跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(3.236.84.188) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/08/06 13:00
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:盧慶樺
研究生(外文):Ching-Hua Lu
論文名稱:建立外派員工教育訓練費用分擔之合作模型
論文名稱(外文):A cooperative model for temporary workers’ training expense sharing
指導教授:周瑛琪周瑛琪引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ying-Chyi Chou
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東海大學
系所名稱:企業管理學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
語文別:中文
論文頁數:67
中文關鍵詞:人力派遣外包暫時性工作者合作模型史塔克貝模型
外文關鍵詞:temporary agencyoutsourcingtemporary workerscooperative modelStackelberg model
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:564
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0
許多針對人力派遣產業的研究都基於交易關係(transactional relationship)來作為其研究背景,例如探討如何篩選人力派遣公司、如何建立交易機制。但很少研究立基於雙方為一伙伴關係(partnership)的前提下,買賣雙方如何建立合作機制,以尋求買賣雙方整體系統的利潤極大,基於此,本研究提出合作教育訓練模型,建立人力派遣買賣雙方對於外派人員的合作訓練機制,希望藉由人力派遣公司與半導體設備供應商合作,對於派遣員工的教育訓練提出一個合作的方式,一來可以減少半導體設備供應商對於暫時性工作員工的訓練成本支出,二來可以增加人力派遣公司人員外派的成功機率。我們採用三種模型來加以探討:第一種為史塔克貝(史塔克貝)的領導-跟隨(Leader-Follower)模型,我們假設人力派遣公司為跟隨者,而要派公司為領導者;第二種為非合作的納許同步賽局,我們假設人力派遣公司與半導體設備供應商彼此同時且獨立地行動。第三種為合作賽局,藉由柏拉圖改善的概念,雙方追求的是整體的利潤極大。
本研究發現,在不合作的情況下,人力派遣公司的利潤在納許模式下的利潤會低於史塔克貝模式,故人力派遣公司會傾向成為跟隨者;而在不合作的情況下,雙方整體的利潤會低於雙方合作時的利潤,故要派公司應制訂一個利潤分配機制,讓人力派遣公司有意願採行合作模式,最後,針對合作所額外增加的利潤,亦提出了四種利潤分配的方式。
Much research of temporary workers dispatch industry are base on transactional relationship. But few studies try to investigate a cooperative(co-op) model based on partnership. our paper attempts to investigate a co-op model and building a co-op training mechanism for the buyers and the seller. At the first,, we can reduce the temporary agency training fee for temporary workers’. Second, increase the success probability of temporary dispatch workers using the model. In a leader-follower noncooperative game, the buyer is assumed to be a leader, the temporary agency, as a follower, decides on the percentage of sharing the training fee. In a noncooperative simultaneous move game, the buyer and the seller are assumed to act simultaneously and independently. In a cooperative game, the system profit is maximized for every Pareto efficient co-op advertising scheme.

We discovered, in noncooperative situation, the temporary agency’s profit are higher in Stackelberg model than in Nash model. Therefore, the temporary agency is to be willing to be a follower. The total system profit are higher at a co-op model than at noncooperative model(Stackelberg, Nash models). Base on this, the buyer should try to build a profit sharing mechanism, to attract the temporary agency to be willing to cooperative. Finally, we bring up four profit sharing models for the extra profit of the cooperation model.
