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研究生:林珈宇
研究生(外文):Chia-Yu Lin
論文名稱:經理人持股、董事會結構與CEO雙重性之關聯性研究
論文名稱(外文):The Interrelationship among Managerial Ownership, Board Structure, and CEO Duality
指導教授:李秀英李秀英引用關係林灼榮林灼榮引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsiu-Ying LeeCho-Jung Lin
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東海大學
系所名稱:會計學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
語文別:中文
論文頁數:83
中文關鍵詞:公司治理經理人持股董事會結構CEO雙重性公司績效董事長經理人內部人方程式董事會
外文關鍵詞:Corporate governanceManagerial ownershipBoard structureCEO dualityFirm performancesystemtaiwandata
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  • 被引用被引用:11
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有鑒於過去大部分研究均著重在探討經理人持股與公司績效(或公司價值)間之關係,以及董事會特性對經營績效之影響,鮮少將經理人持股與董事會結構兩主題合併探討,且殊少探討經理人持股對CEO雙重性之影響。本文則將此三項議題予以串連,企圖找出相關性。Agrawal and Knoeber(1996)將降低代理問題之治理機制區分為內部人持股、大股東持股和外部董事的設置等;公司通常不會只採用一種內部治理機制,而是互相搭配使用以解決代理問題。因此經理人持股、董事會組成與CEO雙重性間存在著密切關係。本研究以2002年至2005年台灣上市公司為研究對象,考慮其間相互影響且共同決定的特性,建構聯立方程式模型並使用兩階段最小平方法進行迴歸估計。實證結果發現,經理人持股、董事會結構與CEO雙重性,三者之間呈現互為因果之關係,印證Agrawal and Knoeber(1996)、Barnhart and Rosenstein(1998)、Denis and Sarin(1999)、Mak and Li(2001)及Lasfer(2006)等之主張。其次,在經理人持股與董事會結構交互影響下,考慮外部大股東持股此控制變數,發現外部大股東持股與經理人持股呈現顯著負相關;也發現外部大股東持股對董事會結構、CEO雙重性有顯著的影響,分別與董事會規模呈負向關係、與獨立董事席次比例、CEO雙重性則呈現正向關係。它顯示,外部大股東持股也會影響經理人持股、董事會組成及CEO雙重性。最後,本研究以資產報酬率、Tobin’s Q及股票報酬變異來衡量公司績效。實證結果發現,公司績效也會反向影響經理人持股、董事會結構與CEO雙重性。雖然使用不同的績效指標所估計出的結果並不一致,但是可以得知,不是只有經理人持股與董事會結構會影響公司績效;公司績效的好壞不僅使經理人持股發生變動,也會促使董事會改組。因此董事會規模、內(外)部董事席次比例、獨立董事席次比例以及董事長是否由高階經理人擔任皆會隨著產生變化。
In the field of corporate governance, there are majority of domestic papers studying the relationship from either managerial ownership or board structure characteristics to firm performance. Few articles, however, investigate the interaction among managerial ownership, board structures, and CEO duality. According to Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), the use of mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders are shareholdings of insiders, blockholders, use of outside directors, etc. Since the existence of alternative mechanisms, the use of one may depend upon the use of others. Therefore, there are mutually closely relation between managerial ownership and the board structure.
This study uses four-year panel data of Taiwan listed companies from 2002 to 2005. We consider the relationship between managerial ownership and the board structure both interdependently and jointly. Construct simultaneous system model and two stage least squares are used. We find a mutually causal relationship among managerial ownership, board structures, and CEO duality. The results support the arguments of previous studies (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Denis and Sarin, 1999; Mak and Li, 2001; Lasfer, 2006).
Furthermore, under the interaction of managerial ownership and board structures, considered the exterior blockholders and find exterior block ownership is positive correlated with managerial ownership.We also find the board structures and leadership structures have been influenced by the exterior blockholders, which are negative correlated with the board size and are positive correlated with the proportion of outside independent directors and CEO duality (the CEO and chairman are identical).
Finally, we use the rate of return on total assets (ROA)、Tobin's Q and the variance estimation of stock return to measure the firm performance.The result is that the firm performance also can affect the managerial ownership, the board structure ,and leadership structure.We find that there reverse causal relationship.Although there are the inconsistent estimation results of firm performance which we use the different measuring indexes to measure, not only the managerial ownership and the board structure have influence on firm performance, but the firm performance also cause the managerial ownership change and promote the board structure to reorganize. Therefore, the board size, the proportion of inside (outside) directors, the proportion of independent directors and whether the CEO and the chairman are identical can comply with the firm performance.
目 錄
謝辭 Ⅰ
中文摘要 Ⅲ
英文摘要 Ⅳ
表目次 Ⅵ
圖目次 Ⅶ
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 論文架構 5
第二章 文獻探討 7
第一節 代理理論與監督機制 7
第二節 股權結構理論與經營績效 9
第三節 董事會功能、結構與經營績效 13
第四節 經理人持股與董事會之關係 18
第三章 研究設計 20
第一節 理論架構與假說建立 20
第二節 實證模型與研究方法 27
第三節 變數定義與衡量 30
第四節 資料來源與樣本選取 39
第四章 實證結果 40
第一節 敘述性統計 40
第二節 模型Ⅰ之實證結果 46
第三節 模型Ⅱ之實證結果 63
第四節 實證結果分析與解釋 69
第五章 結論與建議 71
第一節 研究結論 71
第二節 研究限制 71
第三節 後續研究建議 71
參考文獻 71
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1. 王元章,2001,內部人持股、風險、股利、負債、投資與公司價值,証券市場發展季刊第十三卷,第三期,頁29-69。
2. 杜玉振、黃荃、林容竹,2002,董事會特性對經營績效、財務決策之影響研究-以台灣上市公司為例,管理與系統,第九卷,第三期,頁345-368。
3. 李佳玲、葉穎蓉、何晉滄,2005,績效、公司治理與高階管理者離職關係之實證研究,中山管理評論,第十三卷,第一期,頁75-106。
4. 洪榮華、陳香如、王玉珍,2005,公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係-股權結構與董事會特性的觀點,輔仁管理評論,第十二卷,第三期,頁23-40。
5. 許和鈞、謝國文、楊之宜,2002,管理者持股與公司經營績效,亞太社會科技學報,第二卷,第一期,頁103-118。
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