跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(44.200.194.255) 您好!臺灣時間:2024/07/18 13:17
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:鍾君嬋
論文名稱:盈餘管理、公司治理與企業績效之關連性研究-以台灣上市電子資訊廠商為例
論文名稱(外文):Earnings Management Corporate Governance, and Performance:Empirical Evidences from Taiwan's Listed Technology Firms
指導教授:洪志洋洪志洋引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立交通大學
系所名稱:科技管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:其他商業及管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2008
畢業學年度:96
語文別:中文
論文頁數:69
中文關鍵詞:盈餘管理公司治理
外文關鍵詞:Earnings ManagementCorporate Governance
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
  • 點閱點閱:441
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2
現代企業為了獲得規模經濟的優勢和發展科技,大多發展成大型組織並透過上市募集資金,但經營權和所有權分離的經營模式導致有財務報導不實與重大的財務弊案發生,造成投資人對財務報表的可靠性產生質疑,並危及金融體質。因而使公司治理議題獲得各方的重視。由過去文獻可知大多研究議題都是探討公司治理和企業績效的關係,或是各種盈餘管理的動機,但對解析公司治理、盈餘管理和企業績效之間的關連性,卻較少著墨。
因此本研究以1995~2006年間台灣電子資訊產業為研究對象,所採用的數據資料皆取自台灣經濟新報資料庫,以採取Panel Data複迴歸模式的作法。透過公司治理結構下的股權結構、董監事會結構和債信評等、盈餘管理行為和四種不同的企業績效間的關係,發展為五個命題:1.公司治理結構是否影響企業績效 2.公司治理結構是否影響盈餘管理行為 3.盈餘管理行為是否影響企業績效 4.企業績效是否影響公司治理結構 5.企業績效是否影響盈餘管理行為,並且藉此探討上述三者間的相互影響效果。
結果顯示,公司治理品質資訊的確可以為公司評價的重要資訊,也就是說,個別公司可藉由改善公司治理實務品質,增進公司績效。此是驅使公司願意採行較高水準治理機制的關鍵,也是政策上推動公司治理改革的重要依據。而公司績效的提升,可以減少盈餘管理的動機,並降低弊案的發生。
The present day of firms in order to obtain the advantages of scale economy and develop technology, most of them develop to large-scale to raise fund by entering the market but control and ownership separate cause untrue financial reports and serious financial frauds. Investors don’t believe financial reports anymore. These serious financial frauds endanger financial constitution. Although numerous literatures have shed light on managers’ incentives on earnings management and the effects of corporate governance on firm performance, little attention has been devoted to disentangle the relation among corporate governance, earnings management and firm performance.
The numerical data in the Taiwan Technology industry from 1995 to 2006 which are listed on TSE was all collected from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) and use Panel Data regression model to analyze data. By the association between ownership structure and board of directors structure under corporate governance structure, earnings management behavior and four different firm performances developed five theses:1. If corporate governance structure affect firm performances? 2. If corporate governance structure affect earnings management behavior? 3. If earnings management behavior affect firm performances? 4. If firm performances affect corporate governance structure? 5. If firm performances affect earnings management behavior?
The results reveal the quality of corporate governance indeed important information to value firm. Each Firm by improving quality of corporate governance to increase firm performances. Increasing of firm performances can decrease the motivations of earnings management behavior and financial frauds.
