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研究生:陳淑女
研究生(外文):Shu-Nu Chen
論文名稱:理財人員薪資制度之研究
論文名稱(外文):A Study on the Compensation Systems of Financial Planners
指導教授:邱奕嘉邱奕嘉引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中興大學
系所名稱:高階經理人碩士在職專班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:65
中文關鍵詞:代理問題薪資制度理財規劃人員
外文關鍵詞:agency problemcompensationfinancial planner
相關次數:
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「代理關係」是發生在一方(主理人)必需仰賴另一方(代理人)為其工作,而這項工作是為了主理人的利益。然而,在資訊不對稱的情形下,主理人要了解代理人到底在做什麼是困難且耗費成本的,以致發生代理人在工作上怠惰,造成工作成本上升、效率低落。故「代理理論」經常被用來分析如何設計公司中高階經理人(代理人)的薪資制度,才能使經理人盡全力為公司的股東(主理者)效力,讓公司中的資源能夠有效的運用。
在「理財規劃產業」中,也存在著這樣的代理關係:顧客 (主理人)聽從理財規劃人員(代理人) 的意見,將他們的資產配置在各式各樣的金融商品中。然而,台灣理財規劃人員薪資制度的設計,卻造成了嚴重的「代理問題」:由於現今台灣理財規劃人員的薪資主要來自於客戶交易的手續費,因此理財規劃人員在建議客戶重新配置資產時,往往不是著重在平衡客戶的風險與報酬,而是著眼在本身的手續費收入。
本論文將從「代理理論」的觀點出發,分析理財規劃人員薪資制度和他們的顧客投資報酬之間的關係。本文利用質性研究方法,藉由訪談理財規劃產業的從業人員,以探索不同薪資制度對顧客權益的影響,並藉此提出較佳的建議方案。
Agency theory is based on the premise that principals delegate duties to the agents, who are expected to act in the best interest of the principals. Because of information asymmetry, it is difficult and expensive for principals to monitor if the agents’ behaviors against principals’ interest find out what the agents do whereas the self-interest managers would sacrifice the overall interest in search of their benefits. This may incur the agency problem. Therefore, agency theory predicts that corporate government mechanism will tie the agent interest to the principal''s objective and make managers exert on profit maximization.
In the financial planning industry, it also exist the agency relationship. Inventors will deploy their assets on every financial goods to maximum their profit according to their financial planners'' suggestion. But the financial planners often focus on the transaction fees to raise their own commission; do not pay attention on the inventors'' risk and rewards. Such the design of financial planners'' compensation system in Taiwan have caused serious agency problem.
According to agency theory, this study analyses the relation of financial planners'' compensation system and their customers'' profit. In order to understand the banks''
compensation system, we interview some professionals and financial planners to explore the impact on customer''s rights and interests of system of different compensations. This study also introduces foreign banks'' methods to improve
current agency problem.
目錄

中文摘要.................................................ii
Abstract ...............................................iii
目錄.....................................................iv
表目錄 ..................................................vi
圖目錄..................................................vii

第一章 緒論...............................................1
第一節 研究背景與問題 ..................................1
第二節 研究問題與目的 ..................................3
第三節 研究流程 ........................................5
第二章 文獻探討...........................................7
第一節 財富管理 ........................................7
第二節 代理理論 .......................................15
第三節 交易成本理論 ...................................20
第四節 薪酬制度 .......................................25
第三章 產業介紹..........................................32
第一節 台灣財富管理產業發展沿革 .......................32
第二節 理財規劃產值及產業型態..........................36
第三節 理財規劃產業特性 ...............................39
第四章 研究方法..........................................40
第一節 研究方法選擇 ...................................40
第二節 個案及訪談對象選擇 .............................42
第三節 研究工具及訪談內容設計 .........................45
第五章 個案訪談與分析....................................46
第一節 四家銀行的薪資制度 .............................46
第二節 薪資制度對代理問題的影響 .......................51
第三節 搜尋成本對代理問題的影響 .......................54
第六章 結論與建議........................................55
第一節 結論 ...........................................55
第二節 研究建議 .......................................59

附錄.....................................................61
參考文獻.................................................62
中文部分 ................................................62
英文部分 ................................................62

表目錄
表2-1-1 財富管理之定義 ...................................8
表2-1-2 財富管理/貴賓理財 ...............................10
表2-1-3 理財專員十大令消費者詬病之處 ....................14
表2-2-1 代理理論的內涵 ..................................17
表2-3-1 交易成本 ........................................22
表2-4-1 薪酬定義 ........................................26
表2-4-2 國內共同基金手續費計算方式(可彈性折扣到5折以下)..27
表2-4-3 後收型海外基金手續費計算方式 ....................27
表3-1-1 金融總機構家數 ..................................35
表3-1-2 金融分機構家數 ..................................35
表3-2-1 金融服務業名目GDP 佔GDP 比重 ....................37
表3-2-2 台灣管理財富業務商機 ............................38
表5-1-1 B銀行月獎金百分比 ..............................47
表5-1-2 四家銀行業績與獎酬門檻 ..........................48
表5-2-1 AUM 的使用效益 ..................................53

圖目錄
圖 1-3-1 研究流程 ........................................6
圖 2-2-1 財富管理業務 ....................................9
圖2-1-2 財富管理六階段 ..................................12
圖3-2-1 台灣財富管理產業之演進 ..........................34
圖3-2-2 台灣家戶儲蓄結構 ................................37
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財富管理, 客戶導向解決方案, IBM 金融事業客戶群, 2003 年,
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