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研究生:伍家駿
研究生(外文):Chia-chun Wu
論文名稱:資產減損與控制股東代理問題之相關性研究
論文名稱(外文):The study of relationship between assets impairment and controlling stockholders' agency problem
指導教授:蘇裕惠蘇裕惠引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yu-hui Su
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東吳大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
畢業學年度:95
語文別:中文
論文頁數:66
中文關鍵詞:資產減損控制股東代理問題經營階層變動合併
外文關鍵詞:assets impairmentcontrolling stockholdersagency problemmanagement changingmerging
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  本研究係根據Francis et al.(1996)之資產減損模型出發,在控制整體經濟景氣及經營績效等變數的前提下,探討控制股東控制權與資產減損間之關係;再參考Wilson(1996)之建議,深入探討有關經營階層變動原因及合併事件對於資產減損的影響。
  本研究之研究樣本係以民國93-95年6月底間,非屬金融保險業之上市、櫃公司,排除民國93年後掛牌者為樣本。關於本研究之假說一,先蒐集以年報及半年報期間終了日之財務報表資料及股權、董事會結構之相關資料,測試控制股東控制權(以董事會席次控制權代替)對資產減損認列金額之影響。再針對假說二,取得上述期間經營階層變動及合併之資料,分析比較其對於資產減損認列金額之增額影響是否大於非合併造成之一般經營階層變動。
  由本研究之實證結果發現,以控制股東董事會席次控制權與現金流量權偏離率作為代理問題替代變數時,其控制權越高者資產減損認列金額越大,可能代表代理問題較高的公司有利用資產減損進行洗大澡或盈餘平穩化等盈餘管理的動機。再者導因於合併造成之經營階層變動,受到合併後資產重疊的影響,因此對於資產減損認列金額之影響較一般經營階層變動為大。
  本研究之貢獻主要有三:第一,在代理問題發生之初期徵兆,如董事會結構改變,或控制股東持股比例發生變動時,即可事先對於未來可能的裁量性資產減損進行預測,進而提前防範或注意;其次,因合併造成的經營階層變動對資產減損的影響較一般經營階層變動為大,一方面代表經營階層會受到特殊事件發生而進行裁量性資產減損,另一方面亦表示兩公司合併將產生一定程度的資產重疊效果;最後,非流動資產佔總資產比例並非影響資產減損認列金額的主要因素,反而是傳統產業受到代理問題較大的影響,而認列了較多的資產減損,此結果提供了與過去之推論相反的思維模式。
 The study is refer to the assets impairment model constructed by Francis et al.(1996). At the premise of controlling macroeconomic surrounding and operating performance variables, we discuss the relationship between the controlling stockholders’ rights and the assets impairment occurrence. We also consider the suggestions from Wilson(1996), deeply discuss about the effects of management changing reasons and company merging events.
 The study samples are on listed companies in the end of 2004, excluding the finance and insurance industry. For the Hypothesis 1, we collect data about financial reports, stockholders’ rights and the board of directors’ constructions during 2004Q4-2006Q2 to test the effects of controlling stockholders’ rights (instead by the controlling power to the board of directors) to the money amounts of assets impairment. For the Hypothesis 2, We also collect the data at the same period to analyze and compare with the increasing effects of management changing due to companies merging if higher than the common management changing to the money amounts of assets impairment.
 According our study results, we find when using the deviation between stockholders’ controlling power to the board of directors and cash flow right be agency problem proxy, the larger deviation causes higher money amounts of assets impairment. The result represents that the companies with much serious agency problems will have more incentives to make earning management by bath or income
smoothing through assets impairment. We also find the management changing caused by merging events resulted from the effects of assets overlapping has larger money amounts of assets impairment than common management changing.
 The main contributions in the study are as below: First, we can expect the future possible discretionary assets impairment when some agency problem signals appeared. For example, the board of directors construction changes or controlling stockholders’ holding percentage changes. Second, the management changing caused by merging events has larger effects on money amounts of assets impairment than the common management changing means management may proceed discretionary assets impairment when extraordinary events happened. It also means the companies merging events result some effects on assets overlapping. Finally, the agency problems in traditional industry has larger effects on money amounts of assets impairment than electronics industry, and the incurrent assets to total assets rate has few effects. This finding is different with the past cognitions and provides a new way to measure the impairment problems.
