臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以1996年至2005年間我國上市(櫃)公司為樣本研究對象，探討初次公開發行公司於IPO前的裁決性應計數、盈餘預測與原股東股權保留率等訊號傳遞公司價值之效果，觀察IPO公司管理當局能否透過會計資訊的揭露降低IPO市場中的資訊不對稱程度，進而探討各項資訊傳遞工具間之關係為何?
Leland & Pyle(1977)認為初次公開發行(Initial Public Offering, IPO)公司的原股東可透過股權的保留率傳遞公司品質的資訊給投資者，而Gul et al.(2003)主張積極性盈餘管理的目的除投機姓盈餘管理(opportunistic earnings management)外，亦可能為傳遞公司前景佳之私有訊息(informative earnings management)，此外Li & McConomy(2004)之研究亦發現IPO公司可透過盈餘預測作為訊號傳遞工具。首先，本研究以IPO公司上市(櫃)後14日公司總價值為應變數並進一步控制保守性盈餘管理，將裁決性應計數依正負數區分為兩群組做為積極性盈餘管理與保守性盈餘管理之替代變數，觀察前述各訊號工具傳遞效果。其次，關於IPO公司資訊傳遞的工具之間關係為何?文獻並無一致的結論，Hughes(1986)、Fan(2007)皆發現某一訊號管道使用增加將導致另一種訊號傳遞管道使用下降，Ho, Liu and Ramanan (1997)研究亦發現在非IPO的市場中股票買回與會計資訊兩者間的替代關係。因裁決性應計數與盈餘預測之公布皆為會計報導行為的一部份，本研究預期兩者將呈現互補關係。
實證結果顯示：
裁決性應計數絕對值、盈餘預測以及原股東股權保留率等三項訊號於短期股票市場中可正向傳遞公司價值。當管理當局同時使用裁決性應計數及盈餘預測作為資訊傳遞工具時，增加使用裁決性應計數作為資訊傳遞工具時亦會提高財務預測之數字，反之，當管理當局提出較高的盈餘預測亦會增加裁決性應計數資訊管道的使用，即所謂互補關係。

Inspired by the studies of Leland & Pyle (1977) and Li & McConomy (2004), this study examines whether IPO firms use discretionary accruals, earnings forecast, and ownership retention to signal their stock value and how the two signals, i.e. discretionary accruals and earnings forecast, interact in initial public offerings.
Following Gul et al. (2003), I adopt the positive discretionary accruals to proxy informative earnings management and negative discretionary accruals proxy conservative earnings management, then, examine the valuation implication of discretionary accruals and earnings forecast. Furthermore, Hughes (1986) and Fan (2007) suggest that signals act as substitutes in a multiple-signaling environment. In contrast with non-IPO empirical results, Ho et al. (1997) suggest that multiple signals may act as complement. Thus, the present study test how above multiple signals interact. Because of discretionary accruals and earnings forecast are both components of accounting reporting, therefore, I expect that these two signals will act as complement relationship.
The empirical results evidence that discretionary accruals, earnings forecast, and ownership retention are all credible (value-relevant) signals for initial public offerings firms’ signal their values. It is also found that there is a complement effect association between discretionary accruals and earnings forecast. The hypotheses gain confirmatory supports in the present study.

目錄
中文摘要 I
英文摘要 III
誌謝 IV
目錄 V
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究架構 4
第二章 文獻探討 5
第一節 盈餘管理動機之相關文獻 5
第二節 價值訊號傳遞之相關文獻 7
第三章 研究設計 9
第一節 研究假說 9
第二節 資料來源與樣本選取 11
第三節 變數的定義與模型建立 13
第四章 實證結果 19
第一節 樣本敘述統計量 19
第二節 價值攸關模型實證分析 32
第三節 兩階段最小平方法實證分析 36
第五章 敏感性測試 43
第一節 價值攸關模型改以七日及三十日公司總價值測試 43
第二節 兩階段最小平方法加入年度控制變數 49
第三節 裁決性應計數與原股東股權保留率關係之檢測 54
第四節 盈餘預測與原股東股權保留率關係之檢測 60
第六章 結論與建議 63
第一節 研究結論 63
第二節 研究限制 64
第三節 研究建議 65
參考文獻 66

表目錄
表 一 樣本年度篩選情形 12
表 二 樣本產業分布情況 12
表 三 敘述性統計量 20
表 四 價值攸關性假說變數之相關係數矩陣 24
表 五 檢測傳遞訊號關係變數之相關係數矩陣 27
表 六 價值攸關模型之實證結果 34
表 七 DA及FORECAST兩階段最小平方法實證結果 39
表 八 七日價值攸關模型之實證結果 45
表 九 三十日價值攸關模型之實證結果 47
表 十 DA及FORECAST兩階段最小平方法加入年度控制變數實證結果 50
表 十一 DA及RETAIN兩階段最小平方法實證結果 56
表 十二 FORECAST及RETAIN兩階段最小平方法實證結果 61

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