隨著資本市場全球化，企業資訊揭露之態度成為投資人進行投資決策的關鍵因素之ㄧ。然而，國內外陸續發生重大弊案後，各國均增訂相關法規，加重企業高階經理人對財務報導之責任，確保財務報告之編製無虛偽、隱匿之情況。但高階經理人是否與企業資訊揭露之態度有直接的影響，則有待商榷。並且在資訊透明度之重要性愈形顯著的趨勢下，高階經理人與資訊揭露之態度間直接的關係，則尚未有研究加以分析。因此本研究將資訊揭露態度之差異做為研究之標的，考量高階經理人發生變更對資訊揭露態度所造成的影響。
本研究以證基會所設置「資訊揭露評鑑系統」之評鑑結果作為資訊揭露態度之替代變數，檢視高階經理人變更與前後年度間資訊揭露態度是否存有差異。此外，尚進一步將高階經理人─董事長及總經理─分開探究，視何者對資訊揭露之態度較有直接之關聯性，並且加以分析各種高階經理人異動原因與資訊揭露態度間之關係。本實證結果如下：
一、高階經理人有無異動與前後年度資訊揭露評鑑結果是否存有差異達顯著正相關，即高階經理人有變更之公司，其變更當年度資訊揭露評鑑結果與變更前一年度存有差異情形，較高階經理人未變更之公司明顯。
二、高階經理人之異動中，以僅總經理發生異動時，其當年度之資訊揭露評鑑結果與前一年度間存有差異之情形，較董事長及總經理均未變更之公司明顯，兩者間存在顯著正相關。
三、總經理之異動原因中，因退休、健康及死亡因素及配合公司治理專任董事長與資訊揭露評鑑結果變化間達顯著正相關，即總經理之變更係由於退休、健康及死亡因素，或為配合公司治理專任董事長而卸除該職位時，資訊揭露之態度會因此與變更前一年度有所不同。

With globalization of capital market, the attitude toward information disclosure became the key factor for investment decisions making. However, with numerous frauds occurred internationally, governments all over the world have improved related laws to increase managers’ responsibility to the reliability of financial statements. Since the capital market put highly emphasis on transparency, our goal is to examine the relationship between the managers’ turnover and the attitude toward information disclosure.
By adopting the outcome of the information disclosure review system as dependent variable to examine if the managers’ turnover cause the different attitude of information disclosure in recent years. Moreover, we separate the manager to general manager and chairman. Furthermore, we analyze the relationship between each reasons of managers’ turnover and the attitude of information disclosure.
After a series examination and analysis, it can be concluded as follows:
1. It shows significant positive correlation between managers’ turnover and changes of attitude toward information disclosure.
2. Separating the management, there is highly significant positive correlation between general managers’ turnover and the changed attitude toward information disclosure, while the chairman turnover won’t change the attitude toward information disclosure in recent years.
3. In the reasons of general managers’ turnover, the reasons that retirement, death and health and according to corporate governance have highly significant correlation with changes of attitude toward information disclosure.

謝辭 II
論文摘要 III
英文摘要 IV
表目錄 VII
圖目錄 VII
第一章　　緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的與貢獻 4
第三節 研究架構與流程 6
第二章 文獻探討 8
第一節 企業資訊揭露 8
第二節 高階經理人變更 16
第三章 研究方法 20
第一節 研究假說 20
第二節 變數衡量 25
第三節 實證模型之建立 30
第四節 資料來源、研究期間與樣本選取 32
第四章 實證結果分析 41
第一節 敘述性統計分析 41
第二節 相關係數分析 44
第三節 實證結果分析 50
第四節 高階經理人異動原因之探討 53
第五章 結論與限制 66
第一節 研究結論 66
第二節 研究限制 68
第三節 研究建議 68

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