目次
摘要………………………………………………………………………………….I
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………II
目次…………………………………………………………………………………III
表次…………………………………………………………………………………V
圖次…………………………………………………………………………………VI

第一章 緒論
第一節 研究背景……………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究動機……………………………………………………………2
第三節 研究目的……………………………………………………………3
第四節 研究流程……………………………………………………………5
第二章 文獻回顧
第一節 教育訓練……………………………………………………………6
一、教育訓練定義………………………………………………………6
二、教育訓練之重要性…………………………………………………8三、教育訓練之功能……………………………………………………8
四、教育訓練成效評估…………………………………………………10
第二節 人力派遣……………………………………………………………11
一、人力派遣定義………………………………………………………11
二、人力派遣沿革………………………………………………………12
三、人力派遣成因………………………………………………………12
四、人力派遣之勞雇關係………………………………………………14
第三節 Stackelberg模型………………………………………….…………16
一、 模型簡介……………………………………………………………16
二、 Stackelberg模型之應用…………………………………………….17
第四節 Nash均衡……………………………………………………..……..17
一、賽局理論……………………………………………………………17
二、Nash均衡……………………………………………………………19
第五節 柏拉圖效率均衡……………………………………………………21
一、柏拉圖效率均衡定義………………………………………………21
第六節 合作廣告……………………………………………………………23
第三章 模型建立
第一節 模型建立之假設…………....…………………………….…………25
一、模型建立之假設…………………………………………………….25
二、輸入參數…………………………………………………………….26
三、決策變數…………………………………………………………….27
第二節 模型建立………………………………………….………………....27
第三節 模型求解………………………………………………….…………29
一、Stackelberg model..………………………………………………….29
二、Nash model……..……………………………………………………30
三、Cooperative model…………………………………………………...32
第四章 軟體模擬分析
第一節 個案公司介紹……………………………………………………….35
一、台灣應用材料(AMT)………………………………………………..35
二、人力派遣公司(帆宣)……………………………………….………..35
第二節 模擬情境與假設說明………………………………………………..36
第三節 模擬分析…………………………………………………….…….....39
一、參數設定…………………………………………………………..…39
二、模擬分析………………………………………………………….….43

第五章 結論與管理意涵
  第一節 研究結論………………………………………………….……….…55
第二節 後繼研究建議………………………………………………….…….57

參考文獻……………………………………………………………..…………59




















表次
表2-1-1:教育訓練定義之整理…………………………………………………6
表2-2-1:人力派遣成因……………………………………………………….13
表2-4-1:賽局與納許均衡之相關應用……………………………………….19
表2-5-1:柏拉圖效率均衡之相關應用……………………………………….22
表4-3-1:Stackelberg model之利潤函數表……………………………………44
表4-3-2:Nash model之利潤函數表………………………………………….46
表4-3-3:Cooperative model之利潤函數表………………………………….47
表4-3-4:Stackelberg model之利潤函數表……………………………………49
表4-3-5:Nash model之利潤函數表………………………………………….51
表4-3-6:Cooperative model之利潤函數表……………………………….…53





















圖次
圖1-4-1:研究流程圖………………………………………………………………….5圖2-2-1:人力派遣之勞雇關係………………………………………………….…14
圖4-1-1:半導體設備供應商、製造商、人力派遣公司三方作業流程……….....37
圖4-3-1:Stackelberg model下之決策流程……………………………………..…40
圖4-3-2:Nash model下之決策流程……………………………………………….41
圖4-3-3:Cooperative model下之決策流程…………………………………….…42
圖4-3-4:Stackelberg model之利潤函數圖……………………………………..…45
圖4-3-5:Nash model之利潤函數圖…………………………………………….…46
圖4-3-6:Cooperative model之利潤函數圖………………………………………..48
圖4-3-7:Stackelberg model之利潤函數圖…………………………………………50
圖4-3-8:Nash model之利潤函數圖…………………………………………….…52
圖4-3-9:Cooperative model之利潤函數圖………………………………………..53
參考文獻:
一、中文部分:
1.李來希(2000)。「台灣人才派遣制度現況之研究---以日本人才派遣為比較基礎」。國立中山大學人力資源管理研究所碩士論文。
2.宋明賢(1996)。「製造業勞資雙方對企業教育訓練成效之態度比較研究」。私立高雄工學院管理科學研究所碩士論文。
3.吳若萱(2000)。「派遣勞動如何重塑僱傭關係與企業用人政策」。非典型工作型態發展與勞動政策研討會論文集,85-96。
4.吳秉恩(1985)。「管理才能發展文獻研討」。台北:中國經濟企業研究所出版。
5.邱駿彥(1996)。「勞工派遣業法律問題探討」。台北,行政院勞工委員會。
6.陳正良(1994)。「派遣勞工之僱用關係與勞動條件」。勞資關係月刊,12,12,9。
7.陳吟旭(1999)。「台灣大型企業教育訓練外包之研究」。國立中正大學勞工研究所碩士論文。
8.康自立(1985)。「建教合作教育原理」。台北:全華。
9.張建忠(1981)。我國中央公務人員在職訓練之研究。國立政治大學公共行政研究所碩士論文。
10.張愷倫(2001)。「人力派遣之跨國比較----以在台日系執業之人力派遣業者為例」。國立中山人力資源管理研究所 碩士學位論文。
11.程德貞(1999)。「訓練模式與其成效之關係探討— 以高科技產業為例」。私立實踐大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
12.鄭津津 (1998)。「派遣勞動相關法律問題之探討」。就業與訓練,16,6,12-16。
13.戴幼農(1983)。「訓練成效評估」。就業與訓練,1,4,55-60。

二、英文部分:
1.Acemoglu, D. & Pischke, JS. (1998). Why do firms train? Theory and evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, pp.79-119.