目 錄
摘 要 i
Abstract ii
致謝 iii
目 錄 iv
表目錄 vi
圖目錄 vii
第一章 緒論 - 1 -
1.1 研究背景與動機 - 1 -
1.2 研究目的 - 3 -
第二章 文獻探討 - 4 -
2.1 盈餘管理 - 4 -
2.1.1 盈餘管理動機 - 4 -
2.1.2 盈餘管理方法 - 8 -
2.2 盈餘管理與公司治理 - 8 -
2.2.1 股權結構 - 10 -
2.2.2董事會結構 - 10 -
2.3公司治理與公司價值 - 11 -
第三章 研究方法 - 13 -
3.1 研究架構 - 13 -
3.2 研究假說 - 14 -
3.2.1 命題一:公司治理結構是否影響企業績效 - 14 -
3.2.2 命題二:公司治理結構是否影響盈餘管理行為 - 18 -
3.2.3 命題三:盈餘管理行為是否影響企業績效 - 20 -
3.2.4 命題四:企業績效是否影響公司治理結構 - 21 -
3.2.5 命題五:企業績效是否影響盈餘管理行為 - 21 -
3.3 研究變數定義 - 22 -
3.3.1 企業績效指標 - 22 -
3.3.2 公司治理指標 - 23 -
3.3.3 盈餘管理指標 - 25 -
3.3.4 控制變數 - 27 -
3.4 研究樣本與期間 - 31 -
3.5 統計分析方法 - 31 -
3.5.1 敘述統計分析 - 31 -
3.5.2 相關分析 - 31 -
3.5.3 最小平方法(OLS)迴歸分析 - 32 -
3.5.4 一因子變異數分析 - 32 -
第四章 實證結果與分析 - 33 -
4.1 敘述性統計分析 - 33 -
4.2 相關分析 - 35 -
4.3 迴歸分析 - 38 -
4.3.1 公司治理結構是否影響企業績效實證分析 - 38 -
4.3.2 公司治理結構是否影響盈餘管理行為實證分析 - 50 -
4.3.3 盈餘管理行為是否影響企業績效實證分析 - 54 -
4.4 變異數分析 - 56 -
4.3.1 企業績效是否影響公司治理結構和盈餘管理行為實證分析 - 56 -
第五章 結論與建議 - 58 -
5.1 研究結論 - 58 -
5.2研究限制與建議 - 60 -
參考文獻 - 62 -
附錄一 - 68 -
參考文獻
一、英文部份
[1] Ball, R., and P.Brown , “An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers”, Journal of Accounting Research,Vol.6, Autumn., pp159-178,1968.
[2] Schipper, K.,” Commentary on Earnings Management”, Accounting Horizon,3, pp.91-102, 1989.
[3] Friedlan, “J. M., Accounting Choices by Issuers of Initial Public Offerings”, Contemporary Accounting Research, 1, pp.78-84, 1994.
[4] Bannister, J. W. and H. A. Newman.,”Management forecasts as targets for earnings management”, Working paper, University of Illinois at Chicago,1992.
[5] DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo and D. Skinner, “Accounting Choices In Troubled Companies”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, pp.113-143 ,1994.
[6] Teoh, S.E., G.R. Rao and T.J. Wong, “Incentives and Opportunities for Earnings Management in Initial Public Offerings”, American Accounting Association Annual Meeting, Aug. 1994.
[7] Erickson, M., and S., Wang., “Earnings management by acquiring firms in stock for stock mergers.” Journal of Accounting and Economics ,27, pp.149-176, 1999.
[8] Watts, R. L. and Zimmerman, J. L., Positive Accounting Theory Prentice Hall,New York,1986.
[9] DeFond, Mark L. and Jiambalvo, James” Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals” Journal of Accounting and Economics,17, pp.145-176,1994
[10] Watts, R., and J., Zimmerman,“Towards a positive theory of the determination of Accounting Standards”. Accounting Review, pp.112-134, 1978.
[11] Healy, P. M., “The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions”,Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8, pp.85-107, 1985.
[12] Holthausen, R. W., D. F. Larker, and R. G. Sloan, “Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18,pp.29-74, 1995.
[13] Guidary, F., A. J. Leone, and S. Rock,“Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by business-unit managers”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 26,pp. 113-142, January 1999.
[14] Watts, R., and J., Zimmerman ,“Towards a positive theory of the determination of Accounting Standards”, Accounting Review, pp.112-134, 1978.
[15] Collins J., D. Shackelford, and J. Wahlen, “Bank Differences in theCoordination of Regulatory Capital, Earnings and taxes”, Journal of Accounting Research,1995.
[16] Jones, J., “Earnings management during import relief investigations”, Journal of Accounting Research ,29, 193-228, 1991.
[17] Berle, A. and G. C. Means, “The Modern Corporation and Private Property,” New York, MacMillan , 1932.
[18] Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency cost and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp.305-360, 1976.
[19] Williamson, O. E., “Organization form Residual Claimants and Corporate Control,” Journal of Law and Economics,26, pp.351-366, 1983.
[20] Guesneric, R., P. Piard and P. Rey, “Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Risk Neutral Agents, European Economic Review, 33, pp.807-823, 1988.
