臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文研究台灣上市上櫃公司董事會網絡密度與董事會規模對於公司價值的影響，以門檻迴歸模型分析，並且同時使用董事會網絡密度與董事會規模來當作門檻變數，研究結果可以將台灣上市上櫃公司分為五個區間。本研究發現，董事會網絡密度基本上對公司績效是呈現負向影響，特別是在董事會規模大於某一程度下（如區間3與區間5），此負向影響的效果又特別顯著，與董事會網絡密度的大小，並無顯著相關。可能如同Bacon (1973)指出，董事會規模與公司績效呈正相關（區間3與區間5之平均公司價值大於其他區間），其認為較多的董事人數有較寬廣的教育、技術與產業背景，且對於公司的經營決策能提出較多的看法與建議。另外在外部董監事的議題上，有許多學者皆認為外部董監事對於公司價值是有正面的影響(Hill and Snell, 1988; Zahra and Pearce, 1992)。本研究發現，在OLS模型下外部董監事比例越高對於公司價值是有正面的幫助，但是在用門檻模型區分下，在董事或網絡密度較低的情況下（如區間2與區間3），增加外部董監事比例對於增加公司價值才有顯著的影響。

The purpose of this study is to find the relationship of board network density,board size and firm value with threshold analysis in Taiwan listing company . We use both of board network density and board size as threshold variable and split the sample to five regimes. The results show that density has negative effect on firm value basically, and it has stronger effect when the board size is over 1.599 (regime 3 and regime5). The negative effect is not relevant to the size of density. This result is like as Bacon (1973). Board size has positive effect on firm value (the average value of firm is high in regime 3 and regime5), because bigger board sizes have more education and industry background which can give more suggestion for operation. In the other hand, the subject of outside board directors, there are many scholars who suggest that outside board directors have positive effect on firm value (Hill and Snell, 1988; Zahra and Pearce, 1992). In our study, the result of OLS regression shows that higher outside board director ratio has positive effect on firm value. However, under the situation of sample split, only when the board network density is low (like regime 2 and regime 3), increasing the outside board director ratio is positive effect on firm value.

摘　要 i
英文摘要 ii
誌 謝 iii
目 錄 v
表目錄 vii
圖目錄 viii
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景與動機 1
1.2 研究目的 5
1.3 研究架構 6
1.4 研究流程 7
第二章 相關文獻探討 8
2.1 公司治理 8
2.2 董事會與公司治理 10
2.3 董事會組成與公司績效 12
2.3.1 董事會規模與公司績效 13
2.3.2 董事會成員型態與公司績效 14
2.4 網絡關係與公司績效 15
2.4.1 社會網絡的定義 15
2.4.2 社會網絡的起源與發展 16
2.4.3 社會網絡分析的步驟 17
2.4.4 網絡特性與公司績效之相關研究 18
第三章 研究方法 21
3.1 門檻迴歸 21
3.1.1 門檻迴歸概述 21
3.1.2 門檻迴歸參數的估計與檢定 22
3.1.3 門檻迴歸的漸進分配 24
3.1.4 門檻迴歸的信賴區間 25
3.2 網絡分析法 26
第四章 實證模型與結果分析 27
4.1 資料來源 27
4.2 變數定義與衡量 27
4.3 前測模型 32
4.4 檢驗董事會網絡密度之門檻模型 33
4.5 研究結果 34
第五章 結論與建議 46
5.1 結論 46
5.2 未來研究建議 48
參考文獻 49

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