2.Acemoglu, D. & Pischke, JS. (1999). Beyond Becker: Training in Imperfect Labour Markets. The Economic Journal, 109(453), pp.112.
3.Acemoglu, D. (1997). Training and innovation in an imperfect labor market. Review of Economic Studies. 64, pp.445-464.
4.Acemoglu, D. (2003). Cross-Country Inequality Trends. The Economic Journal, 113, pp.121-149.
5.Alepuz, M.D. & Urbano, A. (1999). Duopoly experimentation: Cournot competition. Mathematical Social Sciences, 37, pp.165-188.
6.Atkinson, P. E. (1999). Outsourcing human resources. Management Services, 43, pp.20-22.
7.Autor, D. H. (2001). Wiring the Labor Market. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(1), pp.25-40.
8.Bakken, D. & Bernstein, A. L. (1982). A systematic approach to evaluation. Training and Development Journal, August, pp.44-51.
9.Barkema, HG. & Gomez-Mejia, LR. (1998). Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance: A General Research Framework. The Academy of Management Journal.
10.BARTEL, A. P. (1995), “Training, Wage Growth, and Job Performance: Evidence from a Company Database”, Journal of Labour Economics, 13, 3, 401-425.
11.Basu, K. (1994). Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentives. Economics Letters, 49, pp.459-464.
12.Bischi, G.I. & Kopel, M. (1998). Equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game with adaptive expectations. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 46, pp.73-100.
13.Booth, A. L. & Zoega, G. (2000). Is Wage Compression a Necessary Condition for Firm-financed General Training? A Comment on Acemoglu and Pischke. Discussion Paper. 2.
14.Brandenburg, D. C. (1982). Training Evaluation: What's the CurrentStatus?Training and Development Journal. 36(8), pp.14-19.
15.Brownstein, B.P. (1980). Pareto Optimality, External Benefits and Public Goods: A Subjectivist Approach. Jorunal of Libertarian Studies,4(1).
16.Bushnell, S. D. (1990). Input, Process, output: A model for evaluating training. Training and Development Journal, 44(3), pp.41-43.
17.Carnevale, A. P. & Schulz, E. R. (1990). Evaluation framework, design, and report. Training and Development Journal, 44(7), pp-15-23.
18.Chiesa, V. & Barbeschi, M. (1994). Technology strategy in competence-based competition, in G. Hamel, A. Heene (eds.), Competence Based Competition, J. Wiley, Chichester, UK, pp.293-314.
19.Clegg, W. H. (1987). Management training evaluation: An update. Training and Development Journal, 41(2), pp.65-71.
20.Cook, M. F. (1999). Outsourcing human resource functions. New York: AMACOM.
21.Davidson, L. (1998). Cut away noncore HR. Costa Mesa: Workforce, 77, pp.40-45.
22.Davy, J. A. (1998). Outsourcing human resource headaches. Managing Office Technology, 43, pp.6-8.
23.DeRose, G. J. & McLaughlin, J. (1995). Outsourcing through partnerships. Alexandria: Training &Development, 49(10), pp.51-55.
24.Dopyera, J. & Pitone, L.(1983). Decision points in playing the evaluation of training. Training and Development Journal, 37(5), pp.66-71.
25.Erickson, R. C. & Wentling, T. L. (1976). Measuring student growth. Griffon Press. Urbana, IL.
26.Foote, D.A. & Folta, T.B. (2002), Temporary Workers as Real Options. Human Resource Management Review, 12(4), pp.579-597.
27.Franz W. & Soskice D.W. (1995). The German Apprenticeship System. Institutional Frameworks and Labor Market Performance.