第一章  緒論
  第二節 研究議題與研究目的
  第三節 研究架構
第二章  理論與文獻探討
  第一節 資產減損公報之內容與沿革
  第二節 控制股東之代理問題
  第三節 資產減損與盈餘管理之關聯性
第三章  研究方法
  第一節 研究假說
  第二節 實證變數之操作型定義
  第三節 研究設計
  第四節 研究範圍與資料來源
第四章  實證結果與分析
  第一節 樣本組成及變數之敘述性統計及分析
  第二節 控制股東控制權對資產減損認列之影響分析
  第三節 經營階層變動及合併對資產減損認列之影響分析
第五章  敏感性測試
  第一節 替代變數之敏感性測試
  第二節 樣本分群之t檢定及Logistic分析
第六章  研究結論與建議
  第一節 研究結論
  第二節 研究限制
  第三節 研究建議
參考文獻
一、中文文獻
1. 吳清在與謝宛庭(民94),「認列資產減損時點與金額之決定因素及其市場反應」,2005會計理論與實務研討會。
2. 林有志與廖宜峰(民94),「公司提前採用資產減損公報之盈餘管理動機」, 2005會計理論與實務研討會。
3. 高蘭芬(民95),「資訊透明度及席次控制權與現金流量權偏離對公司績效之影響-以台灣電子業為例」,台灣管理學刊,第6卷,第2期,頁81-104。
4. 鄧小雅(民94),「財務會計準則第三十五號公報對企業之影響」,國立政治大學未出版之碩士論文。
5. 劉惠美(民94),「我國上市櫃公司資產減損與企業特色關聯性之研究」,輔仁大學未出版之碩士論文。
6. 顏信輝,丁緯(民95),「三十五號公報對企業年度報表之影響-由九十三年年報分析(上)」,會計研究月刊,第242期,頁98-104。
7. 顏信輝,丁緯(民95),「三十五號公報對企業年度報表之影響-由九十三年年報分析(下)」,會計研究月刊,第243期,頁86-91。
8. 顏信輝,丁緯(民96),「企業認列資產減損之考量:控制經濟因素的不對稱效果及查核事務所規模之影響」,2006會計理論與實務研討會。
二、英文文獻
1. Beasley M. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review 71 (4): 443-465.
2. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and H. P. Lang. 2002. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57: 2741-2772.
3. Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in east Asian corporations. Journal of Finance Economics 58: 81-112.
4. Elliott, J. and W. Shaw. 1988. Write-offs as accounting procedures to manage perceptions. Journal of Accounting Research 26 (Supplement): 91-119.

5. Elliott, J. and J. Hanna. 1996. Repeated accounting write-offs and the information content of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 34: 135-155.
6. Francis, J., J. Hanna, and L. Vincent. 1996. Causes and effects of discretionary asset write-offs. Journal of Accounting Research 34 (3): 117-134.
7. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance 57: 1147-1171.
8. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54: 471-517.
9. Loh, A. and T. Tan. 2002. Asset write-offs: managerial incentives and macroeconomic factors. Abacus 38 (1):134-151.
10. Riedl, J. 2004. An examination of long-lived asset impairment. Accounting Review 79 (3): 823-852.
11. Rees, L., S. Gill, and R. Gore. 1996. An investigation of asset writedowns and concurrent abnormal accruals. Journal of Accounting Research 34 (Supplement): 157-169.
12. Wilson, G. P. 1996. Discussion of: Write-offs: manipulation or impairment. Journal of Accounting Research 34 (Supplement):171-177.
13. Yeh, Y. H. and T. Woidtke. 2005. Commitment or entrenchment? Controlling shareholders and board composition. Journal of Banking and Finance 29, No.7: 1857-1885.
14. Zucca, L. and D. Campbell. 1992. A closer look at discretionary writedowns of impaired assets. Accounting Horizons 6 (September): 30-41.
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