為提升企業資訊揭露的透明度，以落實公司治理，2003年4月由我國台灣證券交易所(證交所)及財團法人證券櫃檯買賣中心乃委請證券暨期貨市場發展基金會(證基會)在考量我國國情及與國際接軌的原則下，規劃並執行「資訊揭露評鑑系統」，藉由獨立、公正、專業的第三者系統對全體上市櫃公司之資訊揭露透明度作一客觀系統化評量。以外部機制來促使企業在法規要求以外，自願性的加強其對企業資訊的揭露、強化企業透明度、降低存在於企業內部人與外部人之間的資訊不對稱性，以強化投資人對資本市場的信心。此外，為使評鑑工作系統化，證基會並藉由評鑑資訊系統之輔助，以增進資訊揭露評鑑之客觀合理。
本研究以第三屆評鑑結果做為對象，探討公司治理績效對資訊揭露評鑑結果的影響。採用logist迴歸與簡單迴歸分析來探討上市櫃公司其揭露之治理機制資訊對公司資訊揭露程度之影響。檢定資訊揭露評鑑結果是否具有資訊內涵。
研究結果發現：1.董事會特性部份會影響公司經營績效。2.資訊揭露與公司經營績效未具顯著關係。3.董事會特性與資訊揭露部份具顯著影響關係。

In order to promote transparency for corporate information disclosure as to realize corporate governance, the Securities and Futures Institutes entrusted by Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and Gre Tai Securities Market has launched the “information transparency and disclosure ranking system” on April of year 2003. This ranking system was developed according to local needs and International standards. It is also act as a systematic assessment, which is constructed under the principles of independent, justice and professional, for evaluating all listed companies with respect to information disclosure. By using an external self-regulatory mechanism like this system, corporations are encouraged to voluntarily improve the information disclosure, increase the degree of corporate transparency and lessen the degree of unbalance information between internal and external parties so as to strengthen investors’ confidence on the local capital market. Aside from these, Securities and Futures Institute is currently applying this system as main criteria for making the information disclosure assessment more systemic and reasonable.
This study applies the third batch assessment results as the target to explore the relationship between the corporate governance and performance and the information disclosure assessment results. By using the logist regression and the simple regression methods, this study discovers that all listed companies information disclosure of governance processed affects the level of corporate information disclosure. This study also aims to verify if information disclosure assessments possess information content.
The study concludes that 1) characteristics of board of director have some influences on corporate performance management; 2) information disclosure and corporate performance management have no significant relation; and 3) characteristics of board of director and information disclosure have some correlation.

目 錄
第一章 緒論…………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機………………………………………………2
第二節 研究目的………………………………………………………4
第三節 研究架構與流程………………………………………………6
第二章 文獻探討與假說發展………………………………………………8
第一節 公司治理與股權結構…………………………………………8
第二節 公司治理與資訊揭露 ………………………………………13
第三節 假說發展 ……………………………………………………18
第三章 研究方法 …………………………………………………………24
第一節 資料來源與研究期間 ………………………………………24
第二節 變數定義 ……………………………………………………25
第三節 模型設定 ……………………………………………………26
第四章 實證結果與分析 …………………………………………………29
第一節 各變數之敘述統計分析 ……………………………………29
第二節 Pearson 相關係數分析 ……………………………………30
第三節 依評鑑劃分之VIF值 ………………………………………37
第四節 依評鑑程度使用輸入法之邏輯迴歸係數估計值 …………37
第五章 結論與建議 ………………………………………………………45
第一節 研究結論 ……………………………………………………45
第二節 研究限制 ……………………………………………………46
參考文獻………………………………………………………………48

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