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研究生:游子瑩
論文名稱:經營權異動與異動後績效之探討
論文名稱(外文):The study of executive turnover and the following performance changes
指導教授:林宛瑩林宛瑩引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:會計研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:64
中文關鍵詞:經營權異動公司治理董監事持股控制權與所有權偏離
外文關鍵詞:corporate control changecorporate governanceshareholdings by board membersdeviation of control right from cash flow right
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本研究針對我國1996年至2006年之上市櫃公司,以最終控制集團發生異動之公司作為經營權異動樣本,探討經營權異動之決定性因素,與異動後經營績效表現與公司治理機制間之關聯。
實證結果顯示,董監事持股比率愈低、最終控制者無超額持股、經營控制權與所有權偏離愈大、董監事持股質押比率愈高之公司,其經營權發生異動之可能性愈高。獨立董監事之設置雖與經營權異動之可能性呈正向相關,惟其關聯性未達顯著水準。經營權異動之公司,其財務績效在異動前後並無顯著差異,表示經營權異動之目的可能不在取代無效率之管理當局,也可能表示併購的綜效需要較長的時間才得以顯現。其中,董監事持股比率較高之公司,其經營績效在經營權異動後表現較佳。本研究顯示董監最低持股可發揮利益連結的效果,對於近期金管會擬取消董監最低持股規範之提案,本研究認為有作更深入討論之需要。
Using companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and GreTai Securities Market over the period of 1996 to 2006, this study empirically investigates the determinants of change in corporate control and the subsequent period performance after the change. The change in corporate control is measured in terms of change in business group of a specific firm.
The empirical results show that companies with less shareholdings owned by their board members, inadequate shareholdings to support their control, larger deviation in cash flow right from voting right, and higher ratio of shareholding pledged by their board members, have higher probabilities of occurrence of change in corporate control. However, the result doesn’t support that independent directors play a role in corporate control change. With respect to the firm performance in the period subsequent to the corporate control change, there exists no significant difference as compared to that of prior period. The evidence thus suggests that the replacing unqualified management may not be the primary purpose of corporate control change, or simply that the synergies take more time to show. In addition, this study also finds that firms subject to corporate control change tend to perform better if their board members hold a larger fraction of shares. This result lends itself to the proposal recently discussed by the Financial Supervisory Commission, Executive Yuan Taiwan on abolition of requirement of minimal shareholding by the board members. It appears that shareholdings by the board members can have interest-alignment effect.
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究問題 5
第三節 論文章節架構 7
第二章 文獻探討 8
第一節 公司治理對經營權異動的影響 8
第二節 經營績效與公司治理機制對經營權異動之影響 10
第三節 經營權異動後之財務績效 17
第三章 研究方法 23
第一節 研究假說 23
第二節 實證模型與變數衡量 28
第三節 樣本與資料來源 41
第四章 實證結果與分析 42
第一節 敘述性統計分析 42
第二節 相關係數分析 42
第三節 迴歸分析 42
第五章 結論與建議 42
第一節 結論 42
第二節 研究限制 42
第三節 研究建議 42
參考文獻 42
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