the basic CEO turnover model which might explain our empirical results. Our findings suggest that the standard CEO turnover model is too simple to capture the empirical relation between performance and forced CEO turnovers.
中文摘要...................... iii
英文摘要...................... iv
誌謝辭....................... v
內容目錄...................... vi
表目錄....................... viii
圖目錄....................... ix
第一章 緒論................... 1
  第一節  研究背景與動機............ 1
  第二節  研究目的............... 4
第三節 研究流程............... 6
第二章  文獻回顧與假設建立............ 8
  第一節  高階主管與影響異動之因素....... 8
  第二節  公司績效與高階主管異動........ 16
  第三節  CEO異動與相對績效.......... 19
第三章  研究方法................. 29
  第一節  研究變數之定義與衡量......... 29
  第二節  實證模型與統計方法.......... 30
  第三節  樣本選取與資料來源.......... 33
第四章 實證分析................. 35
  第一節  敘述性統計.............. 35
  第二節  強式RPE與弱式RPE檢定....... 36
  第三節  強健性檢定.............. 41
第五章 結論與建議................ 53
第一節 研究結論............... 53
第二節 研究限制............... 58
第三節 研究建議............... 58
參考文獻...................... 61
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