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研究生:楊雅善
研究生(外文):Ya-shan Yang
論文名稱:董事長兼任總經理影響因素初探
論文名稱(外文):A Study on the influential factors of corporate president serving as general manager at the same time
指導教授:張福星張福星引用關係
指導教授(外文):Fu-hsin Chang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立雲林科技大學
系所名稱:會計系研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2007
畢業學年度:95
語文別:中文
論文頁數:80
中文關鍵詞:董事長兼任總經理
外文關鍵詞:corporate president serving as general manager
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:3
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台灣近幾年來上市公司弊案頻傳,究其根源多在於公司治理機制的疏漏。此外,根據商業周刊2005年7月4日調查報導,2004年績效比同業差又比去年差,但董事長薪酬卻比同業高又比去年高,自肥最嚴重的公司計有21家,其中董事長兼任總經理者計有9家,比率高達42.86%。有鑑於此,證期局表示,不鼓勵上市櫃公司董事長兼任公司經理人,以免造成「球員兼裁判」的問題。然而,在2005年我國上市公司中達四分之一以上是不符合證期局所要求,董事長與總經理均為同一人,其中更包括鴻海及華碩2家獲利成長及財務穩健的標竿企業在內。證期局片面認為,球員兼裁判的結果即易滋生弊端的看法,實有需再作更進一步深入的探討。
本研究在公司治理概念引伸下,以公司股權結構、經營績效及規模等因素,採台灣電子類股上市公司為研究樣本,運用羅吉斯迴歸模型分析進行實證研究,探討台灣上市公司董事長兼任總經理之影響因素,藉此檢視證期局看法對國內企業之適切性。
實證結果發現,董事長持股比率與董事長兼任總經理呈正向關係;董監事持股比率、公司規模與董事長兼任總經理呈負向關係;而公司經營績效並非董事長兼任總經理之主要考量。研究結果期望提供政府及企業不同面向的參考。
The increasing scandals of listed company in Taiwan these years mainly originated from the flaws of company management mechanism. According to the report of Business Weekly( July 04,2005),there are 21 companys with lower performance but with higer salary for the president of the company. Among them,there are 9 companies whose president also serve as general manager with the ration of 42.86%. Securities and Futures Bureau expressed the opinion of not encouraging these companied of such situation to avoid the problem of "player and referee the same one".But in 2005,one out of 4 company didn’t meet the expectation form Securities and Futures Bureau including leading companies like FOXCONN co.Ltd and ASUS co. Ltd. Securities and Futures Bureau assumed it is necessary to inquiry more into this situation.
This study starts out from the notion of company management to study the influence of the president also served as general manager. With the factors of ownership structure, operating performance and company size ,this study uses Logistic Regression model to justify Securities and Futures Bureau’s opions.
The study shows that the "stock holding ratio of president" and" the president also serves as GM" has a positive correlation ,while the stock-holding ratio of stock ownership directors,company size and the "president also served as GM" has a negative correlation.The company performance is not a main consideration for "president also served as GM". The study hopes to provide alternative reference for the government and the business.
中文摘要 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- i
英文摘要 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ii
誌謝 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- iv
目錄 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- v
表目錄 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- vi
圖目錄 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- vii
一、 緒論-------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
1.1 研究動機與背景----------------------------------------------------- 1
1.2 研究目的-------------------------------------------------------------- 7
1.3 研究架構-------------------------------------------------------------- 8
二、 文獻探討-------------------------------------------------------------- 10
2.1 公司治理-------------------------------------------------------------- 10
2.2 公司治理相關文獻-------------------------------------------------- 16
2.3 股權結構與經營績效----------------------------------------------- 21
2.4 董事長兼總經理相關文獻探討----------------------------------- 26
三、 研究方法-------------------------------------------------------------- 32
3.1 研究假說-------------------------------------------------------------- 32
3.2 研究期間、資料來源與樣本選取-------------------------------- 35
3.3 變數定義與實證模型----------------------------------------------- 37
3.4 資料分析方法-------------------------------------------------------- 43
四、 實證結果與分析----------------------------------------------------- 45
4.1 敘述性統計及相關分析-------------------------------------------- 45
4.2 實證結果-------------------------------------------------------------- 50
4.3 敏感性分析----------------------------------------------------------- 52
五、 結論及建議----------------------------------------------------------- 60
5.1 研究結論-------------------------------------------------------------- 60
5.2 研究限制-------------------------------------------------------------- 64
5.3 研究建議-------------------------------------------------------------- 65
參考文獻 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 66



