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研究生:李青宜
研究生(外文):Ching-i Lee
論文名稱:公司治理與盈餘管理之關連性研究
論文名稱(外文):EMPIRICAL STUDY ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
指導教授:陳瑞璽陳瑞璽引用關係
指導教授(外文):Rusy-Shii Chen
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:大同大學
系所名稱:事業經營學系(所)
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
論文頁數:109
中文關鍵詞:公司治理盈餘管理
外文關鍵詞:GovernanceEarnings Management.
相關次數:
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在經歷1997年的亞洲金融風暴後,世界銀行及學術界的研究指出,企業的所有權逐漸分散,在經營權與所有權分離的條件下,產生代理問題;管理者為追求個人利益、在自利動機下,可能會違背公司利益、無法確保管理者善盡為股東謀求最大利益,導致企業競爭力下滑、部分公司的大股東與管理階層聯合掏空公司資產;在1999年世界銀行將公司治理化分成外部治理及內部治理二部分,期望能透過市場機制與法律規範,來提升公司的營運績效與股東價值,特別是股權分散的國家採用公司治理機制,使得公司股東及利害關係人都能得到合理、公平的對待。
本研究採用以1996至2006上市、上櫃公司為研究對象,使用Eviews統計軟體作對研究假說進行實證分析,驗證出所提出的各項研究假設。
研究結果發現:董監事持股比例與盈餘管理無呈現顯著關係;在不同產業中,董監事質押比率與盈餘管理呈現關係有所不同;經理人持股比率的多寡對於盈餘管理雖呈負向關係,但並不顯著。
政府機構持股比率方面與盈餘管理其關係呈現不顯著。在不同產業中,本國金融機構、外國投資專業機構與盈餘管理呈現關係有所不同;庫藏股票與盈餘管理皆呈現正向顯著關係。
設立獨立董事席位及獨立董事的比例上,與盈餘管理無顯著關係;在不同產業中,設立獨立監事及獨立監事比例與盈餘管理呈現關係有所不同。
After experiencing the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the World Bank and academic researchers pointed out that the conditions of separation of operating right and the ownership. Managers in pursuing personal interests may transgress the interests of the company. Managers are unable to ensure the best interests of shareholders, incomprehensive protection of shareholders and relevant stakeholders and poor execution resulted in decline of enterprises’ competitiveness and part of the company’s largest shareholders emptied out the company's assets.
In 1999, the World Bank divided corporate governance system into external and internal mechanisms. It acts in the role of supervising the company’s management stratum, protecting the benefits of the shareholders and the relevant parties involved in gains and losses and ensuring the company's operating performance. It is improve the operating performance and values of the shareholders so that shareholders and stakeholders of the company may receive reasonable and fair returns.
This study mainly uses listed companies from 1996 to 2006 in Taiwan to investigate our hypotheses. This study applies Eviews Statistical Software to carry on the analysis.
This study can be summarized:
Holding ratio of directors and supervisors, shares collateralized ratio of directors and earnings management are no significant results. There is no significant relationship between managers’ shareholding ratio and earnings management in this study.
The relationship in this study is not significant between holding ratio of government and earnings management, the local financial institutions shareholding ratio, foreign investors’ shareholding ratio has the significant positive effect on earnings management in whole industry and the electronic industry, but the non-electronic industry estimate result is different from the two industries. There is a significant positive relationship between share repurchase and earnings management in the electronic industry. When the company’s repurchase ratio is high, it will reduce earnings management.
The duty of independent directors is to improve earnings management and to insure earnings information can offer true corporate performance. In this study, we do not find any significant relationship between the number or ratio of independent directors and earnings management. In whole industry and the electronic industry, there are significant negative relationships between the number of independent supervisors and earnings management and a significant negative relationship between the ratio of independent supervisors and earnings management, but the non-electronic industry is not.
ABSTRACT IN CHINESE i
ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………..v
CONTENT…………………………………………………………………vi
LIST OF TABLE viii
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION 1
RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 1
RESEARCH PURPOSE 2
LITERATURE REVIEW 4
INTERNAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISM 4
EXTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM 13
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 16
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT TO REACH EARNINGS THRESHOLD 17
RESEARCH DESIGN 22
HYPOTHESES 22
OPERATING DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 27
DATA DESCRIPTION 31
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 34
WHOLE INDUSTRY 34
THE ELECTRONIC INDUSTRY 38
THE NON-ELECTRONIC INDUSTRY 42
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 46
CONCLUSIONS 46
LIMITATION ON RESEARCH 47
RECOMMENDATIONS 48
BIBLIOGRAPHY 49
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