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研究生:林哲弘
研究生(外文):Che-Hung Lin
論文名稱:資訊透明度、組織人事穩定度對經濟附加價值(EVA®)之關係-兼論台灣家族企業之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Relation of Transparency、Stability of Organization and personnel on the Economic value Added (EVA®) - The Influence of Family Firms in Taiwan Listed Company
指導教授:李馨蘋李馨蘋引用關係
指導教授(外文):Shin-Ping Lee
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:銘傳大學
系所名稱:會計學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:82
中文關鍵詞:資訊透明度經濟附加價值(EVA®)組織人事穩定度
外文關鍵詞:Transparencystability of organization and personnelEconomicValue Added (EVA®)
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本研究首先探討目前台灣家族與非家族企業股權結構及控制權偏離度、資訊透明度、組織人事穩定度及公平對待股東程度等公司治理四大構面上之差異性。再進一步深入瞭解資訊透明度、組織人事穩定度對經濟附加價值(EVA®)之影響,並將樣本區分為家族企業與非家族企業,分析此二群組的影響為何?以2005年及2006年台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象進行實證研究。本研究採獨立樣本T檢定、無母數Mann-Whitney U檢定及多元迴歸進行分析,實證結果顯示如下:
1.家族企業與非家族企業特性不同,導致不同的經營績效,而實證結果亦顯示,非家族企業的經濟附加價值(EVA®)較家族企業佳。
2.家族企業中發現資訊透明度、企業規模、負債比率與董監持股率對經營績效(EVA®)呈顯著正相關,表示資訊透明度愈高、企業規模愈大、負債比率愈高及董監持股率愈大,則家族企業之經營績效(EVA®)愈好;而董事長異動次數、總經理異動次數、財務主管異動次數及內部稽核異動次數越頻繁,則家族經營績效(EVA®)愈差。
3.非家族企業中發現企業規模與董監持股率對經營績效(EVA®)呈顯著正相關,表示企業規模愈大及董監持股率愈多,則非家族企業之經營績效(EVA®)愈好;董事長異動次數、總經理異動次數、財務主管及內部稽核異動次數異動次數越頻繁,則非家族經營績效(EVA®)愈差;另外,企業年齡愈短及負債比率愈小,則會使非家族經營績效(EVA®)愈好。
This study first examines the ownership structure、deviation of control power、transparency、stability of organization and personnel and equitable treatment of shareholders. We understood whether EVA® influences the transparency and stability of organization and personnel. It focuses on differences between family firms and non-family firms. Data is collected from various industries listed in the Taiwan stock exchange during 2005 to 2006. This research adopts Independent-sample T test、Mann-Whitney U test and multiple regression analysis. Empirical results are summarized as follows:
1.The different characterizations from family firms and non-family firms cause different performance. The result shows non-family firms have better performance than family firms.
2.In family firms, transparency、firm size、debt proportion and share ownership of directors are positively associated with performance. It implies the transparency、firm size、debt proportion and share ownership of directors are higher that the performance of family firms are better. And the turnover number of president、general manager、financial manager and internal auditing are more frequently, thus the performance of family firms are more badly.
3.In non-family firms, firm size and share ownership of directors are positively associated with performance. It implied the size and share ownership of directors are higher that the performance of non-family firms are better. And the turnover number of president、general manager、financial manager and internal auditing are more frequently, thus the performance of non-family firms are more badly. On the other hand, firm age and debt proportion are more slowly that the performance of non-family firms are more better.
目錄……………………………………………………………………………….І
圖目錄………………………………………………………………………….. ІІІ
表目錄…………………………………………………………………………....Ⅳ
第一章 緒 論…………………………………………………………………...1
第一節 研就動機與背景…………………………………………………...1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………………....3
第三節 研究範圍、資料來源及統計方法………………………………...3
第四節 研究貢獻…………………………………………………………...3
第五節 研究架構與流程…………………………………………………...5
第二章 文獻探討………………………………………………………………..7
第一節 家族企業之定義…………………………………………………..7
一、家族企業之特性…………………………………………………....10
二、家族企業之相關文獻……………………………………………....12
第二節 資訊揭露與透明度………………………………………………..16
一、資訊透明度之定義………………………………………………....16
二、資訊透明度之重要性……………………………………………..........17
三、資訊透明度之相關文獻…………………………………………..18
第三節 經營績效衡量指標………………………………………………..21
一、經濟附加價值之定義……………………………………………..21
二、經濟附加價值之重要性…………………………………………..26
三、經濟附加價值之相關文獻………………………………………..26
第三章 研究方法………………………………………………………………..28
第一節 理論架構與研究假說……………………………………………....28
第二節 變數定義與衡量…………………………………………………...32
一、家族定義之衡量…………………………………………………....32
二、自變數之衡量……………………………………………………....33
三、控制變數之衡量…………………………………………………....34

四、其他變數之衡量…………………………………………………..35
五、因變數之衡量……………………………………………………....38
六、實證之模型………………………………………………………....38
第三節、樣本資料與研究方法……………………………………………...39
第四章 實證結果與分析………………………………………………………..42
第一節 敘述性統計……………………………………………….........42
一、樣本基本資料……………………………………………………....42
二、相關性分析………………………………………………………..46
第二節 假說迴歸模式分析……………………………………….........49
第三節 交叉項模式分析………………………………………….........56
第四節 敏感性分析………………………………………………………....59
第五章 結論與建議……………………………………………………………..63
第一節 研究結論…………………………………………………..........63
第二節 研究限制…………………………………………………………....64
第三節 研究建議…………………………………………………………....64
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………..66
附錄一 經濟附加價值(EVA®)計算之細項說明...………………............74
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