[21] Fan, J., and T. Wong,” Corporate ownership structures and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia”. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong,1999.
[22] Wright, D. ,”Evidence on the relation between corporate governance characteristics and the quality of financial reporting”. Working Paper,University of Michigan, 1996.
[23] Loebbecke J. K., Eining M.M., and J.J. Willingham,” Auditor’s Experience with Material irregularities:Frequency , Nature , and Detectability”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 9,pp.1-28,1989.
[24] Beasley , M. S.,” An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud” , The Accounting Review ,71,pp.443-465, 1996.
[25] Beasley M. S., J. V. Carcello., D. R. Hermanson, and P.D. Lapides ,”Fraudulent Financial Reporting : Consideration of industry traits and corporate governance mechanisms”, Accounting Horizons ,14,pp,441-454,2000.
[26] Sharma V.D.. Board of Director Characteristics ,”Institutional Ownership , and Fraud :Evidence from Australia” , Auditing : A Journal of Practice &Theory ,23,2004.
[27] Agrawal, A., and G. N. Mandelker,” Managerial incentives and corporate investment and financing decisions”, Journal of Finance , 42 , pp. 823 – 837,September 1987.
[28] Byrd, J., R. Parrino and G. Pritsch,”Stockholder-manager conflicts and firmvalue” Financial Analysts Journal, 54 ,pp.14-30,May-June 1998.
[29] Blair, Margaret M., “Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century”, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,1995.
[30] Rajgopal, S., and M. Venkatachalam., “The role of institutional investors in corporate governance: An empirical investigation.”, Working paper, University of Washington.,1998.

[31] Rajgopal, S., M. Venkatachalam, and J. Jiambalvo,” Is institutional ownership associated with earnings management and the extent to which stock prices reflect future earnings.” Working Paper, University of Washington at Seattle,1999.
[32] Matsumoto, D. A.,” Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises”, The Accounting Review ,77, pp.483-514. 2002
[33] Fama, Eugene F. and Michael C. Jensen,“The Separation of Ownership and Control”, Journal of Law and Economics, 26, pp.301-325,1983.
[34] Beasley, M. S.,” An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud” Accounting Review,71,pp.443-465,1996.
[35] Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney.,” Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC” Contemporary Accounting Research ,13, pp.1-36, 1996.
[36] Peasnell, K. V., P. F. Pope, and S. Young., “Board monitoring and earnings management: Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals?” Working paper, Lancaster University, 2001.
[37] Klein, A.. Audit Committee, “board of director characteristics, and earnings management” Journal of Accounting and Economics ,33, pp.375-400, 2002.
[38] Reitenga, A. L., and M. G. Tearney.,” Mandatory CEO retirements, discretionary accruals”and corporate governance mechanisms. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance ,18, pp.255-280, 2003.
[39] Xie, B., W. N. Davidson, and P. J. DaDalt.,” Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee” Journal of Corporate Finance,9, pp.295-316,2003.
[40] Jensen, M. C. and R. S. Ruback,”The Market for Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence” Journal of Financial Economics,11,pp.5-50,1983
[41] Fama, E. F. ,“Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88,pp.288-307, 1980.
[42] Brickley, J.A., Lease. R.C., and Smith. C. W., “Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.267-291,1988.
[43] Agrawal, A., “Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments”, Journals of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,25,pp.143-161,1990.
[44] Cadbruy Committee., ”The Cadbury Committee Report: Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance” UK, burgess Science Press,1992.
[45] Baysinger, B. D., R. D. Kosnik, and T. A. Turk., “Effects of Board and Ownership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy”, Academy of Management Journal,34,pp. 205-214, 1991.
[46] Stearns, Linda B. and Mark S. Mizruchi, “Board Composition and Corporate Financing: The Impact of Financial Institution Representation on Borrowing”, Academy of Management Journal, 36, pp. 603-618, 1993.
[47] Steiner, Thomas L.. ”A reexamination of the relationships between ownership structure, firm diversification,and tobin’s Q” Journal of Business and Economics,35, pp.39-48,1996.
[48] Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang, “ The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporation”, Journal of Financial Economics ,58,pp.81-112, 2000.
[49] Xu, X., and Y. Wang, “ Ownership structure and corporate governance in Chinese stock companies”,China Economic Review ,10, pp.75-98, 1999.