表 目 錄

表1-1 2004年自肥最嚴重的公司明細表--------------------------------------- 5
表1-2 上市公司董事長兼任總經理家數統計分析表------------------------- 6
表2-1 董監事持股比率與公司績效實證結果彙整表------------------------- 25
表3-1 實證模型所使用之變數名稱、代號及係數預期方向---------------- 42
表4-1 各變數之敘述性統計值---------------------------------------------------- 46
表4-2 自變數Pearson相關分析表----------------------------------------------- 48
表4-3 迴歸分析結果---------------------------------------------------------------- 51
表4-4 規模變數之敏感性分析---------------------------------------------------- 53
表4-5 會計基礎績效指標之敏感性分析---------------------------------------- 54
表4-6 替換績效指標與公司規模變數之敏感性分析------------------------- 55
表4-7 排除非自願性之敏感性分析----------------------------------------------- 57
表4-8 各變數之敏感性分析綜合整理------------------------------------------- 58
表5-1 董事長兼任總經理影響因素實證結果彙總表------------------------- 63









圖 目 錄

圖1-1 論文架構圖------------------------------------------------------------------- 9
一、中文部分
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〔4〕易明秋,2007,公司治理法制論,1版,五南出版。
〔5〕洪麗芳,2003,股權結構、財務決策與公司績效關聯性之研究,私立中原大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
〔6〕吳建頤,1999,董事會規模對公司價值的影響,國立中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
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〔10〕曾素花,2005,我國現階段公司治理之問題研討,中原大學會計學系研究所碩士論文。
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〔12〕陳盈翔,2006,公司治理機制與高階管理者薪酬關係之研究,東海大學企業管理系研究所碩士論文。
〔13〕陳玟秀,2004,公司資訊透明度、董事結構和股權結構與公司經營績效關係之研究-以電子產業為例,國立成功大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
〔14〕陳錦村、葉雅薰,2002,“公司改組、監督機制與盈餘管理之研究”,會計評論,34 期,頁1-28,1 月。
〔15〕葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩,2002,公司治理與評等系統,商智文化出版。
〔16〕詹錦宏及楊麗弘,2001,“臺灣上市公司股權結構與經營績效之研究-產業特性與股權質押之觀點”,臺灣銀行季刊,52,202-220。
〔17〕賴英照,2006,股市遊戲規則-最新證券交易法解析,3刷,自版。
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〔19〕盧智芳,2004,Cheers雜誌,50期, 11月。