28.Gaither, C. (2001). Com Plans to Cut 28% of Its Works. New York Times, C4.
29.Gaspart, F. & Seki, E. (2003). Cooperation, status seeking and competitive behaviour: theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 51, pp.51-77.
30.Gemunden, H.G., Ritter,T. & Heydebreck, P. (1996). Network configuration and innovation success: An empirical analysis in German high-tech industries. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 13, pp-449-462.
31.Gilley, K. M. & Rasheed, A. (2000). Making more by doing less: An analysis of outsourcing and its effects on firm performance. Journal of Management, 26, pp.763-790.
32.Gilley, K. M. & Rasheed, A. (2000). Making more by doing less: An analysis of outsourcing and its effects on firm performance. Journal of Management, 26, pp.763-790.
33.Greer, C. R., Youngblood, S. A. & Gray, D. A. (1999). Human resource management outsourcing: The make or buy decision. Ada: The Academy of management Executive. 13, pp.85-96.
34.Hillebrand, B. & Biemans, W.G. (2003). The relationship between internal and external cooperation-literature review and propositions. Journal of Business Research, 56(9), pp.735-743.
35.Huselid, M.A., Jackson, S.E. & Schuler, R.S. (1997). Technical and Strategic Human Resource Management Effectiveness as Determinants of Firm Performance. The Academy of Management Journal, 40(1), pp.171-188.
36.James, C. & Walker, M. (1998). Learning to play Cournot duopoly strategies. Jorunal of Economic Behavior &Organization, 36, pp.141-161.
37.Jun, S. P. & Armstrong, G.M. (1997). The bases of power in churches: An analysis from a resource dependence perspective. Social Science Jouranl, 34, pp.105-131.
38.Kalwani, M.U. & Narayandas. N. (1995). Long-Term Manufacturer-Supplier Relationships: Do They Pay off for Supplier Firms?. Journal of Marketing, 59(1), pp.1-16.
39.Kandel, E. & Pearson, N. D. (2001). Flexibility versus Commitment in Personnel Management. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 15(4), pp.515-556.
40.Katz, E. & Ziderman, A. (1990). Investment in General Training: The Role of Information and Labour Mobility. The Economic Journal, 100(403), pp.1147-1158.
41.Katzenbach, JR. Smith, DK. (1993). The discipline of teams. Harvard Business Review, Mar-Apr, 71, pp.111-120.
42.Kelly, A.I., Orgel, R.F. & Baer, D.F. (1984). Evaluation: The bottom line is closer than you think. Training and Development Journal, 38(8), pp.32-37.
43.Klaas, B. S., McClendon, J. A. & Gainey, T. W. (2001). Outsourcing HR: The impact of organizational characteristics. Human Resource Management, 40, pp.125-138.
44.Klaas, B. S., Mclendon, J. & Gainey, T. W. (1999). HR outsourcing and its impact: The role of transaction costs. Durham: Personnel Psychology, 52, pp.113-136.
45.Knoblauch, V. (1997). A pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a 3-firm location game on a sphere. Journal of Location Science, 4(4), pp.247-250.
46.Knoke, D. & Janowiec-Kurle, L. (1999). Make or buy: The externalization of company job training. Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 16, pp.85-106.
47.Latham, G. P. & Wexley, K. N. (1981), Increasing Productivity Through Performance Appraisal. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA.
48.Lee, J.N., Huynh, M.Q., Chi-wai, K.R. & Pi, S.M. (2000). The evolution of outsourcing research: What is the next issue? Proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii international conference on System Sciences.
49.Lever, S. (1997). An analysis of managerial motivations behind outsourcing practices in human resource. Human Resource Planning, 20, pp.37-47.
50.Loewenstein & Spletzer. (1998). Dividing the Costs and Returns to General Training. Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), pp.142-171.
51.Low, Brian Koon Huat. (1996). Long-Term Relationship in Industrial Marketing. Industrial Marketing Management, 25, pp.23-35.
52.Mark, A. H., Susan, E. J. & Randall, S. S. (1997). Technical and Strategic Human Resource Management Effectiveness as Determinants of Firm Performance. The Academy of Management Journal, 40(1), pp.171-188.
53.Martin, J. P. & Howerton, P. (1999). Outsourcing: An alternative solutin to providing management and staff development. Frederick: Home Health Care Management & Practice, 11(2), pp.41-45.
