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研究生:粘雅維
研究生(外文):Ya-Wei Nien
論文名稱:家族企業營運績效之實證研究:以台灣上市公司為例
論文名稱(外文):Why Family Controlled Firms Outperformed Non-family Controlled Firms? The Case of Taiwan.
指導教授:陳更生陳更生引用關係
指導教授(外文):Keng-Shen Chen
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:朝陽科技大學
系所名稱:財務金融系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:54
中文關鍵詞:多角化策略董事會規模股權結構營運績效代理問題家族控股企業
外文關鍵詞:DiversificationOwnership StructureBoard of DirectorAgency ProblemOperation PerformanceFamily Control Firm
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:13
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  • 下載下載:6
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摘 要
本研究利用2002至2006年台灣地區不含金融證券業之上市公司為樣本,探討家族控股與企業營運績效之間的關係,實證結果發現:台灣地區家族企業的營運績效顯著優於非家族企業,且家族企業營運績效的優越性與家族企業內部的代理問題(包括大股東與小股東之間的代理問題和股東與經理人之間的代理問題)都比一般非家族企業來得小有關。雖然文獻上指出家族控股可能改善企業內部的代理問題,但也可能使企業內部的代理問題加劇,本文研究結果顯示:家族控股可能利多於弊,是一種有效率的企業運作模式。
Abstract
This paper explores the relative operation performance of family control firms in Taiwan. By examining a data set consisted of firms in non-financial industry in Taiwan, we find that family control firms outperformed their non-family control peers. The superiority of the family control firm’s operation performance is due to the less severity of agency problem within the family control firms (not only the agency problem of the major and the puny stockholders but also the agency problem of the stockholder and the manager). Although the literatures pointed out that family control could enhance the inner agency problem of a firm. Our finding suggested that family control could also serves as an effective solution of firm’s agency problem among its shareholders and firm’s agency problem between its shareholder and manager.
目錄
摘要 I
Abstract II
誌謝 III
表目錄 V
第一章 緖論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 2
第三節 論文架構 3
第二章 相關文獻探討 4
第一節 家族企業概述 4
第二節 多角化策略 9
第三節 股權結構 10
第四節 董事會運作 12
第三章 研究設計 15
第一節 研究假說之建立 15
第二節 變數定義與研究模型 18
第三節 資料來源與描述 29
第四章 實證結果與分析 32
第一節 敘述統計 32
第二節 多元迴歸模型的實證結果分析 36
第五章 結論與建議 43
第一節 結論 43
第二節 後續建議 44
參考文獻 45
附錄 實證結果(表格包含產業及年度控制變數) 50

表目錄
表1 多角化策略定義 9
表2 多角化策略分類準則 21
表3 產業分佈表 30
表4 多角化策略分佈表 31
表5 多角化策略之家族企業分佈表 31
表6 基本統計量分析 34
表7 家族企業之多角化策略績效分析 35
表8 家族企業之績效分析 37
表9 家族企業之多角化策略績效分析 38
表10 家族企業之股權結構績效分析 40
表11 家族企業之董事會運作績效分析 42
表A1 家族企業之績效分析 50
表A2 家族企業之多角化策略績效分析 51
表A3 家族企業之股權結構績效分析 53
表A4 家族企業之董事會運作績效分析 54
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