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研究生:邱逸欣
研究生(外文):I-hsin Chiu
論文名稱:CEO現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬不對稱關聯性之研究-論董事會有效性之影響
論文名稱(外文):Asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to positive and negative stock returns-the moderate effect of Board Effectiveness
指導教授:楊朝旭楊朝旭引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chaur-Shiuh Young
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立成功大學
系所名稱:會計學系碩博士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:79
中文關鍵詞:董事會CEO現金薪酬事後解決問題成本薪酬-績效敏感性
外文關鍵詞:Board of directorsPay-performance sensitivityEx post setting upCEO compensation
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:283
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:6
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
本研究旨在探討CEO現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬的不對稱敏感關聯性,以及董事會有效性對於此種關聯性之影響。理論上,在考量事後解決問題之成本後,有效率的CEO現金薪酬契約與未實現損失的敏感關聯性應該大於與未實現利得的敏感關聯性。由於未實現損益不易觀察,而股票報酬反映未實現利得和損失,因此我們藉由探討CEO現金薪酬與股票報酬之關聯性來評估CEO現金薪酬契約的效率性。本研究預期:CEO現金薪酬與負股票報酬(包含較多未實現損失,壞消息)之敏感關聯性應該大於與正股票報酬(包含較多未實現利得,好消息)之敏感關聯性。此外,有效性較高之董事會應該會有較佳之CEO現金薪酬設計。因而董事會有效性較高之公司,相對於董事會有效性較低之公司,CEO現金薪酬與正股票報酬之敏感關聯性會較小,而CEO現金薪酬與負股票報酬之敏感關聯性會較大。
以美國ExecuComp 2000年至2005年的CEO現金薪酬為研究樣本進行實證分析,結果發現CEO現金薪酬與負股票報酬的敏感關聯性約為正股票報酬的三倍,亦即CEO現金薪酬與正、負股票報酬間存在顯著的不對稱關聯性。另外,本研究亦發現董事會有效性較高之公司,CEO現金薪酬與負股票報酬的敏感關聯性顯著大於董事會有效性較低之公司。然而,CEO現金薪酬與正股票報酬的敏感關聯性,在不同董事會有效性下,並沒有明顯差異。
This paper examines the asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to positive and negative stock returns. Moreover, this study also examine whether board effectiveness affects the aforementioned asymmetric sensitivity. In theory, efficient cash compensation contracts should be conservative, in the sense that cash compensation should be more sensitive to unrealized losses than to unrealized gains. Since returns include both unrealized gains and unrealized losses, we expect cash compensation to be less sensitive to stock returns when returns contain unrealized gains (good news) than when returns contain unrealized losses (bad news). Moreover, CEO cash compensation is expected to be more efficient when the board is more effective. That is, the sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to positive (negative) stock return will decrease (increase) when the board is more effective.
Using data from ExecuComp from 2000 to 2005, I find that cash compensation is roughly triple as sensitive to negative stock returns as to positive stock returns, suggesting that cash compensation reacts asymmetrically to positive and negative stock returns. The evidence also indicates that the sensitivity of cash compensation to negative stock returns is larger for high effective board. However, I find no evidence that the sensitivity of cash compensation to positive stock returns is different between high effective and low effective boards.
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 論文架構 3
第貳章 文獻探討與假說發展 5
第一節 CEO薪酬設計相關文獻之彙整 5
第二節 董事會相關文獻探討 21
第三節 預期研究延伸 24
第參章 研究方法 27
第一節 實證模式 27
第二節 變數定義與衡量方式 29
第三節 樣本選取與資料來源 38
第肆章 實證結果與分析 40
第一節 敘述性統計分析 40
第二節 相關性分析 45
第三節 多元迴歸分析 47
第四節 敏感性測試 51
第五節 額外測試 66
第伍章 結論與建議 71
第一節 研究結論 71
第二節 研究貢獻 72
第三節 研究建議與限制 72
參考文獻 74
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