[50] Black, Bernard S. et al.” Does Corporate Governance Affect Firm Value? Evidence from Korea”, Working Paper, Stanford Law School, 2002.
[51] Gilson, S. C., “Management turnover and financial distress”, Journal of Financial Economics ,pp.241-262, December 1989.
[52] Yoon, S. S., and G. A. Miller, Cash from operations and earnings management in Korea, The International Journal of Accounting ,37,pp. 395-412, 2002.
[53] Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney, “Detecting earnings management”, The Accounting Review ,70, pp.193-225, April 1996.
[54] Tobin, J., and W. Brainard.” Pitfalls in financial model building”, American Economic Review, 58, pp. 99-122,May 1968.
[55] Lindenberg, E. B., and S. A. Ross,”Tobin’s q ratio and industrial organization”, Journal of Business ,54,pp.1-32, January 1981.
[56] Chung, K. H., and S. W. Pruitt,” A simple approximation of Tobin’s q”, Financial Management ,23 ,pp.70-74, Autumn 1994.
[57] Lipton, . M., and Lorsc. J. Y., “ A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance”, Business Lawyer, 48, pp.59-77, 1992.
[58] Zahra,. S. A., Pearce. J. A., “ Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrative Model”, Journal of Management ,15, pp.291-334,1989.
[59] Brickley, J.A., Lease. R.C. and Smith. C. W. ,” Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.267-291,1988.
[60] Agrawal, A., and Charles. R. K.,” Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Mangers and Shareholders”, Journal of Quantitative Analysis, pp.377-397, 1996.
[61] Rosenstein. S., and Jeffrey. G. W., “Inside Directors, Board Effectiveness, and Shareholder Wealth”, Journal of Financial Economics ,44, pp.229-250, 1997.
[62] Beasley, M.S. , “An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud”, The Accounting Review ,71,pp. 443-465, 1996.
[63] Rajgopal, S. and M. Venkatachalam,” The role of institutional investors in corporate governance: An empirical investigation”, Working paper, University of Washington,1998.
[64] Morck, R., Shleifer . A. V. and Robert. W.,” Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics ,20,pp. 293-315,1988.
[65] Han, J., and S-W Wang.,” Political costs and earnings management of oil companies during the 1990 Persian Gulf crisis”, The Accounting Review ,73, pp.103-117 ,1998.
[66] VonGlinow,. M. A., and Teagarden. M. B., “ The Transfer of Human Resource Management Technology in Sino-U.S. Cooperative Ventures”,1988.
[67] Skinner, D., and R. G. Sloan,” Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns: Don’t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio”, Working paper, University of Michigan,1999.
[68] Warfield, T. D., J. J. Wild, and K. L. Wild,”Managerial ownership, accounting choices,and informativeness of earnings”, Journal of Accounting and Economics ,20, pp.61-92,1995.
[69] Becker, C.L. et al,” The effect of audit quality on earnings management”, Contemporary Accounting Research, 15, pp.1-24, 1998.
[70] Peasnell, K. V., P. F. Pope, and S. Young,” Board monitoring and earnings management:Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals?” Working paper, Lancaster University, 2001.
[71] Bartov, E., F. A. Gul., and J. S. L. Tsui, “Discretionary-accruals models and audit qualifications”, Journal of Accounting and Economics ,30, pp.421-452,2001.
[72] Klein, A. Audit Committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management, Journal of Accounting and Economics ,33, pp.375-400,2002.
[73] Mehran, H.,” Executive Compensation Structure, ownership, and Firm Performance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp.293-315,1988.




二、中文部份
[1] 林嬋娟、官心怡,「經理人員盈餘預測與盈餘操縱之關聯性研究」,管理與系統,第 27-41 頁,1996。
[2] 許伯彥,「財務報表舞弊風險評量模式研究」,國立台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文,2003。
[3] 劉韻僖、葉匡時,「企業監控之研究」,經濟情勢暨評論季刊,5 期, 1-14頁,1999。
[4] 柯承恩,「我國公司監理體系之問題與改進建議(上)」,會計研究月刊,173 期,75-81頁,2000。
[5] 陳依蘋,「透明度與企業價值」,會計研究月刊,第200期,48-54頁,2002。
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top