54.Matthyssens, P. & Van den Builte, C. (1994). Getting closer and nicer: partnerships in the supply chain. Long Range Plann, 27(1), pp.72–83.
55.Maurer, R. & Mobley, N. (1998). Outsourcing: Is it the HR department of the future?. New York: HR Focus, 75, pp.9-10.
56.Meertens, M., Potters, J. & Reijnierse, H. (2002). Envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations in economies with indivisible goods and money. Journal of Mathematical Social Sciences, 44, pp.223-233.
57.Michele, B. & Zaccour, G. (2001). Equilibria in asymmetric duopoly facing a security constraint. Energy Economics, 23, pp.457-475.
58.Morris, D. J. (1997). Going global: Expatriate outsourcing can help. Brookfield: Benefits Quaterly, 13, pp.46-48.
59.Mullery, C. B. & Brenner, S. N. (1995). A structural analysis of corporate political activity. Business & Society, 34, pp.147-171.
60.Nadler D.A. (1979). The effects of Feedback on Task Group Behavior: A Review of the Experimental Research. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 23, pp.309-338.
61.Ngwenyama, O. K. & Bryson, N. (1999). Making the information systems outsourcing decision: A transaction cost approach to analyzing outsourcing decision problems. European Journal of Operational Research, pp.351-367.
62.Olalla, M. F. (1999). The resource-based theory and human resources. International Advances in Economic Research, 5, pp.84-92.
63.Pfeffer, J. (1994). Competitive Advantage Through People. Harvard Business School Press, Boston.
64.Phillips, J. J. (1983). Handbook of training evealuation and measurement methods. Gulf Publishing Company. Houston, TX.
65.Pinker, E.J. & Larson, R.C. (2003). Optimizing the Use of Contingent Labor when Demand is Uncertain. European Journal of Operational Research, 44(1), pp.39-55.
66.Sammer, J. (1998). Using the business case for training outsourcing. Yarmouth: Service News, 18, pp.17-20.
67.Schroyen, F. (1997). Pareto efficient income taxation under costly monitoring. Journal of Public Economics, 65, pp-343-366.
68.Shelgren, D. (2001). HR outsourcing. The Journal of Business Strategy, 22(4), pp.4.
69.Shelton, S. & Alliger, G. (1993). Who's afraid of level 4 evaluation?. Training and Development Journal, 47(6), pp.43-46.
70.Solomon, C. M. (1998). Protect your outsourcing investment. Costa Mesa: Workforce, 77, pp.130-132.
71.Solomon, C. M. (1998). Protect your outsourcing investment. Costa Mesa: Workforce, 77, pp.130-132.
72.Spee, J.C. (1995). Addition by subtraction: Outsourcing strengthens business fo. HRMagazine, 40, pp.38.
73.Susan, X.L., Zhimin, H. & Allan, A. (1996). Improving buyer-seller system cooperation through inventory control. International Journal of Production Economics, 43, pp.37-46.
74.Swierczek, F.W. & Carmichael, L. (1985). The quantity and quality of evaluating training. Training and Development Journal, 39(1), pp.95-99.
75.Tesoro, F. M. (1991). The Use of The Measurement of Continuous Improvement Model For Training Evaluation. Ph.D, Purdue University.
76.Tsang, E.W.K. (1998). Motives for strategic alliance: A resource-based perspective. Scand. J. Mgmt, 14, pp.207-221.
77.Wang, X.H. (1998). Fee versus royalty licensing in a cournot duopoly model. Economics Letters, 60, pp.55-62.
78.Wolf, D.D. & Smeers, Y. (1997). A Stochastic Version of a stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Equilibrium Model. Management Science, 43(2), pp.190-197.
79.Xing, W., & Wu, F.F. (2001). A game-theoretical model of private power production. Electrical Power and Energy system. 23, pp.213-218.
80.Zhimin, H., & Susan X. L. (2001). Co-op advertising models in manufacturer-retailer supply chains: A game theory approach. European Journal of Operational Research, 135, pp.527-544.
連結至畢業學校之論文網頁點我開啟連結
註: 此連結為研究生畢業學校所提供,不一定有電子全文可供下載,若連結有誤,請點選上方之〝勘誤回報〞功能,我們會盡快修正,謝謝!
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top