二、英文部分
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〔2〕Barnea, A., R. Hungen and L. Senbet,1985,Agency problems and financial contracting, Englewood Cliffs New Jersey:Prentice Hall Foundations of Finance Series.
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〔7〕Daily,C.M. and Dalton, D.R.,1997,“CEO and board chair roles held jointly or separately:much ado about nothing?”, Academy of Management Executive 11(3),p.p.11-20。
〔8〕Dalton, D. R. and C. M. Daily, 1999,“ What''s wrong with having friends on the board?” Across the Board 36(3), 28-32.
〔9〕Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F.D. and Donaldson, L. ,1997,“Toward a stewardship theory of management. ”,Academy o Management Review, 22, pp. 20-47.
〔10〕Davis, G.F. and Thompson, T.A. ,1994,“A social movement perspective on corporate control.”,Administrative Science Quarterly 38, pp. 141-173.
〔11〕DeAngelo, H. and E. Rice,1983,“ Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth”, Journal of Financial Economics,11(1-4):p.329-361.
〔12〕Dechow, P.M., R.G. Sloan and A.P. Sweeney, 1996, “Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 13, 1-36.
〔13〕Donaldson, L., 1990,“The ethereal hand: Organization economics and management theory”, Academy of Management Review 15(3), 151-160..
〔14〕Fame, E. F., 1980, “Agency problem and theory of the firm”, Journal of Political Economy Vol.88, 288-307.
〔15〕Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen, 1983, “Separation of competition on CEO turnover”, Journal of Law and Economics Vol.26, 301-325.
〔16〕Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen, 1983, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325.
〔17〕Fama, E. F. and M. C. Jensen, 1983, “Agency problem and residual claims”, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 327-349.
〔18〕Forker, J.J., 1992, “Corporate Governance and Disclosure Quality.”,Accounting and Business Research 22: 111-124.
〔19〕Finkelstein, S. and D’Aveni, R. A.,1994,“CEO duality as a double-edged sword:How boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and untily of command ”, Academy of Mangement Journal, vol. 37, pp.1079-1108。
〔20〕Grinblatt, M. and C.Y. Hwang, 1989, “Signalling and the Pricing of Unseasoned New Issues”, Journal of Finance Vol.44, 393-420.
〔21〕Jensen, M. C., 1993, “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control System.”, Journal of Finance, 48, No.3, p.831-880.
〔22〕Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling, ,1976, “The Theory of Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 3, , p.5-60.、p.305-360.
〔23〕Kesner., 1987, “Directors’stock ownership and Organizational Performance: An Investigation of Fortune 500 Companies”,. Journal of Management 11(3): 499-507.
〔24〕Leland, H. and Pyle, D. H., 1977, “Information Asymmetric, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediation”, Journal of Finance Vol.32 (2), 371-388.
〔25〕Mehran, H.,1995,“Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership and Firm Performance”, Journal of Political Economy 38(2): 163-184.
〔26〕Monsen, R.J. and A.V. Downs, 1965, “A Theory of Large Managerial firms”. Journal of Political Economics 73(1965): 221-236.
〔27〕Morck, R., A. Shileifer and R. W. Vishny, 1988, “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 20, 293-315,.
〔28〕Jensen, M.C. and R.S. Ruback,1983,“The market for corporate control:The scientific evidence” , Journal of Financial Economics, 1(1-4), 5-50.
〔29〕Jensen, M. C.,1993, “The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control system”, Journal of Finance, Vol.148: 831-880.
〔30〕Patton, A. and Baker, J.C., 1987, “Why won’t Directors Rock the Boat“, Harvard Business Review 65(6): 10-18.
〔31〕Pfeffer, J. & G.R. Salancik, 1978, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependency Perspective., Harper and Row Publishers, New York.
〔32〕Rosenstein, S. and J.H. Wyatt, 1997, “Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth”,Journal of Financial Economics Vol.25, 175-191.
〔33〕Santerre, R. E. and S. P. Neum, 1993, “Corporate Control and Performance in the 1930s”,Economic Inquiry Vol.31 (3), 466-480.
〔34〕Salmon, Walter J., 1993, “Crisis prevention: How to gear up your board.”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 71 No.1,p. 68-75.
〔35〕Song, M.H. and R. Walking., 1993, “The Impact of Managerial Ownership on Acquisition Attempts and the Market for Corporate Control”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 28: 439-457.
〔36〕Tosi, H. and Gomez-Mejia, L.,1989,“ The decoupling of CEO pay and performance: An agency theory perspective”,Administrative Science Quarterly 34, pp. 169-190.
〔37〕Williamson, O. E., 1983, “Organization Form, Residual Claimants and Corporate Control”, Journal of Law and Economics Vol.26, 431-460.
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